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THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION

[American] lawyers are obliged, however, to yield to the
current of public opinion, which is too strong for them to
**
resist . . . .

,

This Article seeks to answer two questions. First, t o what
degree has public opinion influenced American constitutional
interpretation, both on and off the Supreme Court, over the
past two centuries? Second, how much weight, if any, should
constitutional decision-makers give t o public opinion, however
that protean concept is defined? The Article initially places
these queries in a contemporary context by considering the
extended discussion of public opinion in the Planned
Parenthood v. Caseyl opinions of Justice Souter: Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia. Justice Souter partially relied on
public opinion to not overrule the constitutional right t o an
abortion created in Roe v. Wade: while Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia claimed in their Casey dissents
that public opinion was constitutionally irrelevant?
** 1 ALEXISDE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA279 (Phillips Bradley
ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1972) (1835); see LOUISFISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES:
INTERPRETATION
AS POLITICALPROCESS 17 (1988) (illustrating the influence of
THE
public opinion on the Supreme Court); see also GERALDN. ROSENBERG,
H o m w HOPE: CAN COURTSBRINGABOUTSOCIALCHANGE?(1991) (arguing that
Courts cannot make "significant" changes without support from the electoral
branches); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as
a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957) (arguing that Justices follow
election returns). But see LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH
F. KOBYLKA,THE SUPREME
COW AND LEGALCHANGE:ABORTIONAND THE DEATHPENALTY (1992) (asserting
that judicial doctrine has a major effed on outcomes and that the Justices are
relatively insulated from policy and political considerations). Law and public
opinion have a symbiotic relationship: "The history of the Anglo-Saxon race shows
that, for ages past, the members of the legal profession have been powerful for
good or evil to the government. They are, by the nature of their duties, the
moulders of public sentiment on questions of government . . . ." Ex parte Garland,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 385-86 (1866) (Miller, J., dissenting) (holding that Congress
cannot condition pardon to keep attorney out of federal courts by requiring loyalty
oath).
1. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
2. The New York Times reported that Justice Souter was primarily
responsible for the joint opinion. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: A Telling
July 1, 1992, at Al.
Court Opinion, N.Y.TIMES,
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2814-15. Contra id. at 2862-63, 2884.
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The second part of the Article demonstrates that all three
Justices' arguments in Casey have a viable intellectual
tradition. This section presents a history of public opinion from
before the American Revolution to the present. It considers the
views of David Hume, James Madison, Chief Justice Marshall,
Abraham Lincoln, Chief Justice Taney, and Justice Brandeis,
along with a host of others.
Part I11 argues that public opinion ought to influence many
constitutional decisions. In other words, public opinion is a
legitimate interpretive factor, comparable to text, history,
structure, precedent, and policy. Indeed, some constitutional
disputes, such as impeachment standards and proceedings, can
only be effectively regulated by public opinion.
Public opinion can either expand or contract important
constitutional rights. The different fates of Supreme Court
nominees Robert Bork and Ruth Bader Ginsburg are public
reafl'iirmations of the Supreme Court's previous decisions
outlawing gender discrimination; Bork characterized such
non-originalist outcomes in the area of sexual equality as
"illegitimate," or "unsatisfactory"5 while Ginsburg was a
leading advocate of gender neutrality. On the other hand, the
Court's unwillingness to combat segregated suburban schools in
Milliken v. ~ r a d l e ybecomes
~
somewhat defensible because of
probable adverse public opinion, confirmed by the country's
continued unwillingness to rectify the underlying problems.
Other important cases appear different when viewed from this
perspective. Justice Powell's condemnation in Regents of the
University of California v. ~ a k k e 'of "quotas" while approving
of "diversity" in affirmative action plans may not be very
coherent or elegant, yet his opinion was arguably the "best"
decision, simply because both political sides have adopted his
rhetoric in the subsequent debate over this inherently
contentious issue.
Some constitutional rights, however, are so important that
the Court should resist public opinion. For example, the "core"

5. ROBE^ H. BORK,THE TEMPTINGOF AMERICA:
THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 131, 330 (1990); see also Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding,

Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of "This Constitution," 72 IOWAL. REV. 1177,
1272 11.397 (1987) (regretfully concluding that gender discrimination decisions are
illegitimate).
6. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
7. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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right in Brown v. Board of Education8 of all schoolchildren t o
be able to attend public schools that do not overtly, maliciously
segregate on the basis of race, should be immune from current
public influence. Such observations and arguments lead t o a
questioning, or at least t o a qualification, of the sigmficance of
"principles," neutral or otherwise, in constitutional
adjudication.
For those who are theoretically inclined, the most
important constitutional debate is not about any particular
decision but involves the permissible modes of constitutional
interpretati~n.~
The Supreme Court, leading political
thinkers,'' and major American politicians have frequently
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. The history of constitutional adjudication extends beyond the rise and fall
of certain cases and doctrines to the ebb and flow of particular forms of argument.
See PHILIP B O B B ~C, O N ~ I O N A
FATE
L (1982). Precluding particular forms of
rhetoric can constrain judicial discretion, determining the appropriate role for the
unelected judiciary within the American constitutional system. Justices can claim to
be more "neutral" and more consistent if they apply the same forms of reasoning
in different contexts.
Most importantly, the "legitimacy" of outcomes depends upon the choice of
"legitimate" arguments. Raoul Berger's unyielding originalism calls into question
the seminal school desegregation case, Brown v. Board of Education, because the
Fourteenth Amendment's Framers stated that public schools could remain
segregated. RAOULBERGER,GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY:
THE TRANSFORMATION
OF
THE FOURTEENTHAMENDMENT118-19 (1977). Bork's originalism undermines
Brown's cousin, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Bolling applied the "equal
protxtion component" of the Due Process Clause of the FiRh Amendment to
outlaw school segregation in the District of Columbia, even though the Framers
never intended such an interpretation. BORK, supra note 5, at 83, 305-06. John
Hart Ely construed "representation reinforcement" to uphold the school
desegregation cases but to question the abortion decision, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973). JOHN
HART ELY,DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST
(1980).
10. The battle over the role of public opinion recurs in many doctrinal
debates. For instance, Professor Blasi partially defended the prior restraint doctrine
because "the dissemination of speech may create public opinion pressures that can
exert a healthy influence on the formulation and application of first amendment
standards." Vincent Blasi, Towards a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central
Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11, 50-51 (1981).
As part of his critique of Blasi's multifaceted defense of the prior restraint
doctrine, Professor Redish made three interrelated arguments:
Initially, the public would not likely react to particular expression with
sufficient fervor and unanimity that the reaction would be widely
noticed . . . . [Elven if the public did express a coherent and favorable
opinion, it is doubtful that that view would influence a court's substantive
constitutional analysis. Moreover, it is arguable that it should not do so
in any event because most would agree that generally a strong negative
public reaction to challenged expression should have no influence on
judicial constitutional analysis.
Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First
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and legitimately used several conceptions of "public opinion" in
constitutional interpretation to create a complex constitutional
tradition. The Supreme Court, in particular, has ranged from
giving determinative weight to public opinion, conceptualized in
a variety of ways, to excluding public opinion completely fiom
constitutional interpretation. Furthermore, the Court has
tended to refer expressly to public opinion when the issues
were particularly contentious.
Some historical context is needed before turning to the
Casey decision. United States v. Hudson" is a classic, early
example of the Court expressly applying public opinion to
resolve a controversial issue, e.g., whether federal courts could
recognize common law crimes. The issue had embroiled the
country for some years before the Supreme Court resolved it. In
1793, a lower federal court instructed the jury to find the
defendant, Gideon Henfield, guilty for violating a presidential
proclamation: "As a citizen of the United States, he was bound
to act no part which could injure the nation . . . . This is the
law of nations; not an ex post facto law, but a law that was in
existence long before Gideon Henfield e~isted."'~In 1798,
Justice Chase, presiding over a lower court trial of a man
charged with bribing a federal official, disagreed: "[Tlhe United
States, as a federal government, have no common law; and,
consequently, no indictment can be maintained in their courts,
for offences merely at the common law."13 When the Supreme
Court finally addressed the issue fourteen years later in United
States v. Hudson, Justice Johnson adopted Justice Chase's
conclusion that federal courts could not create common law
crimes. The most startling aspect of Johnson's opinion was his
reasoning:
Although this question is brought up now for the first
time to be decided by this Court, we consider it as having
been long since settled in public opinion. In no other case for
many years has this jurisdiction been asserted; and the
general acquiescence of legal men shews the prevalence of

Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV.53, 60 (1984).
11. 11 US. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (holding that government cannot bring
common law seditious libel action against newspaper).
12. Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1120 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360).
13. United States v. Worrall, 28 F. Cas. 774, 779 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798) (No.
B.
16,766). For a brief discussion of Justice Chase's jurisprudence, see STEPHEN
PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL
MISUNDERSTANDING
98-99 (1991).
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opinion in favor of the negative of the proposition."

Justice Johnson's argument has enormous contemporary
implications. For example, what if Justice Blackmun had based
the right to abortion in Roe v. Wade completely on the views of
the American Medical A~sociation?'~Further, imagine the
Supreme Court stating in Bowers v. Hardwick that
homosexuals have a fmdamental right to engage in their form
of consensual sexuality solely because public opinion resolved
the issue.16
11. PLANNED
PARENTHOOD
V. CASEY:A MODERN
EXAMPLE
OF
THE SUPREME
COURT'SRELATIONSHIP TO PUBLIC
OPINION

Although it is chilling to imagine the existing Court basing
its decisions only on public opinion, Supreme Court Justices
have considered public opinion's relevance to constitutional
adjudication. The most dramatic recent example is Planned
Parenthood v. Casey." In Casey, five Justices refused to
reverse the "essential holding" of Roe v. Wade, "the right of the
woman t o choose to have an abortion before viability and t o
obtain it without undue interference from the State."18
Premising the joint opinionlg on such relatively
immutable concepts as the rule of law, stare decisis and a
~~
Souter claimed
judicial commitment t o p r i n ~ i p l eJustice
that the people would only support judicial opinions that
transcend immediate public opinion:
The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow
people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims
for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises
with social and political pressures having, as such, no bearing
on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make.
Thus, the Court's legitimacy depends on making legally
principled decisions under circumstances in which their
principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by

14. 11 US. (7 Cranch) at 32.
15. 410 U S . 113, 141-44 (1973).
16. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that homosexuality is not protected by
substantive due process).
17. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
18. Id. at 2804.
19. Justices 07Connor,Souter, and Kennedy signed the joint opinion.
20. 112 S. Ct. at 2804.
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the Nati~n.~'

According to Justice Souter, the Court must resist partisan
opposition to its most important, "watershed" opinions: "So to
overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling
reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the
Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question."22 In other
words, Roe v. Wade gained additional authority by being so
fiercely criticized, so divisive.
Justice Souter had a t least two conceptions of the public
who create public opinion: First, the partisans who evaluate a n
opinion for its compatibility with their beliefs, and second, the
broader spectrum of society that believes in the "rule of law."
The Supreme Court needs the latter group's sympathy, support,
and respect to preserve the overall legitimacy of the legal
system: "Thus, the Court's legitimacy depends on making
legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their
principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by
the Nation."23One reason Justice Souter affirmed Roe was to
create the judicial constancy that would sustain overall public
respect for the Supreme Court, even if many members of the
public disliked the Court's protecting women's right to a n
abortion under the Constitution.
In his concurrenceldissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed
with what he viewed to be the plurality's position: "[Tlhis
Court's duty [is] to ignore the public criticism and protest that
may arise as a result of a decision. Few would quarrel with this
~ t a t e m e n t . " ~Chief Justice Rehnquist then criticized the
plurality for actually incorporating public opinion into its
analysis by being less willing to overrule "intensely divisive"
cases.25 According to Chief J u s t i c e Rehnquist, t h e
"divisiveness" standard leads to the paradox of retaining
unpopular decisions until opposition fades away. Furthermore,
the standard forces the Court to make judgments beyond the
Court's capacity: "[Blecause the Court's duty is to ignore public
opinion and criticism on issues that come before it, its
members are in perhaps the worst position to judge whether a
decision divides the Nation deeply enough to justify such
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

2814.
2815.
2814 (emphasis added).
2862 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring & dissenting).
2862-63.
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Although he claimed to agree with
uncommon prote~tion."~~
Justice Souter, Chief Justice Rehnquist created a far more
severe form of isolationism. The Court is obligated to ignore not
only public opinion but also "criticism." If one takes Chief
Justice Rehnquist literally, there is one less reason for
commentators to critique constitutional law.27
Justice Souter's opinion did not preclude public opinion
from consideration even as much as Chief Justice Rehnquist
had claimed. In addition to justifying his commitment to
principle and stare decisis because such steadfastness
preserves public respect for the Court, Justice Souter consulted
public opinion to determine which "watershed" constitutional
cases should have been overruled. For example, he concluded
that the Lochner substantive due process cases2$ were
properly reversed because it "seemed unmistakable to most
people by 1937, that the interpretation of contractual freedom
protected . . . rested on fundamentally false factual
assumptions about the capacity of a relatively unregulated
market to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare."zg He also
quoted Professor Charles Black's explanation of why Brown
legitimately overruled Plessy v. Ferguson: "[Tlhat question has
meaning and can find an answer only on the ground of history
and of common knowledge about the facts of life in the times
and places aforesaid."30 Justice Souter believed that the Court
could only keep favorable public opinion by ignoring divisive

26. Id. at 2863 (emphasis added).
27. "Most lobbying by the executive and legislative branches is open and
direct; lobbying by the judiciary is filtered through legal briefs, professional
meetings, and law review articles." FISHER, supra note **, at 19; see also Fowler
V. Harper & Edwin D. Etherington, Lobbyists Before the Court, 101 U. PA.L. REV.
1172 (1953); Chester A. Newland, The Supreme Court and Legal Writing: Leaned
Journals as Vehicles of an Anti-Antitrust Lobby?, 48 GEO. L.J. 105 (1959).
28. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261
U.S. 525 (1923); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (signalling
demise of Lochner era).
29. 112 S. Ct. at 2812 (emphasis added).
30. 112 S. Ct. at 2813 (quoting Charles L. Black Jr., The Lawfulness of the
Segregation Decisions, 69 YALEL J . 421, 427 (1960) (emphasis added)). Turning to
Roe, Justice Souter used the ambiguous collective pronoun "our," apparently
extending his perspective beyond the Court (which frequently refers to itself as
'We"): "Neither the factual underpinnings of Roe's central holding nor our
understanding of it has changed." 112 S. Ct. at 2813 (emphasis added). Justice
Souter used the same ambiguous pronoun later in the same opinion to reject cases
refusing to extend equal protection to women: "These views, of course, are no
longer consistent with our understanding of the family, the individual, or the
Constitution." Id. at 2831 (emphasis added).
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public reactions, at least until the public is no longer divisive
and has developed a broad consensus that the Court has erred.
Justice Souter's opinion is simultaneously a plea for continuity
and a justification of perpetual constitutional reinterpretation.
The Supreme Court can transform "watershed" constitutional
caselaw whenever it discerns a widespread belief that a
particular form of constitutional jurisprudence is ineffective or
In the absence of such a finding,
otherwise inappr~priate.~'
the Court should accept the status quo, applying the doctrine of
stare decisis. Justice Souter is assuming that the Court can
make some very fine-tuned determinations. Not only must the
Court determine when an issue is so contentious that the Court
should remain committed to the status quo, but the Court must
also ascertain when public opinion has so shifted that the
Court should overrule its prior decisions. This task will be
difficult because some disagreement will linger over virtually
every important constitutional issue. In other words, when do
judicial critics constitute a merely divisive dissent instead of an
overwhelming majority that should pressure the Court to
change watershed decisions?
Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence/dissent that the
furious controversy over abortion placed the Court in a
hopeless position in terms of public opinion. Many would see
the Court as capitulating to public pressure no matter what it
did:
m e have been subjected to what the Court calls "political
pressure" by both sides of this issue . . . . Maybe today's
decision not to overrule Roe will be seen as buckling to
pressure from that direction. Instead of engaging in the
hopeless task of predicting public perception-a job not for
lawyers but for political campaign managers-the Justices
should do what is legally right . . ."

.

Justice Scalia also bemoaned the public's impression that their
reactions mattered: "How upsetting it is, that so many of our
citizens . . . think that we Justices should properly take into
account their views, as though we were engaged not in
31. Justice Souter's argument suggests that the Court periodically transforms
its doctrine, modes of argument, and outcomes. Similar notions have arisen in legal
academia. Professor Ackerman has delineated three major constitutional "moments":
the Founding, the Reconstruction Amendments, and the New Deal. See BRUCE
WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
(1991).
ACKERMAN,
32. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2884 (Scalia, J., dissenting & concurring).
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ascertaining a n objective law but in determining some kind of
social consensus."33
This Article's review of Supreme Court cases that consider
public opinion, usually in express terms, concludes that Justice
Souter's candid, flexible incorporation of public opinion into
constitutional interpretation better reflects constitutional
history. His approach is more consistent with the weight of
Supreme Court precedent, as seen in Hudson, than with the
more monastic views of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia. But Justice Souter is only employing the historically
dominant view; the Rehnquist-Scalia position retains its own
constitutional pedigree. Putting the issue more generally, the
Court traditionally has vacillated between the two competing
sub-traditions expressed i n Casey.
This Article does not argue solely from tradition. If
consequentialism is to play any role in constitutional
adjudication:* the Court should consider public reactions,
including enforcement difficulties, whenever it formulates
doctrine. As Justice Frankfurter explained, constitutional
adjudication is "applied p o l i t i ~ s . " ~Frankfurter
~
gave a
compelling example to support his precept: "The simple truth of
the matter is that decisions of the Court denying or sanctioning
the exercise of federal power, as in the first child labor case,
largely involve a judgment about practical matters, and not at
all any esoteric knowledge of the C o n s t i t ~ t i o n . " Judicial
~~
politics must include a strain of realpolitik, an awareness of
the limitations of both power and principle. The Court must not
only evaluate previous public responses and the existing state
of public opinion, but it must also anticipate how the public
will react to its decisions.37
33. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Scalia expressed similar sentiments in his
concurring opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 535
(Scalia, J., concurring) (1989) (permitting extensive state regulation of abortion).
N. CARDOZO,
THE NATUREOF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 102-03
34. See BENJAMIN
(192 1).
35. Felix Frankfurter, The Zeitgeist and t h Judiciary, SURVEY (1913),
reprinted in LAW AND POLITICS: OCCASIONAL
PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER
1913-1918, at 3, 6 (Archibald MacLeish & E.F. Prichard, Jr. eds., 1962).
36. Felix Frankfurter, The Red Terror of Judicial Reform, NEW REPUBLIC,
Od. 1, 1924 (unsigned editorial), reprinted in LAW AND POLITICS,supra note 35, at
10, 12. The Court's political role made judges "less than ever technical expounders
of technical provisions of the Constitution. They are arbiters of the economic and
social life of vast regions and at times of the whole country." FELIX FRANKFURTER
& JAMES
M. LANDIS,
BUSINESSOF THE SUPREMECOURT173 (1928); see also
Louis Fisher, Social Influences on Constitutional Law, 15 J. POL. SCI. 7 (1986).
37. See, e.g., R. DOUGLASARNOLD,THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL
ACTION
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Self-consciously including public opinion in constitutional
adjudication also raises basic jurisprudential questions. For
instance, how can Justice Souter's sensitivity to public opinion
coexist with his commitment to "prin~iple"?~~
Does public
opinion have any place in Justice Scalia's search for "objective
lawYsg Does the concept of public opinion destroy the
distinction between law and politics, thereby undermining "the
rule of law," the autonomy, and even the legitimacy of the
HOWcan the constitutionalization of public opinion
be reconciled with the anti-majoritarian impulse that questions
yet justifies judicial review?" Are there methodological and
ideological differences i n trying to ascertain public opinion
instead of "tradition" and "history"'? On a more disturbing level,
is law nothing more than an elaborate fiction, a fluid collection
of metaphors which creates a secular "religion" that we lawyers
~ ~ Article cannot
hope the public will find a ~ c e p t a b l e ?This
pretend to resolve such difficult questions; it seeks to make
those queries more immediate. At the very least, conscious
incorporation of public opinion into constitutional doctrine
makes constitutional law even more indeterminate.

111. A BRIEFHISTORY
OF THE ROLEOF PUBLIC
OPINIONIN
CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
FROM THE GLORIOUS
~ V O L U T I O NTHROUGH
THE LOCHNER
ERA
This section presents a brief intellectual history describing
the evolution of the concept of public opinion from an
eighteenth-century, aristocratic sense of honor among
gentlemen to the triumph of the masses by the early

(1990) (discussing how politicians anticipate public opinion as well as respond to
it .)
38. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2814.
39. Id. at 2884 (Scalia, J., concurring).
CULTURES: THE MENTALITYAND
40. See ROBERTF. NAGEL,CONST~UTIONAL
CONSEQUENCES
OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW
(1989); see also THOMAS
R. MARSHALL,
PUBLIC
OPINIONAND THE SUPREME COURT(1989) (describing relationship of Supreme Court
opinions to public opinion polls).
The
41. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword:
Vanishing Constitution, 103 HAW. L. REV. 43 (1989). Justice Chase held that the
federal courts were "the only proper and competent authority to decide whether
any statute made by congress . . . is contrary to . . . the federal constitution."
United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239, 256 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709).
42. I wish to thank Professors Lazarus and Gellman for helping me develop
LEVINSON,CONS~P~PTIONAL
FAJTH (1988); Sanford
this question. See SANFORD
Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 123.
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nineteenth century. Different conceptions of public opinion
influenced leading pre-Revolutionary cases, political theorists,
the Constitutional ratification debates, the political conflict
between the Republicans and the Federalists, decisions by the
early judiciary, and the controversy over slavery. Most of these
conceptions of public opinion have continued to influence
constitutional thought."

A. The Influence of Public Opinion on Law and
Constitutional Thought Prior to the Constitution
America's cult of celebrity is merely a perversion of the
Enlightenment. When the Enlightenment thinkers rejected the
centrality of a Christian God, including the accoutrements of
Heaven and Hell,"' they had to find substitutes to bind and
regulate society. Part of the Enlightenment's
as
expressed by Adam Smith, was the Principle of Approbation:
"For approbation, heightened by wonder and surprise, constitutes the sentiment which is properly called admiration, and of
which applause is the natural e~pression?~Human beings,
governed by passion;' naturally seek the approval of other
humans. They will perform great feats, benefitting all, to gain
that recognition. Smith asked: "For to what purpose is all the
toil and bustle of this world? What is the end of avarice and
ambition, of the pursuit of wealth, of power, and
pre-eminence?" His answer was a cheerful echo of
Ecclesiasticism:

43. Because public opinion is such a protean concept, it has played numerous
roles. Dicey wrote that the concept of public opinion was an "abstraction." A.V.
414 (2d ed. 1914).
DICEY,LAW AND OPINION IN ENGLAND
44. According to Professor Horwitz, the Lmhner formalists hoped "neutral,"
"autonomous" law would serve as a secular replacement to keep society cohesive.
MORTONJ. H o R ~ THE
, TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1870-1960, at 193
(Oxford University Press 1992) (1977) [hereinafter H o ~ w n TRANSFORMATION
,
187019601.
45. The eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinkers offered other social binding agents. Adam Smith recommended the market. ADAM SMITH,AN INQUIRY INTO
THE NATUREAND CAUSESOF THE WEALTHOF NATIONS(R.H.Campbell et al. eds.,
Clarendon Press 1976) (1776). Most Enlightenment theorists preferred some form of
"republicanism," premised upon virtue instead of force. GORDON
S. WOOD,THE
RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION104-05 (1992) (discussing evolution of
beliefs about necessary societal adhesives).
46. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL
SENTIMENTS64 (1759).
AN ESSAYON PERSON47. Id. at 75; see &o ROBERTOM. UNGER,PASSION:
AUTY (1984).
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To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with
sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages. It is the vanity, not the ease, or the pleasure, which
interests us. But vanity is always founded upon the belief of
our being the object of attention and approbation."

David Hume had another, more global definition of public
opinion: "It may farther be said, that, though men be much
governed by interest; yet even interest itself, and all human
affairs, are entirely governed by opinion.'*g On the Continent,
Rousseau also concluded that opinion was the foundation of
government:
What means has the government for shaping behavior? I
respond: public opinion. If our conduct arises from our own
feelings in solitude, it arises from the opinion of others in
society . . . . Not reason, not virtue, not the laws can oversway
public opinion unless one finds a means of changing the latter.50

For Rousseau, public opinion was a country's actual constitution51
Public opinion was not just a device of abstract political
theory. At several critical moments, public opinion dramatically
influenced the Anglo-American legal system. The protracted

48. SMITH,supra note 46, at 113.
49. DAVIDHUME,Whether the British Government Inclines More to Absolute
Monarchy or to a Republic, in 1 ESSAYSMORAL,POLPTICAL,
AND LITERARY51 (Eugene F. Miller ed., Liberty Classics 1985) (1777) [hereinafter HUME,British Government]; see DAVIDHUME,Of the First Principles of Government, in 1 ESSAYSMORAL,
POLITICAL,AND LITERARY,supra, at 32-36 [hereinafter HUME,First Principles].
There is a narrower version of Hume's argument; the Court always considers public opinion in constitutional cases because elected officials' actions invariably reflect
public opinion, at least to some degree. See DICEY, supra note 43, at 3. Professor
Dicey was not the first to make such an argument. In 1795, a lawyer told the
United States Supreme Court that "[tlhe Conftitution of Pennfylvania explicitly
provides, that no law fhall be paffed prohibiting emigration from the ftate. This
is, perhaps, the only direct expreffion of the public fentiment on the fubjed."
Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 142 (1795) (argument of counsel). Indeed,
the entire constitutional text expresses a form of public opinion. The public that
ratified the constitutional text approved of certain words with generally understood
meanings. Part of the Court's job is to determine what the public meant when it
ratified a particular text.
50. GARRYWILLS,
CINCINNATUS:
GEORGEWASHINGTON
AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT 99-100 (1984) (quoting JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU,L ~ R AEM. D'ALEMBERT
176, 178 (Paris, Gamier-Flammarion 1967)).
51. JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU,THE SOCIAL CONTRACT272 (Charles M.
Sherover trans., 1984) (1762).
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struggle between Lord Coke and King James over the relationships between the Common Law and the Royal Prerogative
took place during "heightened popular feeling" caused by the
High Commission's imprisoning the lawyer Nicholas Fuller for
contempt. Fuller had been battling that Royal Court's efforts to
particular religious
force individuals to make an oath
beliefs." In the absence of such angry public sentiments, Coke
might have been unable to defy the King.
The trial of the Seven Bishops in 1688 was a turning point
in the almost century-long conflict between the Stuart Kings
and the coalition of Parliament and Common Law lawyers.
King James, a Catholic, demanded that seven Anglican Church
Bishops read in their churches a declaration endorsing James'
annulment of existing religious laws. When the Bishops refused, James charged them with seditious libel. Three judges
rejected the Bishops' defense of truth. But Judge Powell instructed the jury that James had acted illegally by annulling
existing laws and that truth was a defense.53Lord MacAulay
graphically described the public reaction to the jury's acquittal,
showing how emotional public opinion can be: 'Yet were the
acclamations less strange than the weeping. For the feelings of
men had been wound up to such a point that at length the
stern English nature, so little used t o outward signs of emotion,
gave way, and thousands sobbed aloud for very joy."54
The Seven Bishops case affected the American trial of
Peter Zenger for seditious libel in 1735. Zenger printed some
pieces, written by James Alexander, which criticized the Royal
Governor's administration. Like the Bishops, Zenger pled truth
as a defense. The prosecution claimed truth was either irrelevant or an aggravating factor, undermining and insulting the
government. The prosecutor argued that three of the four judges in the Seven Bishops case had rejected the defense of truth.
Zenger's attorney replied:
If it be objected that the opinions of the other three judges
were against [Powell], I answer that the censures the judgments of these men have undergone, and the approbation
Justice Powell's opinion, his judgment and conduct upon that
trial has met with, and the honor he gained to himself for
52. CATHERINE
DRINKER
BOWEN,THE LIONAND THE ONE 298-306 (1957).
53. 2 LORDTHOMASB. MACAULAY,MACAULAY'SHIS~ORY
OF ENGLAND165-67
(1954).
54. Id. at 168.
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daring to speak truth at such a time, upon such an occasion,
and in the reign of such a King, is more than sufficient in my
humble opinion, to warrant our insisting on his judgment as a
fill authority to our purpose."

Zenger's lawyer was arguing that the public reaction, both
immediate and historical, legitimated Powell's sole opinion in
the Seven Bishops case, giving it fill authority, not just relevance. Zenger's judges, however, agreed with the prosecution.
They defined and applied "opinion" to achieve the opposite
result; the government should not be libelled even by true
statements because the people need to have "a good opinion of
it."56The jury ignored the judges and acquitted Zenger, triggering another enthusiastic public outb~rst.~'
Public opinion
55. JAMES
ALEXANDER,
A BRIEFNARRATIVE
OF THE CASEAND TRIALOF JOHN
PETER ZENGER,PRINTER OF THE NEW YORKWEEKLYJOURNAL
72 (Stanley N. Katz
ed., 2d ed., Belnap Press 1972) (1736).
56. Id. at 100 (quoting The Queen v. Tutchin, 14 Howell's State Trials 1096,
l l 2 8 (1704)).
57. Id. at 101. It should not be surprising that the Zenger and Seven Bishops
case juries, which had the power to decide questions of law and fact, reflected
existing public opinion. Juries are an essential part of the Anglo-American legal
tradition because they manifest community mores. Just as juries sometimes ignore
existing law, they also protect the "rule of law" from corrupt rulers. Jbhn Adams
explained that the jury placed inside the "executive branch of the constitution . . .
a mixture of popular power." Because of this popular power, "the subject is guardORIGINSOF
ed in the execution of the laws." BERNARD
BAILYN,THE IDEOLOGICAL
THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
74 (1967) (quoting Letter from John Adams). Members
of the Court have acknowledged the link between juries and general -public opinion:
"[T]welve people are more likely than one person to reflect public sentiment."
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 487 n.33 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring & dissenting) (holding that judge can implement death penalty despite jury recommendation of mercy) (quoting Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
63 (1980)).
The eighteenth- and nineteenth-century debate over the appropriate role of the
jury, a struggle the jury system largely lost as the judges gradually excluded juries
from deciding "questions of law," revolved around the appropriate role of public
opinion in all types of adjudication. In the early 1800s, former Speaker of the
House Theodore Sedgwick recommended major changes in the judge-jury relationship: "In all instances where trial by jury has been practiced, and a separation of
the law from the fact has taken place, there have been expedition, certainty, system and their consequences, general approbation." RICHARD
E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTSAND POLITICS IN THE YOUNGREPUBLIC190 (1971). Justice
Gray also defended the expanded judicial role: "Wlhen the law is settled by a
court, there is more certainty than when done by a jury, it will be better known
and more respected in public opinion." Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 164
(1895) (Gray, J., dissenting) (holding uncontradicted confession by one defendant of
joint commission of murder admissible against both defendants). Nevertheless, continuing jury powers, particularly nullification, demonstrate that public opinion plays
a major role within the legal system at the critical point of determining criminal
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had made truth a defense.
According to the historian Gordon Wood, it was no coincidence that the Zenger case was a libel case involving rulers'
reputations. Unique social and economic forces made the American elite protective of their reputations. Bereft of formal ranks
of nobility, the elite needed their reputation to gain respect and
financial credit.58As a result, libel litigation flourished in the
eighteenth century. For instance, a boat manufacturer sued
someone for saying his boats were "only fit to drown people."5g
The American aristocracy7squest for fame extended beyond
personal benefit. Douglas Adair asserted in his famous essay,
Fame and the Founding Fathers, that the leaders of the Revolutionary generation, many of whom also framed the Constitution, were obsessed with public opinion and with their place in
history.60 Furthermore, the pursuit of glory was virtuous.
Gordon Wood has described that impulse in almost existential
terms: "Everyone had appetites and interests, but only the
restless-minded, the great-souled, the extraordinary few, had
ambition-that overflowing desire to excel, to have precedence,
and t o achieve fame.'s1
There were obvious political ramifications in courting public opinion. The Revolutionary leaders knew their revolution
succeeded because public opinion supported it; the Revolutionaries had put into practice Hume's truism about the primacy of
opinion.62John Adams reminisced about this point in a letter
t o Jefferson:
What do we mean by the Revolution? The war? That was no
part of the Revolution; it was only an effect and consequence
of it. The Revolution was in the minds of the people, and this
was effected, from 1760 to 1775, in the course of fifteen years
before a drop of blood was shed at L e ~ i n g t o n . ~

Jefferson would hardly disagree. His plea in the Declaration of
guilt or innocence. At the very least, the Anglo-American legal system has never
been completely premised on objectivity and principle.
58. WOOD,supra note 45, at 38-39.
59. Id. at 60.
60. DOUGLAS ADAIR, FAME AND THE FOUNDINGFATHERS(1974).
61. WOOD, supra note 45, at 39. Wood believed that the gentlemen of the
period were far more concerned about their reputation among their peers than
with general public opinion. Id. at 40-41.
62. See HUME,
British Government, supra note 49.
63. BAILYN, supra note 57, at 1 (quoting Letter from John Adams to Thomas
Jefferson, 1815).

.
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Independence was addressed t o the court of world opinion and
thus to history: 'When in the Course of human Events, it becomes necessary for one People to dissolve the Political Bands
which have connected them with another. . . a decent Respect
to the Opinions of Mankind requires that they should declare
the causes which impel them to the S e p a r a t i ~ n . ' ~ ~
The pre-Revolutionary American public did not express its
views solely through juries or eloquent revolutionary documents and pamphlets. The lower classes, generally excluded
from power, periodically took t o the streets as semi-organized
mobs. They undermined the Royal government:^ capacity to
enforce general writs of assistance by gathering near buildings
that were to be searched, thereby intimidating the officia.ld5
Thomas Hutchinson, the Chief Justice of Massachusetts, felt
the sting of public opinion most directly: a mob burned his
house down in 1765. Hutchinson's Humean analysis should
come as little surprise: "Authority is in the populace . . . no law
can be carried into execution against their mind.'*6
Not all eighteenth-century thinkers found even cold comfort in the dominance of opinion. David Hume agreed with
Rousseau that public opinion determined governmental rule
but did not find that linkage reassuring:
As force is always on the side of the governed, the governors
have nothing to support them but opinion. It is, therefore, on
opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim
extends to the most despotic and most military governments,
as well as to the most free and most popular."

Opinion was simply a fearsome, inevitable force: "Government
is instituted in order to restrain the fury and injustice of the
people, and being always founded on opinion, not on force, it is
dangerous to weaken, by speculation, the reverence that the
multitude owe to authority.*8 Hurne would not have been sur64. THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). The original feminist manifesto made a similar plea to "the opinions of manOF SENTIMENTSAND RESOLUTIONS
para. 1
kind." THE SENECAFALLSDECLARATION
(1848).
65. M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS
OF ASSISTANCE
CASE446 (1978).
66. BERNARDBAILYN, THE ORDEAL OF THOMASHUTCHINSON
73-74 (1974)
(quoting Letter from Thomas Hutchison to Samuel Jackson).
67. HUME,First Principles, supra note 49, at 32-33, quoted in DICEY,supra
note 43, at 2. Hume noted that governments gained strength over time from opinion. H u m , First Principles, supra note 49, at 33.
68. 5 DAVIDH u m , HISTORYOF ENGLAND
59 (1863). Nor would Hume have
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prised by the blunt reductionism of the despot Napoleon: "Opinion rules e~erything."~
Many other pre-revolutionary leaders in America expressed
views similar to Hume's, revealing the self-conscious hierarchical gap between the untitled American aristocracy and their
fellow Americans." Early in his career, John Adams referred
to the masses as the "common Herd of Mankind."71 In 1774,
John Randolph applied a class analysis to public opinion,
bluntly stating: "When I mention the public, . . . I mean t o
include only the rational part of it. The ignorant vulgar are as
unfit to judge of the modes, as they are unable t o manage the
reins of g~vernment."'~Randolph elevated the "reasoned"
views of the elite above the ignorant reactions of the passionate
masses.
Soon after the American Revolution, the Federalists, who
agreed with Hume's concerns about the masses, battled
Jefferson's Republicans over the significance of public opinion,
both in and out of court. Hume's conservatism infuriated men
who saw public opinion as presumptively liblike Jeffers~n,?~
erating. Perhaps Hume provoked Jefferson by striking a nerve.
Jefferson wrote in 1788, twelve years after the Declaration of
Independence, that "'tavern keepers, Valets de place, and
postilions'-were 'the hackneyed rascals of every country' who

quarrelled with Samuel Johnson's basing aesthetic evaluations upon public opinion:
"A man . . . who writes a book, thinks himself wiser or wittier than the rest of
mankind; he supposes that he can instruct or amuse them, and the publick to
whom he appeals, must, after all, be the judges of his pretensions." JAMES
BOSWELL,LIFE OF JOHNSON
142 (R.W. Chapman ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1980)
(1791). Boswell prefaced that quote by noting: "[Johnson] had, indeed, upon all
occasions, a great deference for the general opinion." Id.
69. DICEY,supra note 43, at 1 n.1.
70. The debate over whose public opinion should count more, the views of the
elite or the masses, continues to this day. For a powerful defense of democracy
AND ITS CRITICS
against elitist "guardianships," see ROBERTA. DAHL,DEMOCRACY
52-79 (1989). See also Stephen L. Carter, The Right Questions in the Creation of
Constitutional Meaning, 66 B.U. L. REV. 71 (1986); Symposium, Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259 (1981); Eugene V.
Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HAW. L. REV. 193 (1952);
J. Skelly Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society--Judicial
Activism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL
L. REV. 1 (1968).
71. WOOD,supra note 45, at 27.
72. Gordon S. Wood, The Democratization of Mind in the American RevoluMORALFOUNDATIONS
OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC102, 106-07 (Robert
tion, in
H. Horwitz ed., 2d ed. 1979) (quoting JOHN
RANDOLPH,CONSIDERATIONS
ON THE
PRESENTSTATEOF VIRGINIA
(1774)).
AMERICA:
THE FEDERALIST
32 (1981).
73. GARYWILLS, EXPLAINING
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'must never be considered when we calculate the national character.' "74 Jefferson preferred the small agrarian farmer, made
independent by his land, to the urban masses. Nor was Jefferson sanguine about human nature. He warned the Virginia
assembly about governmental corruption because "human nature is the same on every side of the Atlantic."" Thomas
Paine had a purer Republican perspective, linking public opinion, free speech, and democracy together through a plain writIn his libel deing style designed to reach a broad a~dience.?~
fense of Thomas Paine for writing Rights of Man, Erskine explained the basic linkage between free speech, public opinion,
and a just government: "[Tlhe liberty of opinion keeps governments themselves in due subjection to their duties."??
In conclusion, the concept of "opinion" already had several
meanings before the drafting and ratification of the Constitution. Political theorists like Hume and Rousseau used "opinion"
as an all-embracing concept that described the temper of the
times, the Zeitgeist.?' During the colonial period, most of the
American elite saw mass public opinion as an irrational threat
to individual liberties, while revolutionaries like Erskine and
Thomas Paine believed only public opinion could prevent tyranny.7g Finally, early leaders sometimes conceived of public
opinion as the verdict of their gentlemen peers and at other
times as the will of the entire people. Public opinion analysis
therefore has at least two factors: (1)a determination of whose
opinions are t o be consulted, and (2) an assessment of what
weight, if any, should be given to those views.

74. WOOD,supra note 45, at 28 (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Hints to Americans Traveling in Europe (June 19, 1788), reprinted in 13 THE PAPERSOF THOMAS
JEFFERSON
268 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1954-55)).
75. THOMASJEFFERSON,NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 121 (William
Peden ed., Univ. of N.C. Press 1955) (1787).
76. Wood, supra note 72, at 110-11.
, dissenting)
77. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 186 n.4 (1979) ( B r e ~ a n J.,
(holding that plaintiff who is public figure can depose news media about state of
mind to determine malice); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 247-48
(1936) (enjoining state tax on newspapers) (quoting 1 LORDERSKINE,SPEECHESOF
LORD ERSKINE525 (James L. High ed., 1876); see also LLOYDP. STRYKER,FORTHE
DEFENSE210-16 (1947).
78. To the degree that Hume is right, this article involves everything and
therefore has difficulty proving anything. Supreme Court Justices are no more
capable of escaping the Zeitgeist than the rest of us.
79. See ERSKINE, supra note 77, at 525.
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B. Public Opinion and the Framing of the Constitution
The Framers of the Constitution viewed public opinion as a
constitutional lodestone. In The Federalist, Madison accepted
Hume's truism as a premise: "If it be true that all governments
rest on opinion, it is no less true that the strength of opinion in
each individual, and its practical influence on his conduct,
depend much on the number which he supposes to have entertained the same opinion."'' However, Madison did not fear
public opinion as much as Hume, creating two definitions of
Madison
public opinion: public passion and public reason:'
wrote: "[Ilt is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought t o
control and regulate the government. The passions ought t o be
controlled and regulated by the government."82 Because he
had to obtain votes from average citizens as well as from his
fellow gentlemen, Madison broke down the prevailing distinction, as expressed by Randolph, between the elite and the rest
of the citizenry. One can assume Madison believed that constitutional supporters, of whatever class, exercised "public reason." "Reason" and "passion" were no longer class differences
but rather political distinctions.
Because the Constitution had to be ratified by the voters,
the Framers were intensely aware of and deferential to public
opinion. They believed the voters could legitimate the new
Constitution by consent. Madison wrote in The Federalists3
that the constitutional delegates "must have borne in mind
that as the plan to be framed and proposed was t o be submitted to the people themselves, . . . its approbation [would] blot
out antecedent errors and irreg~larities."~~
Some of the irregu80. THE FEDERALTST
No. 49, a t 314-15 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); see James G. Wilson, The Most Sacred Text: The Supreme Court's Use of
The Federalist Papers, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV.65 (discussing how the Supreme Court
has utilized The Federalist in opinions).
81. Madison's distinction between reason and passion permitted the people,
who tend toward passion, to create a legitimate, viable government if they followed
reason: "Elsswhere [Madison] has said that only the people have the right to establish a constitutional system; but now he adds a qualifier-the people can do i t
only when they are calm." WILLS,supra note 73, at 28.
82. THE FEDERALIST
No. 49, supra note 80, a t 317.
83. The Federalist Papers were carehlly written to influence an uncertain
electorate. George Washington feared he would undermine the drive for nationalization by making any public endorsements; many would believe he was seeking
despotic power. WILLS,supra note 50, a t 102-03.
84. THE FEDERALIST
No. 40, supra note 80, a t 253 (James Madison). Madison
later made the same argument about the Bill of Rights. See 4 ANNALSOF CONG.
772 (1796) (Statement of James Madison), reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGSOF JAMES
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larities were rather significant. The Constitution's ratification
process ignored the existing Article of Confederation's requirement that all states consent to any amendments.85The Constitutional convention drafted a document that vastly exceeded
what many people understood the primary purpose of the convention to be: facilitating commercial relations? Thus the
electorate had to decide the most important constitutional
question of all: Should the new Constitution be ratzed in express violation of the terms of the existing constitution? In
other words, the crucial jurisprudential concept of consent is a
form of public opinion.
During the ratification campaign, the Framers had cause
to fear existing public opinion. Many Framers were strong
nationalists, even monarchists, but they lived in a land still
fearful of any concentration of power. Their rebuttals to the
Anti-Federalists' claims that the new Constitution would concentrate governmental power were less than candid: "The Federalists met this attack by an attempt t o deny the accusation in
public, but it seems from their private statements that they
intended t o create a national government, although prevailing
opinion obliged them to compromise."' The Federalists may
have designed the Constitution t o rein in democratic sentiments, but the ratification campaign required them to glorify
those sentiments: 'We, sir, idolize dernocra~y."~~
Neither Madison nor Hamilton thought any written Constitution could ever transcend public opinion. For Hamilton, public opinion limited all written constitutions. Concerning freedom of the press he said, "mhatever fine declarations may be
inserted in any constitution respecting it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people
Madison concurred: "The restricand of the go~ernrnent."~~

MADISON263 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906). For a discussion of the multiple levels of
constitutional thought and power, see John M. Rogers & Robert E. Molzon, Essay:
Some Lessons About the Law from Self-Referential Problems in Mathematics, 90
MICH. L. REV. 992 (1992).
85. Forrest McDonald, however, argued that the Constitution actually comNOWS ORDOSECLORUM
plied with the Articles' requirements. FORRESI'MCDONALD,
279 (1985).
86. Id. at 98.
T. MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS
121 (1961).
87. JACKSON
88. Wood, supra note 72, at 116 (quoting 3 THE DEBATESIN THE SEVERAL
ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERALCONSTITUTION
222 (reprint
STATECONVENTIONS
ed. Ayer Co. 1987) (1888) (statement of John Marshall)).
89. THE FEDERALIST
No. 84, supra note 80, at 514 (Alexander Hamilton).
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tions however strongly marked on paper will never be regarded
when opposed to the decided sense of the public."90 Madison
demonstrated how public opinion could transform the constitutional debate over federalism:
If, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the people
should in future become more partial to the federal than to
the State governments, the change can only result from such
manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration a s
will overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that
case, the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving
most of their confidence where they may discover it to be
most due.g1

The Framers of the Constitution designed the new government both to incorporate and regulate public opinion. Most
tellingly, the people only directly elected the members of the
House of Representatives. Nevertheless, the will of the people
permeated the entire Constitution: "Even the judges, with all
other officers of the Union will, as in the several States, be the
choice, though a remote choice, of the people t h e m s e l v e ~ . " ~ ~
90. WILLS, supra note 50, at 101. Gordon Wood concluded that Madison still
considered "public opinion" t o be the views of the elite as late as 1791. Wood,
supra note 72, at 125-26. Yet in The Federalist, Madison distinguished public reason from public passion on the merits, not on class grounds. THE FEDEWIST No.
49, supra note 80, at 317 (James Madison).
91. THE FEDERALIST
No. 46, supm note 80, at 296 (James Madison).
Madison's comment could help resolve notably volatile Tenth Amendment doctrine.
In 1968, the Supreme Court upheld federal regulation of state minimum wages in
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 US. 183 (1968). Wirtz was overruled by National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (prohibiting congressional regulation of state
workers' wages and hours), which in turn was overruled nine years later in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991), and New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408
(1992), the Court undermined Garciu by distinguishing it; Garcia had been largely
decided on the ground that the Court could not develop any meaningful Tenth
Amendment distinctions, 469 U.S. at 537-39.
The Tenth Amendment activists have their own tradition. The Slaughter-Home
Cases admitted the Court would have problems determining the appropriate doctrine: "[Tlhis line has never been very well defined in public opinion,"
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US. (16 Wall.) 36, 81-82 (1872) (upholding monopoly
over slaughter-house locations). That lack of clarity did not preclude judicial review. Id. at 82; see also Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U.S. 548, 560 (1879) (concluding that a state can move a county seat).
92. THE FEDERALIST
No. 39, supra note 80, at 242 (James Madison). Even
relatively arcane issues were analyzed in terms of public opinion. Pinckney explained in 1800 why congressional immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause
was so important:
[Olur Constitution supposes no man . . . to be infallible, but considers
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Yet some of the choices were designed to be quite remote. Hamilton argued that independent Courts would protect the Constitution from temporary majorities reflecting prevailing public
opinion: "This independence of the judges is equally requisite to
guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from . . .
dangerous innovations in the government, and serious
.~~
oppressions of the minor party in the c o m r n ~ n i t y Lifetim-e
judicial tenure was essential: "[Otherwise] there would be too
great a disposition t o consult popularity to just* a reliance
that nothing would be consulted but the Constitution and the
law^.'"^ Madison saw another advantage in giving the judiciary the primary interpretive role: "The danger of disturbing
the public tranquillity by interesting too strongly the public
passions is a still more serious objection against a frequent
reference of constitutional questions t o the decision of the
whole society.'*5

C. The Battle Between the Republicans and the Federalists
1. The Republicans'glorification of public opinion

The electoral process, which now determined leadership,

them all as mere men, and subject to all the passions, and frailties, and
crimes, that men generally are, and accordingly provides for the trial of
such as ought to be tried, and leaves the members of the Legislature for
their proceedings, to be amenable to their constituents and to public opinion.
10 ANNALSOF CONG.71 (1800).
93. THE FEDERALIST
No. 78, supra note 80, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton).
94. Id. at 471.
95. THE FEDERALIST
No. 49, supra note 80, at 315 (James Madison). During
the drafting of the Bill of Rights, the First Congress considered requiring legislators to comply with the instructions of their electorate. Hartley successfully made
the Burkean argument that representatives should implement their own views
instead of being pure proxies for the majority will: T h e right of instructing is liable to great abuses; it will generally be exercised in times of popular commotion . . . . I have known, Sir, so many evils arise from adopting the popular opinion of the moment, that I hope this government will be guarded against such an
influence." CREATING
THE BIU OF RIGHTS154 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991).
Jefferson defended the First Amendment because it served public opinion so
well: "[Tlhe only security of all, is in a free press. The force of public opinion cannot be resisted, when permitted freely to be expressed. The agitation it produces
must be submitted to. It is necessary, to keep the waters pure." Letter from ThomOF THOMAS
as Jefferson to Marquis de la Fayette (Nov. 4, 1823), in 7 WRITINGS
- JEFFERSON
325 (HA. Washington ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1871)
[hereinafter Jefferson to Fayette], quoted in Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 143 n.3 (1943) (alteration in original) (holding that municipality cannot forbid
person to knock on doors to distribute religious handbills).

,
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undermined the pre-Revolutionary cohesion among the American elite. All political leaders needed votes in a country which
was turning increasingly democratic after the Rev~lution.'~
Whatever other virtues democracy may have, it forces elites to
compete among themselves to gain the populace's favor.
Madison's distinction between reason and passion as good
and bad public opinion faded during the ensuing political conflict between the Federalists and the Republicans." The debate between the Federalists and the Republicans became ever
more polarized, more Manichean. The partisan split between
the Republicans and Federalists revived class-based definitions
of public opinion. Jefferson summed up the Republican perspective when he explained why he preferred the nature of the
people to the elite: "[Tlhe sickly, weakly, timid man, fears the
people, and is a Tory by nature. The healthy, strong and bold,
cherishes them, is formed a Whig by nature.'*8 Jefferson
trusted an educated populace more than any elite: '%very government degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the people
alone. The people themselves therefore are its only safe depositories. And to render even them safe, their minds must be
improved to a certain degree.'*' This general perspective explains Jefferson's wariness of judicial review:
You seem . . . to consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters
of all constitutional questions; a very dangerous doctrine
indeed, and one which would place us under the despotism of
an oligarchy. . . . [Tlheir power the more dangerous as they
are in office for life, and not responsible, as the other h c tionaries are, to the elective

During the debate over the Alien and Sedition Act, Madison, who had become a Republican, opposed the Federalist Act,

96. See WOOD,supm note 45; Wood, supra note 72.
97. See WOOD,supm note 45, at 363-64. For a thorough review of these politTHE AGE OF FEDERALISM:
ical conflicts, see STANLEY E m s & ERICMCK~~RICK,
THE EARLYAMERICAN
REPUBLIC,
1788-1800 (1993).
98. See WOOD,supra note 44, at 97 (quoting Jefferson to Fayette, supra note
95).
99. JEFFERSON,
supra note 75, reprinted in 3 WRITINGSOF THOMAS
JEFFERSON
254 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1894).
100. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William C. Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), in 15
WRITINGSOF THOMASJEFFERSON276, 277-78 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E.
Bergh eds., 1903). Lincoln read this letter during the Lincoln-Douglas debates. See
Wallace Mendelson, Jefferson on Judicial Review: Consistency Through Change, 29
U. CHI.L. REV. 327 (1962).
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which heavily regulated political speech. Madison defended the
Virginia Resolutions' opposition to the Act as
expressions of opinion, unaccompanied with any other effect
than what they may produce on opinion, by exciting reflection. The expositions of the judiciary, on the other hand, are
carried into immediate effect by force. The former may lead to
a change in the legislative expression of the general
will-possibly, to a change in the opinion of the judiciary; the
latter enforces the general will, whilst that will and that
opinion continue unchanged.lO'

According to Madison, "judicial will," and the force that accompanies it, should never be completely insulated and isolated
from public opinion. Madison explicitly appealed to the public
for constitutional change: "The truth declared in the resolution
being established, the expediency of making the declaration at
the present day may safely be left to the temperate consideration and candid judgment of the American
To Republicans, opinion was everything. Thomas Cooper defiantly
accepted the costs of punishment for violating the Seditious
Libel Act: "I depend principally on my practice: that practice,
imprisonment will annihilate. Be it so. I have been accustomed
to make sacrifices to opinion, and I can make this."'"
Many early politicians believed that the public could reinterpret the Constitution. Jefferson relied on a "just" public
opinion to validate the Louisiana purchase, an exercise of presidential power exceeding Jefferson's prior strict constructionism:
An officer is bound to obey orders; yet he would be a bad one
who should do it in cases for which they were not intended,
and which involved the most important consequences. The
line of discrimination between cases may be difficult; but the
good officer is bound to draw it a t his own peril, and throw
himself on the justice of his country and the rectitude of his
motives.'04

101. JAMESADIS IS ON, REPORT
ON THE RESOLUTIONS
(1800), reprinted in 6 THE
WRITINGS
OF JAMESMADISON341, 402 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
102. Id. at 352.
103. United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 643 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No.
14,865).
104. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in 9
WRITINGS
OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON,
supra note 99, at 279, 281-82.
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Whether the politicians and leaders wanted it or not, the
Constitution quickly evolved into something far different than
the Framers intended. Henry Jones Ford contended that the
rapid evolution of the Electoral College was "conclusive evidence of the ability of public opinion to m o w the actual constitution to any extent required."105Nor were such changes
limited t o such basic structural questions as who should elect
the President. For example, the demand for paper money overwhelmed the Framers' constitutional protections of specie.lo6
John Pope used public opinion to legitimate the National
Bank.lo7 When President Andrew Jackson vetoed a subsequent National Bank bill, he also acknowledged public opinion:
"Mere precedent is a dangerous source of authority, and should
not be regarded as deciding questions of constitutional power
except where the acquiescence of the people and the States can
be considered as well settled."lo8Note that President Jackson
invoked a corporate form of opinion: the views of the people
and the States.
The country's rapid changes precipitated a change in consciousness among the elite. They worried less about personal
reputation and more about the overall will of the country. By
1817, "public opinion" had reached a novel status in American
consciousness; it was "that invisible guardian of honour-that
eagle-eyed spy on human actions-that inexorable judge of men
and manners-that arbiter, whom tears cannot appease, nor
105. HENRYJ. FORD,THE RISE AND GROWTHOF AMERICAN
POLITICS 161
(1914).
106. WOOD,supra note 45, at 316.
107. Pope defended the Bank by distinguishing between "individual liberty"
and "measures of general policy":
My reflections and practical observations on the Government incline me to
the opinion that, with regard to measures of general policy not assailing
individual liberty or right or the independence of any State, there is not
that danger to be apprehended from a liberal construction of the Constitution which gentlemen seem to imagine. So long as the Government is
in the hands of the people, measures affecting the whole nation, if oppressive or inconvenient, will be resisted and corrected by the public
feeling and opinion.
22 ANNALSOF CONG.233-34 (1811) (Statement of Sen. John Pope). Eight years
later, Chief Justice Marshall would uphold the Bank partially because the Bank
did not affect "the great principles of Liberty," but only "the respective powers" of
the federal government. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401
(1819).
OF
108. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 3 A COMPILATION
THE MESSAGESAND PAPERSOF THE PRESIDENTS1789-1897, at 1139, 1144-45
(James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
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ingenuity soften-and from whose terrible decisions there is no
appeal."'Og Public opinion was the "vital principle" that permeated America; it undermined all fixed principles, whether
they be rules of law or social mores.l1° Tocqueville described
how public opinion and the rule of law uniquely reinforced each
other in American culture: "Those who wish to attack the laws
must consequently either change the opinion of the nation or
trample upon its decision.""'
2. The Federalist perspective
The first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, John Jay,
summed up the Federalists' pessimistic view of the average
citizen, a premise that justified putting an enlightened elite a t
the helm of power: "The mass of men . . . are neither wise nor
good, and virtue, like the other resources of a country, can only
be drawn to a point and exerted by strong circumstances ably
managed, or a strong government ably administered."" Led
by Hamilton, the Federalists did not rely on republican virtue
or approbation; they preferred the monarchial device of corruption, of providing financial benefits to those who supported the
g~vernment."~
They also benefited from a post-Revolutionary.
disillusionment: "[Tlhe people do not exhibit the virtue that is
necessary t o support a republican government."'" According
to one Federalist critic, North Carolina laws were "[tlhe vilest
collection of trash ever framed by a legislative body."l15
The Federalists quickly turned to the judiciary for protection of property,ll6 contract,"' and the new written
109. Wood, supra note 72, at 125 (quoting WILLIAM CRAFTS, JR., AN ORATION
ON THE INFLUENCEOF MORALCAUSESON NATIONAL
CHARACTER,
DELIVERED
BEFORE THE PHI BETAKAPPA SoC!D3IY, ON THEIRANNIVERSARY 5-6 (Aug. 28, 1817)).

110. Id.
111. TOCQUEVILLE,supra note **, at 247.
112. WOOD,supra note 45, at 261 (quoting John Jay, quoted in DAVIDH .
FISCHER,
THE REVOLUTION
OF AMERICAN
CONSERVATISM:
THE FEDERALIST
PARTYIN
THE ERAOF JEFFERSONIAN
DEMOCRACY
7 (1965)).
113. WOOD,supra note 45, at 263 (quoting HELENR. PINRNEY, CHRIS~OPHER
GORE: FEDERALIST
OF M A S S A C H U S1758-1827,
~,
at 37 (1969)). Hamilton's 'corruption" may have included more illegal techniques. His chief aide went to jail.
GOREVIDAL,Political Melodmnurs, in UNITEDSTATES;ESSAYS1952-1992, at 854
(1993).
114. STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL
S. ZAINALDIN, LAWAND JURISPRUDENCE
IN
AMERICAN
HISI'ORY132 (2d. ed. 1989).
115. Id.
116. Common law property rights also yielded to changes in technology and
ideology: "The onward spirit of the age must, to a reasonable extent, have its way.
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constitutions. Chancellor James Kent lectured on the need for
judicial review of the constitutionality of legislative actions: "If
public opinion was in every case t o be presumed correct and
competent to be trusted, it is evident, there would have been no
need of original and fundamental limitations. But sad experience has sufficiently taught mankind, that opinion is not an
infallible standard of ~afety.""~Chancellor Kent, however,
did not give the judiciary the last word:
[Ilf the ljudiciaryl should a t any time be prevailed upon to
substitute arbitrary will, to the exercise of a rational Judgment, a s i t is possible it may do even in the ordinary course
of judicial proceeding, it is not left like [the legislature], to the
mere controul of public opinion. The Judges may be brought
before the tribunal of the Legislature, and tried, condemned,
and removed from office.'lg

It should not be surprising that lawyers and courts led the
Federalists' efforts to constrain the democratic will. Tocqueville
described the inherently consenrative, aristocratic instincts of
most lawyers:
Men who have made a special study of the laws derive
from this occupation certain habits of order, a taste for formalities, and a kind of instinctive regard for the regular connection of ideas, which naturally render them very hostile to
the revolutionary spirit and the unreflecting passions of the
multitude. 120
The law is made for the times, and will be made or modified by them." Lexington
& O.R.R. v. Applegate, 38 Ky. (8 Dana) 289, 309 (1839) (holding railroad not a
nuisance).
117. In his famous argument in Dartmouth College opposing a state law which
modified an existing contract with Dartmouth College, Daniel Webster said:
It will be a dangerous, a most dangerous experiment, to hold these institutions subject to the rise and fall of popular parties, and the fluctuations
of political opinions. If the franchise may be at any time taken away, or
impaired, the property also may be taken away, or its use perverted.
TIIKOTHYFARRAR,
REPORTOF THE CASEOF THE TRUSTEESOF DARTMOUTH
COLLEGE
WILLIAM
H. WOODWARD
282-83 (Boston, 1819).
AGAINS~
118. JAMES KENT, INTRODUCTORY
LECTURETO A COURSE OF LAW LECTURES
~ DURING
G THE FOUNDING
ERA,
(1794), reprinted in 2 AMEFUCAN POLITICALW
1760-1805, at 936, 942 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983). Kent
equated public opinion with faction: The Courts of Justice which are organized
with peculiar advantages to exempt them from the baneful influence of Faction."
Id. (footnote omitted).
119. Id. at 943-44.
120. TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note **, at 273. A.V. Dicey observed that judges are
older than most of their contemporaries. Their views will usually lag two gener-
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The Federalists heeded Hamilton's vision in The Federalist
Papers, interpreting constitutions and protecting vested property rights under "fixed principles" of law that only could be divined and applied by judges.lzl
The Federalists did not completely exclude public opinion
from their constitutional analysis. During the debate over the
Alien and Sedition Act, the Federalist Massachusetts legislature endorsed the Act, using the rhetoric of public opinion:
"[The freedom of the press] is a security for the rational use
and not the abuse of the press-of which courts of law, the
juries, and people will judge; this right is not infringed but confirmed and established by the late act of Congress."lP The
Resolution's conclusion was equally forceful, linking constitutional interpretation to public opinion manifested through election returns: "The legislature M b e r declare, that in the foregoing sentiments they have expressed the general opinion of
their constituents, who have not only acquiesced without complaint in those particular measures of the Federal Government,
but have given their explicit approbation by reelecting those
men who voted for the adoption of them?
How could Republicans and Federalists applaud and appeal to public opinion during conflicts like the Alien and Sedition Act? To a large degree, they had two different audiences in
mind: The Republicans referred to the "whole people" while the
Federalists tended to value the views of "those philosophical
and patriotic citizens who cultivate their reason."124The Republicans had the last word. They won the next election and repealed the Act.
The debate between the Republicans and the Federalists
over the primacy of public opinion was not limited to political
power. Gordon Wood has explained how the Alien and Sedition
Act, which had made "truth" a defense, triggered an
ations behind the times, because people tend to reflect the most powerful thinking
of their immediate forefathers. DICEY,supra note 43, at 369.
121. WOOD,supra note 45, at 325.
ms
IN REPLYTO VIRGINIA
(1799), reprinted in
122. M ~ s s ~ c ~ u sRESOLUTIONS
JEFFERSON
POWELL,
LANGUAGES
OF POWER136 (1991) (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 138.
124. WOOD,supra note 45, at 363 (quoting Letter from James Madison (Mar.
7, 1790)). Gordon Wood also described a social component to the dispute: "[Mlost
Revolutionary writers, at the outset at least, presumed the existence of these universal principles, of right behavior and expected a uniformity of response, supposing that their audience either was, or would like to be, part of that restricted
circle of men of good taste and judgment." Wood, supra note 72, at 109.
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epistemological disagreement over the meaning of "truth":
While the Federalists clung to the traditional assumption that
truth was constant and universal and capable of being discovered by enlightened and reasonable men, their Republican
opponents argued that opinions about government and rulers
were many and diverse and the truth of such opinions could
not be determined simply by judges and members of juries, no
matter how educated and reasonable such men might be.125

The dispute between the Republicans and the Federalists
over public opinion can be exaggerated. No American politician
seeking elected office could contemptuously dismiss the public
and remain in power. Although his views were unique a t the
time, Federalist James Wilson combined the Hamiltonian commitment to a strong central government with the Jeffersonian
belief in majority rule, anticipating the ultimate outcome of the
Federalist-Republican debate.126Only a few bitter Federalists
withdrew from the public arena during the early nineteenth
century.12'
Such divergent views reveal the inherent difficulty of determining the appropriate role of the public in constitutional
theory. This rich discourse also demonstrates that the early
political leaders, including conservative Federalist judges, did
not have a one-dimensional idea of how to organize their novel
republic. They groped toward their new form of government.
Most leaders believed the public had t o participate in the evolution of the Constitution. Nobody knew how or how much. But
many changes took place in the early years; the public ignored
the Framers' views on the electoral college, the prohibition
against paper money, but legitimated rival political parties.12'
Admittedly, the rate of constitutional change diminished. But
myriad constitutions could have emerged out of that single
text; the courts and the public joined together to create the
basic system that we continue to use today.

125. WOOD,supra note 45, at 362.
126. Robert G. McCloskey, Introduction to 1 THE WORKSOF JAMESWILSON 1,
4-5 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967). Wilson believed that all three branches of the
federal government had to be premised upon popular consent, not command. Id. at
24-25, 47.
127. James Wilson, Of the General Principles of Law and Obligation, in THE
WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE
JAMESWILSON, L.L.D. (1804), reprinted in 1 THE
WORKSOF JAMES
WILSON,supra note 126, at 97, 119.
128. See, e.g., RICHARDHOFSTADTER,
THE IDEAOF A PARTYSYSI'EM
(1969).
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D. Public Opinion and the Early Courts
Both State and Federal Courts sought and needed public
support to prevail against the more powerful elected branches.
In 1788, the Virginia State Legislature passed a statute increasing the responsibilities of many judges. "The judges therefor sent a 'Respectful Remonstrance' . . . asking that 'the present infraction of the constitution may be remedied by the legisThe judges said if the legislature relature them~elves.'"'~~
fused to act, "they see no other alternative for a decision between the legislature and judiciary than an appeal t o the people."130After the legislature refused to change the law, the
judges made that appeal by resigning. The legislature capitulated, amending the statute and reappointing the judges.13'
Like Justice Souter in Casey, early judges used public
opinion to justify judicial review. Several early courts developed
Hamilton's argument that the judiciary was the intermediary
between the people and their elected representatives:
This constitution is sanctioned by the consent and acquiescence of the people for seventeen years; and it is admitted by
the almost universal opinion of the people, by the repeated
adjudications of the courts of this commonwealth, and by very
many declarations of the legislature itself, to be of superior
authority to any opposing act of the legislature.'"

The judges envisioned a dialogue between the judiciary and the
public. They wrote their opinions to persuade both the litigating parties and the public of the correctness of their decisions.
In other words, the courts initially interpret constitutions, but
the public could oppose particular adjudications and statutes,
as they did with the Alien and Sedition Act. This process ultimately extended beyond discourse. Many judges accepted the
Republican argument that the people, not the judiciary, are the

129. POWELL, supra note 122, at 73.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 72-73. This early episode c o n f m Justice Souter's argument that
the judiciary depends on widespread public support.
132. Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 37 (1793). Judicial opinions
and legislative acts can increase in authority due to the passage of time and the
validation by public opinion: "[Tlhe constitution, and the subsequent acts of the
convention . . [bloth depend upon the acquiescence of the people, as the convention was not deputed to make the constitution; or to pass laws under it; and,
therefore, if the people acquiesced under the constitution, they acquiesced in the
interpretation also." Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call) 113, 185 (1804).

.
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ultimate guardians of liberty.lss
The federal courts initially did not fulfill Hamilton's expectations that the unelected courts would effectively constrain
the elected branches.la In 1801, Chief Justice John Jay refused President Adams' reappointment because "under a system so defective" the Court would never "obtain the energy,
weight and dignity which were essential to its affording due
support to the National Government, nor [would it] acquire the
public confidence and respect which, as the last resort of the
justice of the nation, it should possess."135
The Court gradually asserted itself against the two more
powerful branches. Attorney General Caesar Rodney published
a letter he wrote to President Jefferson complaining about a
judicial decision, Gilchrist v. Collector of Charleston,lS6 that
undermined Jefferson's embargo. Justice Johnson, the author of
Gilchrist, turned to the newspapers to sway public opinion:
That the president should have consulted that officer upon a
legal subject [in private], is perfectly consistent with the relation subsisting between [the executive and judicial departments] . . . . But when that opinion is published to the
world . . . an act so unprecedented in the history of executive
conduct could be intended for no other purpose than to secure
the public opinion on the side of the executive and in opposi-

133. But, should usurpation rear its head; should the unnatural case ever
occur, when the representatives of the people should betray their
constituents, we are referred, for consolation and remedy, to the power and vigilance of the state governments; to publick opinion; to the
active agency of the people in their elections; to that perpetual dependence on the people, which is the primary controul on the government . . . .
United States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614, 619 (D. Mass. 1808) (No. 16,700).
Justice Chase asserted that the courts were the primary guardians of liberty:
"If your constitution was destroyed, so long as the judiciary department remained
free and uncontrolled, the liberties of the people would not be endangered. Suffer
your courts of judicature to be destroyed: there is an end to your liberties." United
States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 640-41 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865).
134. Hamilton complained in 1802: "I am still labouring to prop the frail and
worthless fabric [of the Constitution] . . . . What can I do better than withdraw
from the scene? Every day proves to me more and more that this American world
was not made for me." FORREST
MCDONALD,
ALEXANDER
HAMILTON:
A BIOGRAPHY
356 (1979). Gordon Wood has described how many other early leaders, including
Jefferson, became discouraged about the fate of America by the end of their lives.
WOOD,supra note 45, at 367-68.
135. EDWARD
JOHN
MARSHALLAND THE C O N S T ~ I O23-24
N (1919)
S. CORWIN,
(quoting John Jay).
136. 10 F. Cas. 355 (C.C.D.S.C. 1808) (No. 5420).
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tion to the j~diciary.'~'

The Court needed the public to support its power to ignore
the public. In 1810, the Supreme Court stated in Fletcher v.
Peck' that judicial interpretations of the relevant text must
prevail over public opinion: 'Would the act be null, whatever
might be the wish of the nation, or would its obligation or nullity depend upon the public sentiment?"'" In Osborn v. Bank
of the United States, Justice Johnson dissented because the
Court may have satisfied "the public mind" but failed to comply
with the Constitution when it upheld a congressional law giving the Bank of United States jurisdiction to sue i n federal
circuit courts. 13'
From the very beginning, Justices have had two different
conceptions of their role. Some believe that the Court interacts
with the country, while others believe the Court must insulate
itself from outside pressures. Some Justices, like Justice Johnson, who wrote Hudson'40 and dissented in 0sborn,14' appear to hold both viewpoints at different times. Justice Johnson
thus personified the two competing sub-traditions (incorporating public opinion and being hostile to public opinion) that constitute the Supreme Court's approach.
Chief Justice Marshall increased the Supreme Court's
power by synthesizing Republican and Federalist thinking.'"
He sought to separate law from politics but remained attuned
to the country's political mood when applying that distinction:
[Marshall] has a strong attachment to popularity but indisposed to sacrifice to it his integrity; hence it is that he is
disposed on all popular subjects to feel the public pulse and
hence results indecision and an obsession of doubt. . . .
Doubts suggested by him create in feeble minds those which
are irremovable. He is disposed . . . to express the great respect for the sovereign people and to quote their opinions as a

137. WIW
JOHNSON,
REPLYTO ATTORNEYGENERALCEASAR RODNEY'SATTACK ON HIS DECISIONIN THE G m m CASE
~ (1808), reprinted in 1 THE GROWTH
OF PRESIDENTIAL
POWER563-64 (William M. Goldsmith ed., 1974).
138. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130 (1810) (prohibiting State from rescinding legislative land grants made by prior, fraudulent legislature).
139. 22 US. (9 Wheat.) 738, 871 (1824) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (holding that
Bank of United States' charter gives jurisdiction to United States circuit courts).
140. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
141. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 871.
142. Many Federalists did not think Chief Justice Marshall was sufficiently
committed to their ideology. POWELL, supra note 122, at 173.
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Chief Justice Marshall systematically sought the public approbation and support that Chief Justice Jay believed the Court
could never achieve.lM Chief Justice Marshall's careful,
pathbreaking opinion in Marbury v. Madison obtained significant judicial power over both the President and Congress without forcing either elected branch t o counter-atta~k."~
Chief Justice Marshall did not limit himself to his opinions
to convince the public; he wrote letters to newspapers t o persuade the populace of the validity of McCulloch v. Maryland,146 which upheld the Second National ~ank.'*' He
began McCulloch by observing that the elected branches had
created such banks in the past. His constitutional jurisprudence was formed not only by theory but also by practice. Chief
Justice Marshall's successes led to Tocqueville's observation
that the American public had ratified another fundamental
question of constitutional law: "Americans have acknowledged
--

143. Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to Rufus King (May 12, 1800), in 3 THE
OF RUFUS KING236-39 (Charles R. King ed., 1896).
LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE
144. Chief Justice Marshall eventually achieved his goal. In a dissent to
Marshall's opinion permitting Georgia to expel the Cherokee Indians, Justice
Baldwin observed: T h e opinion of this court is of high authority in itself; and the
judge who delivers it [Marshall] has a support as strong in moral influence over
public opinion, as any human tribunal can impart." Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 32 (1831) (Baldwin, J., dissenting).
145. Marshall held that the Executive acted unconstitutionally by depriving
Marbury of his "vested legal right" to his commission but that Marbury could not
prevail because Congress had unconstitutionally expanded the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803); see
William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L J .
1; James M. O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN.L. REV. 219 (1992).
146. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
DEFENSEOF MCCULLOCHV. MARYLAND
147. See generally JOHN WHAU'S
(Gerald Gunther ed., 1969). Given its abstract, protean nature, the concept of public opinion is putty in the hands of a skillful judge, particularly a relatively nonpartisan judge like Chief Justice Marshall. Depending upon the issue, Chief Justice
Marshall emphasized different relationships between the people, the elected branches, and the Court. When validating an act, he emphasized that the Legislature is
the agent of people and a co-interpreter of the Constitution. For example, in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819), Chief Justice Marshall
began his defense of the National Bank by referring to prior legislative acts, not to
constitutional text. When Chief Justice Marshall decided that an Act ran counter
to the Constitution, he ignored existing public opinion as reflected through legislation and the Legislature as the people's agent. Instead, the Court became the intermediary on behalf of the people. For example, neither the people nor their representatives could disturb the "vested legal right" of Marbury to his commission,
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803), or of innocent holders in
due course, Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 132-33 (1810).
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the right of judges to found their decisions on the Constitution
rather than on the laws. In other words, they have permitted
them not t o apply such laws as may appear to themto be uncon~titutional."~~~
Although Justice Story was far more of a Federalist than
Chief Justice Marshall, he sometimes incorporated public opinIn Martin v. Hunter's
ion into constitutional interpretati~n.'~~
Lessee, Story extrapolated, at least in part, his constitutional
interpretation of the meaning of Article I11 from an existing
congressional statute: "[This distinction has] been brought into
view in deference to the legislative opinion, which has so long
Observe that in
acted upon, and enforced, this distin~tion."'~~
McCulloch, Hudson and Hunter's Lessee, the Supreme Court
believed that ten t o twenty years was a s6cient length of
time for judicial andlor public interpretations of the Constitution t o become ~rystallized.'~'
The Framers designed the Constitution to protect private
property from pro-debtor, majoritarian legislature^.'^^ The
Supreme Court eventually fulfilled Hamilton's hopes of being
the primary guarantor by significantly immunizing private
property and contract rights from public opinion through the
doctrine of "vested legal rights."lS3For example, in Fletcher v.

148. TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note **, at 100 (emphasis added).
149. Justice Story described the abortive constitution that the philosopher John
Locke drafted for Caroline in 1669 in a way that summarizes this article's thesis:
Perhaps in the a ~ a l sof the world there is not to be found a more
wholesome lesson of the utter folly of all efforts to establish forms of
governments upon mere theory; and of the dangers of legislation without
consulting the habits, manners, feelings, and opinion of the people, upon
which they are to operate.
JOSEPH
~ I Q R Y ,COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITEDSTATES58
(reprint ed. 1987) (1833).
150. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 336 (1816) (holding
that state supreme court must follow decision of United States Supreme Court).
Professor Amar partially premised his "two-tieredwtheory of Article 11.jurisdiction
upon Story's arguments in Martin. Alchil R. Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article
111: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 210
(1985).
151. In Casey, Justice Souter partially gave Roe v. Wade more authority because it had endured for almost twenty years and many women had relied on it.
P l a ~ e dParenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2809 (1992).
INTERPRETATIONOF THE C O N S T ~ I O
OFN
152. CHARLES BEARD,AN ECONOMIC
THE UNITEDSTATES(1913). For a discussion of the historiography that followed
from Beard's thesis, see WILLS, supra note 73, at xiv-xvi.
153. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION
Peck,'% Chief Justice Marshall protected allegedly innocent,
third-party purchasers of legislative land grants from a state
legislature which sought t o revoke the grants due to prior legislative fraud.ls5 Chief Justice Marshall rejected the parliamentary sovereignty argument that public o@on was the only
constraint on governmental alterations of existing eleemosynary corporate charters in Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward.'" In his concurrence in that case, Justice Story
made an argument Justice Scalia would appreciate: "I have endeavored to keep my steps . . . under the guidance of authority
and principle. It is not for judges to listen to the voice of persuasive eloquence or popular appeal."15'
The constitutionalization of the common law did not completely isolate private "vested legal rights" from public opinion.
The common law had been formed by a combination of Yearned
men," judges, and public opinion:'" "[Wle must suppose, that
the framers of our constitution were intimately acquainted with
the writings of those wise and learned men, whose treatises on
the laws of nature and nations have guided public opinion on
the subjects of obligation and contract."'" If the common law
is formed by an interaction between 'learned men" and public
opinion,lBO
and if the Constitution protects the common law,
cannot public opinion change the common law and thus the
Con~titution?'~'

154. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
155. Id. at 132-33.
156. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 643 (1819). "According to the theory of the Britl
rights might
ish constitution, their parliament is omnipotent. To a ~ u corporate
give a shock to public opinion, which that government has chosen to avoid; but its
power is not questioned." Id. Chief Justice Marshall also wrote that the public
opinion was the only effective monitor of abuses by corporate officers: "Should this
reasoning ever prove erroneous in a particular case, public opinion, as has been
stated at the bar, would correct the institution." Id. at 650.
157. Id. at 713 (Story, J., concurring). Justice Story defended "principles" as a
supra note 149, at 175.
necessary aspect of the virtue of judicial certainty. STORY,
THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION
OF OUR COMMON LAW
158. See JAMES C. CARTER,
5-6 (1884) (equating the common law with the "popular willn).
159. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 353-54 (1827) (holding that
congressional bankruptcy power does not exclude states from also regulating
bankruptcies).
supra note 158, at 6.
160. CARTER,
161. More particularly, public opinion has been able to change the dehition of
nuisance over the centuries, incorporating new forms of injury, including environmental damage. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886
(1992) (holding that coastal regulation reducing property to no economic worth was
a "taking," unless it constitutes a nuisance under background principles of state
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By the middle of the nineteenth century, the rule of law
appeared triumphant.lB2 While still a lawyer, Abraham Lincoln told a crowd in 1838:
Let every American, every lover of liberty, every well wisher
to his posterity, swear by the blood of the Revolution, never to
violate in the least particular, the laws of the country; and
never to tolerate their violation by others.

....

. . . [Allthough bad laws, if they exist, should be repealed as soon as possible, still while they continue in force,
for the sake of example, they should be religiously observed.
In the early years of the Republic, Americans temporarily managed to combine the cult of public opinion with their belief in
the rule of law. All common, statutory, and constitutional laws
ultimately expressed the people's will. As Tocqueville made
clear throughout his famous study of American society, public
opinion, defined in the modern sense as the overall mood of the
country, completely prevailed.

nuisance laws).
162. The debate over the relationship between law and public opinion extended
beyond constitutional law. State courts transformed common law by preserving
some desirable Blackstonian principles but changing others. See, e.g., mom^ J.
HORWITZ,THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICANLAW, 1780-1860 (Oxford University
TRANSFORMATION
1780-18601. Such legal
Press 1992) (1977) [hereinafter HORWITZ,
flexibility undercut the codification movement, which reflected the belief that the
public could better express their will through statutes than by accepting judicial interpretations of common law:
Statutes, enacted by the legislature, speak the public voice. Legislators,
with us, are not only chosen because they possess the public confidence,
but after their election, they are strongly influenced by public feeling.
They must sympathize with the public, and express its will: should they
fail to do so, the next year witnesses their removal from office, and others are selected to be the organs of the popular sentiment.
ROBERTRANTOUL,
JR.,Oration at Scituate, in MEMOIRS,SPEECHESAND WRITINGS
OF ROBERTRANTOUL,
JR.251, 280 (Luther Hamilton ed., Boston, John P. Jewett &
Co. 1854).
Even common law adjudication included assessment of public views. In his infamous concurrence precluding women from practicing law because of the Yaw of
the Creator," Justice Bradley referred to the common law: "So h d y fnced was this
sentiment in the founders of the common law that it became a maxim of that
system of jurisprudence that a woman had no legal existence separate from her
husband." Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
163. Abraham Lincoln, The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions: Address
Before the Springfiid Young Men's Lgceum, (1838), reprinted in THE POLITICAL
THOUGHTOF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN16-17 (Richard N. Current ed., 1967).
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Where do the three Casey opinions that considered public
opinion fit in this ideological continuum? Justice Souter sounded like a Federalist when he wrote that the Court gained its
prestige by deciding cases using "fixed principles." But his
conscious courting of public opinion places him with moderates
like Madison. The country's early history also confirms his
observation that the Supreme Court needs popular support. By
dismissing public opinion as an annoyance, Chief Justice
Rehnquist resembled those embittered Federalists who withdrew from the public arena because they were disgusted by the
triumph of the public.'" Justice Scalia made the Federalist
philosophical argument by praising "objective" law. Both dissenters can find comfort in the dissent in Osborn, just as Justice Souter can find support in Hudson. In fact, the real tradition is the fluctuation of the Court between the two approaches. After all, Justice Johnson wrote the dissent in Osborn and
the majority opinion in Hudson.
E. Public Opinion and Slavery
No issue divided the United States as much as slavery.lB5
In the course of sending slaves back to their captors, Chief
Justice Marshall observed in The Antelope: "That the course of
opinion on the slave trade should be unsettled, ought to excite
no surprise. The Christian and civilized nations of the world,
with whom we have most intercourse, have all been engaged in
it.ml66 Nevertheless, Chief Justice Marshall believed that the
public's views were changing: "Public sentiment has, in both
countries, kept pace with the measures of government; and the
opinion is extensively, if not universally entertained, that this
unnatural tr&c ought to be suppressed."167Justice Baldwin,
who struggled with the slavery question, pitted judicial "principle" against current public opinion:
To consider [slaves] as persons merely, and not property, is,
in my settled opinion, the first step towards a state of things
to be avoided only by a firm adherence to the fundamental
principles of the state and federal governments, in relation to
this species of property. If the first step taken is a mistaken
164. Wood, supra note 72, at 119.
165. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 68 (1872).
166. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 114-15 (1825) (requiring slaves
from forfeited ship to be returned to their masters).
167. Id. at 116.
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one, the successive ones will be fatal to the whole system. I
have taken my stand on the only position which, in my judgment, is impregnable; and feel confident in its strength, however i t may be assailed in public opinion, here or
elsewhere. '6.13

Part of the problem was that each side could assert a basic
legal principle: liberty competed against property.'"
The courts frequently had to decide the legal status of
alleged fugitive slaves.
Leonard Levy described how a
small but very aggressive minority in Massachusetts effectively
challenged the administration of fugitive slave laws.17' In
such a context, "public opinion" became the views and actions
of a few zealous advocates who may or may not have reflected
the majority of the populace. To a certain degree, the American
form of government needs the consent of minorities as well as
the majority. A profoundly alienated or angry minority can
influence policy as much as the more passive majority. Justice
Story tried to solve the problem in Prigg v. Pennsylvania by
releasing the states from any obligation to return fugitive
slaves: "[Ilt would be left to the mere comity of the states to act
as they should please; and would depend for its security upon
the changing course of public opinion, the mutations of public
policy, and the general adaptations of remedies for purposes
strictly according to the lex fori."'" Story upheld Congress's
fugitive slave act by combining current public acceptance with

168. Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 517 (1841) (Baldwin, J., dissenting) (avoiding decision on state constitutional provision banning slave importation because state did not pass activating legislation). Baldwin concluded that
states could ban slavery but could not exclude slaves from out of state if slavery
were continued within the state.
169. See The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 421 (1815) (holding that neutral
may hire an armed belligerent vessel to ship goods).
170. According to one Supreme Court advocate, hostile public opinion negated
state enforcement of state fugitive slave laws:
It is true that the legislature of the state of New York, several years
ago, enacted a law authorizing the governor of the state, in his discretion,
to surrender fugitives from foreign countries. But public opinion has lately
manifested itself strongly against the validity of the law; and the governor, during the last year, refused to act under it.
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 554 (1840) (argument of counsel) (equally divided Court dismissing habeas corpus petition).
171. See LEONARD
W. LEVY,THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH
AND CHIEF
J u m c ~SHAW72-108 (1957).
172. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 US. (16 Pet.) 539, 614 (1842) (freeing fugitive
slave catcher for violating state law).
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the views of Framers and ratifiers:
This very acquiescence . . . of the highest state functionaries,
is a most decisive proof of the universality of the opinion that
the act is founded in a just construction of the Constitution;
independent of the vast influence which it ought to have as a
contemporaneous exposition of the provisions, by those who
were its immediate framers, or intimately connected with its
adoption.'"

Story's argument coexists somewhat uncomfortably with his
consultation of the "legislative mind" in Hunter's Lessee and his
refusal t o consider public opinion in Dartmouth College. For
Story, the significance of public opinion varied with the issue.
Until Casey, no Justice discussed the role of public opinion
more f d y than Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott.17*Taney
contrasted the "public opinion" at the time of the Framers with
public opinion at the time of the case. Current public opinion
was constitutionally irrelevant:
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public
opinion or feeling, in relation to this unfortunate race, in the
civilized nations of Europe or in this country, should induce
the court to give to the words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they were intended to
bear when the instrument was framed and adopted. Such an
argument would be altogether inadmissible in any tribunal
called on to interpret it. If any of its provisions are deemed
unjust, there is a mode prescribed in the instrument itself by
which it may be amended?

Turning to historical public opinion, Taney claimed that
the entire country considered blacks to be inferior during the
Revolution. Nobody intended the Declaration of Independence's
phrase "all Men are created equal"'" to apply to blacks: "It is
difficult at this day to realize the state of public opinion in
relation to that unfortunate race."'77 Racial discrimination
persisted in all parts of the country during the ratification of

173. Id. at 620-21.
174. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (holding slave is not
American citizen and Congress cannot ban slavery from Territories).
175. Id. at 426.
176. THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 W.S. 1776).
177. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407.
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the Constitution."8 Even the disappearance of the slave trade
in the North was not attributable to public opinion: "[Tlhis
change had not been produced by any change of [public] opinion in relation to this race; but because it was discovered, from
experience, that slave labor was unsuited to the climate and
productions of these state^.""^ According to Taney, these
facts determined the meaning of the Constitution: 'We refer t o
these historical facts for the purpose of showing the fixed opinions concerning that race, upon which the statesmen of that
day spoke and acted."lS0
As has been discussed elsewhere, Taney's grasp of history
was quite faulty.ls' Many Revolutionary pamphleteers had
extended their egalitarian analysis t o castigate American slavery.'82 Eighteenth-century Pennsylvania Quakers led the
fight against the slave trade.'" Thomas Jefferson, author of
the Declaration of Independence, expressed racist sentiments,
but he also believed blacks had equal liberties? Better history probably would not have changed the outcome. Taney
could have accurately distinguished such progressive views as
178. The unhappy black race were separated from the white by indelible
marks, and laws long before established, and were never thought of or
spoken of except as property, and when the claims of the owner or
the profit of the trader were supposed to need protection.
This state of public opinion had undergone no change when the
Constitution was adopted, as is equally evident from its provisions
and language.
Id. at 410.
179. Id. at 412.
180. Id. at 409; see also Woodson v. Murdock, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 351, 376
(1874) (Miller, J., dissenting) (holding that state can release lien on railroad).
181. See generally Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred Again: Originalism's Forgot37 (1993); Herbert J. Storing, Slavery and the
ten Past, 10 CONST.COMMENTARY
OF THE AMMoral Foundations of the American Republic, in MORALFOUNDATIONS
ERICAN REPUBLIC214-33 (Robert H. Horwitz ed., 1979).
Taney's history was controversial at the time. One of the lawyers in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania had stated more than a decade earlier: "Before the close of the Revolution, however, public opinion in the northern section of the country, had materially changed with regard to the policy and humanity of [slavery]." 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
539, 563 (1842). Chief Justice Taney had a Merent view: "The number [of blacks]
that had been emancipated at that time were but few in comparison with those
held in slavery; and they were identified in the public mind with the race to
which they belonged." Dred Scott, 60 U.S.(19 How.) at 411. In addition to criticizing Taney's history, Justice Curtis relied on learned men to limit slavery to positive law because it was "contrary to natural right," a concept "agreed [to] by all
writers on the subject." Id. at 624 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
182. BAILYN,supra note 57, at 232-46.
183. DAVIDH. FISCHER, ALBION'SSEED601-03 (1989).
184. JEFFERSON,
supra note 75, at 163.

,
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minority sentiments, even in the North, at the times of the
Revolution and Constitutional ratification.
Taney's one-sided history demonstrates the perils judges
face in assessing public opinion of any form, at any time. It is
hard for Justices to determine the views of the Framers, the
mood of the country at the time the relevant text was ratified,
or the country's opinion a t the time of a decision. Given their
tendency to make everything in their opinions converge toward
one seemingly inevitable outcome, Justices tend to get nonjudicia1 facts wrong. Even if Justices do get such facts right, they
will (or at least should) rely on existing historiography, which
is far from immutable.
Nevertheless, Taney's analysis demonstrates that the
Court must determine at least one form of public opinion in
every constitutional law case. The Court should determine why
the general populace, not just some articulate, vocal Framers,
agreed to the constitutional text in question. If the Justices isolate themselves from large segments of history by refusing t o
determine public consciousness at the time of the ratification of
a given text, they eliminate a major constraint and grounding
factor that regulates law.
No Justice has claimed that history is so unknowable that
it is constitutionally irrelevant. Consequently, any argument
against the Court's use of public opinion, based upon judicial
ignorance or institutional incompetence, proves too much. Assuming the Court can begin to assess public opinion in 1789, it
has a similar ability to discern the current public mood. The
Court admittedly has limited competence to assess any form of
public opinion, as Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
noted in Casey, but the Court has even less capacity to determine public beliefs two hundred years ago, particularly the
beliefs of the average citizen. Current public opinion may be an
inappropriate variable in constitutional adjudication, but the
argument against it must extend beyond judicial competence,
because that argument also undermines any judicial use of
history and tradition, favorite arguments of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.
Perhaps the Court should only try to ascertain the
Framers' views, not public opinion at the time of text's ratification. But that interpretation undermines the fundamental
premise that the Constitution reflects the sovereign will of the
people, not the Framers. By consulting only the Framers, the
Court would be constitutionalizing the elite views of the politi-
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cal leadership. The Court is supposed to be an intermediary for
the people, not for the drafters. After all, judicial review is
partially premised upon the argument that the Court is enforcing the views of the supermajority against, the People, the
temporary majority. More practically, the body politic would be
very wary of ever committing to a constitutional text if they
knew their opinions were going to be completely ignored once
the text was put into place.
The Court needs to consult general public opinion to determine the Framers' views. After all, the Framers self-conscious1y
took public opinion into consideration. Thaddeus Stevens, for
example, complained about the Joint Resolution that became
the Fourteenth Amendment: "This proposition is not all that
the committee desired. It falls far short of my wishes, but it
fulfills my hopes. I believe it is all that can be obtained in the
present state of public opinion."185 Making such determinations will not be easy. The Supreme Court can learn much
about widespread public opinion by consulting such works as
Professor Fischer's Albion's Seed, which not only captures the
everyday life of America before the revolution but also demonstrates that American culture and politics were influenced by
four radically different conceptions of liberty. 1' 36
Fortunately, the Dred Scott Court did not have the last
word on slavery.18' Abraham Lincoln, who had earlier glorified the rule of law, became a Humean political analyst, asserting that "[olur government rests in public opinion. Whoever can
change public opinion, can change the government, practically,
just s o
While President, Lincoln justified his ag-

185. CONG.GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866), cited in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 175 (1970) (upholding federal law setting minimum age for federal elections but striking down minimum age for state elections).
supra note 183, at 782.
186. FISCHER,
187. The subsequent furor over admitting Kansas as a slave state may have
been a more divisive event than Dred Scott. See, e.g., K E ~ M.
H ~ ~ T A M ~AMERIP,
CA IN 1857 (1990).
188. Abraham Lincoln, Speech in Chicago, Ill. (Dec. 10, 1856), in 2 RIE W m INGS OF ABRAHAMLINCOLN284 (Arthur B. Lapsey, Constitutional ed. 1923). The
Lincoln-Douglas debates, which focused on slavery and Dred Scott, reflected the
building tensions between law and public opinion concerning slavery. For Douglas,
law was supreme, perhaps even to the point of stifling subsequent criticism: "As a
lawyer, I feel at liberty to appear before the Court and controvert any principle of
law while the question is pending before the tribunal; but when the decision is
made, my private opinion, your opinion, all other opinions must yield to the majesty of that authoritative adjudication." Stephen A. Douglas, Douglas at Chicago
(July 9, 1858), in TIMES, July 11, 1958, reprinted in PAULM. ANGLE, CREATED
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gressive tactics against the Southern rebellion, such as jailing
hostile Maryland legislators and other dissidents, because the
public would retain the last word about the validity of these actions through the electoral and impeachment processes. At
critical points, constitutional trust is more important than
constitutional law.'' Ralph Waldo Emerson described with
admiration how Lincoln patiently waited for the right moment
to free all slaves behind rebel lines:
The extreme moderation with which the President advanced
to his design-his long-avowed expectant policy, as if he chose
to be strictly the executive of the best public sentiment of the
country, waiting only till it should be unmistakably pronounced-so fair a mind that none ever listened so patiently
to such extreme varieties of opinion."190

EQUAL?THE COMPLETE
LINCOLN-DOUGLAS
DEBATESOF 1858, at 20 (1958).
Lincoln replied that he did not advocate resistance to the actual Dred Scott
decision; he opposed extending the decision beyond the actual parties. "[Douglas]
would make it a rule of political action for the people and all the departments of
government. I would not. By resisting it as a political rule, I disturb no right of
property, create no disorder, excite no mobs." Abraham Lincoln, Lincoln at Springfield (July 17, 1858), in ILL. ST. J., July 20-21, 1858, reprinted in ANGLE, supra, a t
78. Lincoln observed that "a vast portion of the American people . . . look upon
[slavery] as a vast moral evil." Abraham Lincoln, Lincoln at Chicago (July 10,
1858), in DAILYDEMOCRAT,
July 13, 1858, reprinted in ANGLE,supra, at 35.
Douglas attacked Lincoln's nonviolent attempt to use public opinion to amend
judicial constitutional doctrine: 'Why, he is going to appeal to the people to elect a
Resident who will appoint judges who will reverse the Dred Scott decision . . . .
It is a proposition to make that court the corrupt, unscrupulous tool of a political
party." Stephen A. Douglas, Douglas at Springfield (July 17, 1858), in ILL. LFT.
REG., July 19, 1858, reprinted in ANGLE,supra, at 57.
Frederick Douglass believed that the existing constitutional text was not an
obstacle to manumission:
I have much confidence in the instincts of the slaveholders. They see that
the Constitution will afford slavery no protection when it shall cease to
be adminiatered by the slaveholders. They see, moreover, that if there is
once a will in the people of America to abolish slavery, there is no word,
no syllable in the Constitution to forbid that result.
Frederick Douglass, The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro-Slave? or
Anti-Slavery?, in 2 LIFE AND WRITINGS
OF FREDERICK
DOUGLASS
478 (P.Foner ed.,
1950).
189. "[Tlhe constitution is different, in its application in cases of Rebellion or
Invasion, involving the Public Safety, from what it is in times of profound peace
and public security . . . ." Letter &om Abraham Lincoln to Ohio Democrats (June
THOUGHT OF ABRAHAMLINCOLN261 (Richard N. Current
29, 1863), in POLITICAL
ed., 1967). According to Garry Wills, Lincoln never tried to grasp more power than
was legally available under the Constitution to suppress the Rebellion. GARRY
WILIS, LINCOLN
AT GETNSBURG139-40 (1992).
The Emancipation Proclamation (1862), in SE190. RALPHWALDOEMERSON,
LECTED WRITINGS886, quoted in WILLS, supra note 189, at 104.
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Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation echoed Jefferson's Declaration of Independence in its plea to all of mankind, to history:
"And upon this a d , sincerely believed to be a n act of justice,
warranted by the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke
the considerate judgment of mankind . . . ."lgl Lincoln's eventual triumphs, including the Thirteenth Amendment's elimination of slavery, were high-water marks of Republican participatory politics. Public opinion, combined with public will, had
transformed the Constitution into a more centralized form of
government with the power to combat all forms of racism.lg2
The tree of liberty had been rewatered with patriotic blood.
Underneath public opinion lay public will-black and white
Northern foot-soldiers' dogged deterrninati~n.'~~

F. Public Opinion and the Post-Civil War Court:
The Domestication of Public Opinion
After the Civil War, the Supreme Court domesticated public opinion. It "scientifically" developed a n elaborate, formal set
of doctrines that allegedly transcended not only the views of
the people but also the personal views of the Justices.'* For
example, the Court held that antitrust laws could not apply to
a massive sugar monopoly because the "manufacturing" of
Perhaps such artificsugar was not "interstate commer~e."'~~
es, premised upon a strong conception of individual economic
liberty that repudiated slavery, were necessary healing devices.lg6 It may have been time for the Court to appear to depo-

191. ABRAHAMLINCOLN,THE EMANCIPATION
PROCLAMATION
(1863). See generally MARK E. NEELYJR.,THE FATEOF LIBERTY(1991) (evaluating Lincoln's civil
liberties record during the Civil War). Not everyone was pleased with Lincoln's
assertion of vast power, whether allegedly under the Constitution or not. Former
Justice Curtis criticized pro-Lincoln newspaper assertions "that 'nobody cares'
whether a great public a d of the President of the United States is in conformity
with or is subversive of the supreme law of the land." 2 A MEMOIROF BENJAMIN
ROBBINSCURTISL.L.D. 332 (Benjamin R. Curtis ed., 1879).
192. Conservatives like Justice Scalia would argue that the new Constitutional
settlement precludes the use of virtually all racial categories.
193. See generally JAMES
M. MCPHERSON,
BATI'LECRYOF FREEDOM:
THE CML
WAR ERA(1988).
194. See David D. Field, Magnitude and Importance of Legal Science (Address
at the opening of the Law School of the University of Chicago, Sept. 21, 1859), in
1 SPEECHES,ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS
PAPERSOF DAVIDDUDLEY FIELD
517-33 (A.P. Sprague ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1884).
195. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding antitrust
laws not applicable to manufacturing of sugar).
196. ROBERTH. WIEBE, THE SEARCHFOR ORDER 1877-1920 (1967).

10371

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION

1083

liticize the Constitution in particular and the legal system in
general, both having been battered by the slavery debate.lg7
Hundreds of thousands had been killed to resolve these constitutional disputes, while politicians continued t o wave the
"Bloody Shirt" even after the War to provoke sectional conflict.lg8
One function of the Supreme Court is the preservation of
social order. To achieve this end, the Court must determine the
public mood, develop a mode of rhetoric that the public finds
acceptable, and make decisions that the public at least tolerates. The postbellum Court's pseudo-scientific jurisprudence
apparently fooled, or at least satisfied, enough people so the
country could turn from the contentious issue of constitutional
interpretation to the far less divisive task of making money. In
other words, Langdellian formalistic jurisprudence had some
salutary effects for twenty to thirty years after the Civil War.
Supreme Court decisions like in re Debs,199which permitted the federal courts t o fight unions with labor injunctions,
and Lochner u. New York,2°0which opposed legislative regulation of the market by striking down a state law limiting bakers'
working hours, revealed the limits, both conceptually and practically, of the Court's formalistic ideology.
By self-consciously ignoring public opinion, the Court
missed a fundamental change in political consciousness. The
debate over the Lochner jurisprudence dwelled on the appropriate role of public opinion. Dissenters like Justice Brandeis,
who opposed economic substantive due process, expressly argued that the Court improperly excluded public opinion. Conversely, when the Lochner-style Justices ended up on the losing
side during the 1930s, they criticized the new majorities for
capitulating t o public opinion.
More recently, Justice Scalia seeks an objective Constitution governed by fixed legal principles. He has tried to weed
public opinion out of constitutional adjudication, with the exception of public opinion expressed through positive law, in
order to form a constitutionally protected "tradition." Although
such formalistic interpretations might have satisfied

197.
198.
(1967).
199.
200.

See ROBERTM. COVER, JUSTICEACCUSED (1975).
KENNETH M. STAMPP,
THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION:1865-1877,at 117
158 U.S. 564 (1895).
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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post-Civil War generations who were enamored with scientific
metaphors, such interpretations are unlikely to persuade a
modern, relativistic America. Perhaps the post-World War I1
Court should not have resolved as many issues as it did, keeping them instead in the democratic domain. Supreme Court
nominations might be less theatrical if the Court were less
important, but such a n institutional shift can only occur with
societal consensus. Since such a consensus seems unlikely to
develop, one can only hope that recent domestic conflicts like
abortion and racial relations prove to be less polarizing than
~lavery.~''

I. Informed public opinion: Determining "cruel and unusual
punishment" under the Eighth Amendment
In Casey?O2 Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist
rejected a venerable constitutional tradition when they severed
constitutional law from public opinion. For over a hundred
years, state and federal courts have explicitly used public opinion to expand the definition of "cruel and unusual punishment."
In 1866, the Supreme Court stated, "What punishments shall
be considered as infamous may be affected by the changes of
public opinion from one age to another."203In 1892, the South
Dakota Supreme Court applied severity and proportionality
standards, proscribing "very extreme cases, where the punishment proposed is so severe and out of proportion to the offense
as to shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable people.'a04 The South Dakota Supreme Court considered two forms of public opinion: the general "public sentiment" and the "judgment of reasonable people,"205similar to
Hudson's consultation of "public opinion" and "legal men."
In Weems v. United States, the Supreme Court struck down
201. Tocqueville observed that Americans tend to turn all political questions
supm note **, at 290.
into legal questions. 2 TOCQUEVILLE,
202. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
203. Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 351 (1886) (holding that crime
punishable by imprisonment is "infamous crime* under Fifth Amendment); see also
Medley, Petitioner, 134 U.S. 160, 170 (1890) ("In Great Britain, as in other countries, public sentiment revolted against this severity, and . . . the additional punishment of solitary confinement was repealed.").
204. State v. Becker, 51 N.W. 1018, 1022 (S.D. 1892), quoted in Harmelin v.
Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2696 (1991) (upholding mandatory life sentence for
conviction of possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine).
205. Beckr, 51 N.W. a t 1022. Compare this with the approach taken in United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32 (1812).
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bizarre punishments such as being forced to wear chains while
in prison for twelve years and being put under permanent
surveillance for making a false entry. The Weems Court echoed
Hudson's dual conception of public opinion: ''me [cruel and unusual punishment] clause of the Constitution in the opinion of
the learned commentators may be therefore progressive, and is
not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."206 The
Weems decision defined the appropriate form of public opinion
as a benign interaction between humane, learned commentators and the general public, a synthesis of the elite and the
masses, of Federalism and Republicanism.
Weems quoted Judge Cooley as one of its learned commentators. Cooley had written that states could not "establish the
whipping post and the pillory in those States where they were
never recognized as instruments of punishment, or in those
States whose constitutions, revised since public opinion had
banished them, have forbidden cruel and unusual punishment~."~"As the Weems Court noted, Cooley's analysis was
not very clear.208In the second part of the quote, Cooley only
considered public opinion at the time of constitutional ratification. He argued the state constitution had to be revised after
public opinion changed t o justify a particular constitutional
limitation. Yet, Cooley also applied a more universal approach-certain punishments could never be introduced if they
had not been previously used. In other words, a few states
could continue t o use the pillory if it had been their practice or
could reintroduce the pillory if public opinion had approved of
the practice at the time of Constitutional ratification, but the
rest of the states could never use the pillory. Although profoundly different in details, Cooley's conception of public opinion foreshadowed, at least in terms of complexity, Justice
Souter's theory of public opinion.
The Eighth Amendment did not play a major role again in
constitutional adjudication until aRer the Second World War.
When the Court fmally returned to the Clause, not only did it
embrace the concept of public opinion, but it also flirted with
notoriously fickle and unreliable public opinion polls.209For
206. 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
207. Id. (quoting 1 THOMAS
M. COOLEX,A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS
694 (8th ed. 1927)).
208. Id. at 375.
209. In 1968 the Court noted, "It appears that, in 1966, approximately 42% of
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some Justices, the Eighth Amendment became very dynamic,
requiring "a flexible analysis that recognized that as public
opinion changed, the validity of the penalty would have to be
re-e~arnined."~~~
Even some of the conservatives who would have upheld the
death penalty for murder in Furman v. Georgia acknowledged
the constitutional significance of polls. Justice Powell wrote:
"Public opinion polls, while of little probative relevance, corroborate substantially the conclusion derived from examining legislative activity and jury sentencing-opinion on capital punishment is 'fairly divided."*" Justice Powell had little difficulty ascertaining the public mood, at least with regards to the
more visible murder cases: "It could hardly be suggested that
in any of these highly publicized murder cases . . . the public
has exhibited any signs of 'revulsion' at the thought of executing the convicted murderers. The public outcry, as we all know,
has been quite to the contrary.77212
In other words, the conservatives developed their own data base-jury sentencing, statutes, and "public outcry"-to determine what constitutes cmel
and unusual punishment^.^'^ From both perspectives, then,
public opinion was an appropriate factor.

the American public favored capital punishment for convicted murderers, while 47%
opposed it and 11% were undecided." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520
11.16 (1968) (citing 2 POLLS,INTERNATIONAL
REVIEWON PUBLICOPINION, No. 3, at
84 (1967)). Justice Stewart acknowledged a Gallup poll in Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 181 11.25 (1976) (plurality opinion).
For a general discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of public opinion
polls, see Susan J. Becker, Public Opinion Polls and Surveys as Evidence: Suggestions for Resolving Confusing and Conflicting Stanclad Governing Weight and
Admissibility, 70 OR. L. REV. 463 (1991).
210. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 329 n.37 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). The Woodson plurality cited a House Report "noting that the modification of
the federal capital statutes to make the death penalty discretionary was in harmony with 'a growing public sentiment.' " Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
293 n.27 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citing H.R.REP. NO. 108, 54th Cong., 1st Sess.
2 (1896) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 545, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1894))) (finding mandatory death penalty unconstitutional).
211. 408 U.S. at 441 11.36 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 470 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
212. Id. at 445 (emphasis added).
213. The legislative branches also have a duty to interpret the Constitution.
For example, Congress will initially determine which crimes are "infamous": "The
cases arising under the first Clause of the F'ifth Amendment recognize that what
may be considered an 'infamous crime' within the meaning of that Clause may be
affected by changes of public opinion from one age to another." Ullmann v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422, 451 n.5 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (requiring testimony
before grand jury).
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I n the past twenty years, some Justices questioned the
constitutionalization of public opinion polls. In his concurrence
in Furman u. Georgia, Justice Thurgood Marshall found polls of
limited value: ' m e a public opinion poll obviously is of some
assistance in indicating public acceptance or rejection of a specific penalty, its utility cannot be very great.'"14 Despite what
he said above, Justice Powell's dissent in Furman also chastised the majority for relying too heavily on public opinion:
"[Hlowever one may assess the amorphous ebb and flow of
public opinion generally on this volatile issue, this type of inquiry lies a t the periphery-not the core--of the judicial process in constitutional cases. The assessment of popular opinion
is essentially a legislative, not a judicial, function."215 I n subsequent years, public opinion polls played a n increasingly unimportant role.216
More importantly, recent liberal and conservative Justices
have found any conception of public opinion to be constitutionally insignificant. Justice Marshall argued in Furman: "Regardless of public sentiment with respect to imposition of one of
these punishments in a particular case or a t any one moment
in history, the Constitution prohibits it."217Not surprisingly,

214. 408 U.S. at 361 (Marshall, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
215. Id. at 443 (Powell, J., dissenting).
216. The judicial battle against the use of public opinion, and public opinion
polls in particular, began quickly. Chief Justice Burger was disturbed by the
majority's search for public opinion in various statutes, polls, and jury decisions to
determine if a state could execute a rapist: "If the Court is to rely on some 'public
opinion' process, does this not suggest the beginning of a 'trend'?" Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 613 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (striking down death penalty for rape). In Penry v. Lynuugh, Justice O ' C o ~ o rwas unimpressed by "several
public opinion surveys that indicate strong public opposition to execution of the
retarded." Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 US. 302, 334 (1989) (upholding execution of
mentally retarded murderer).
A law review article which challenged the validity and accuracy of public opinion polls, Neil Vidmar & Phoebe Ellsworth, Prcblic Opinion and the Death Penalty,
26 STAN.L. REV. 1245 (1974), was cited in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 298 11.34 (1976) (plurality opinion), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325,
352 n.5 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (holding that mandatory death penalty violates Eighth Amendment).
217. F'urman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.238, 330 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). In
Furman, Justice Marshall also argued that informed public opinion would agree
with him that the death penalty was unconstitutional, particularly after the public
learned that the death penalty did not deter. Id. at 361-63 (Marshall, J., concurring). Although it is easy to characterize Justice Marshall's informed opinion as
opinion that agrees with him, it is important to distinguish between public opinion
that has thought about an issue in contrast to immediate public reactions. See
Gregory A. Mark & Christopher L. Eisgruber, Introduction: Law and Political Cul-
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Justice Scalia dismissed "public opinion polls, the views of
interest groups, and the positions . . . [ofl professional associations" as too uncertain a foundation for constitutional law.'18
2. The mixed role of public opinion in determining procedural
fairness for criminal trials
The Supreme Court has expressed some of its strongest
views about public opinion in criminal cases, which often involve high stakes and provoke powerful public reactions. Public
fury is often completely understandable, e.g.: "[Llittle Marsha
Brill was dragged from her bicycle on one of the public thoroughfares . . . and there stabbed to death. The impact of. . .
two similar crimes upon the public mind was terrific . . . . Not
only were they outraged but they were terrified."21g
The Court has periodically characterized the public as a
dangerous mob swayed by "public passion." Justices did not
always hide their contempt for fellow citizens. In 1851, i n the
context of a scandal over an adulterous woman who went
abroad to have her baby and then accused her husband of a
crime, the Court observed: "The early times, and the unintelligent condition of much of the population of New Orleans at
that day, must account for this absurd public opinion, and the
proceedings founded on it."220The Supreme Court reversed
the Scottsboro boys' conviction, requiring counsel in all capital
cases, because of "hostile and excited public sentiment" and an
ture, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 426 (1988) (discussing reflective public opinion).
218. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (upholding death penalty for seventeen-year-old juvenile). Although contemporary conservative Justices claimed to distance themselves from public opinion, not everyone
was convinced, even on the Court. Justice Stevens complained that "the 'hydraulic
pressure' of public opinion that Justice Holmes once described-and that properly
influences the deliberations of democratic legislatures-has played a role not only
in the Court's decision to hear this case . . . but even in its resolution of the constitutional issue involved." Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2631 (1991)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (permitting prosecutor to discuss effects of murder on family members) (footnotes omitted). Stevens also accused Justice Scalia of applying the
views of the " 'victims' rights' movement." Id.
219. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 912 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (denying certiorari to review state court order fmding radio
broadcasters in contempt).
220. Gaines v. Relf, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 472, 527 (1851) (discussing controversy
surrounding adulterous wife who had baby abroad and then misled innocent husband); see also Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 287 (1882) (approving striking attorney from roll for encouraging mob to lynch suspect); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S.
22, 23 (1889) (basing decision not to review change of venue upon court's assessment of state of public opinion).
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atmosphere of public passion.221 For instance, the defense
counsel was threatened and the trial court feared mob viol e n ~ e Later,
. ~ ~ the Court took judicial notice of the Red Scare
in determining what amount is excessive bail under the Eighth
Amendment: "But the protest charges, and the defect in the
proceedings below appears to be, that, provoked by the flight of
certain Communists after conviction, the Government demands
and public opinion supports a use of the bail power to keep
Communist defendants in jail before c ~ n v i c t i o n . " ~ ~
Over the years, the Court has created a set of rules to
resolve such cases:224"[A] trial judge must often be the bulwark of the legal system when presented with unpopular causes and adverse public opinion."* Juries were instructed to
ignore public opinion: 'When you do this you have responded to
the high responsibilities which rest upon you as jurors. It matters not whether your verdict accords with public sentiment or
not ."226
221. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 51, 58 (1932) (requiring paid counsel for
all indigents in death penalty cases).
222. DAN T. CARTER,SCOlTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN
SOUTH223-25
(1979).
223. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 10 (1951) (opinion of Jackson, J.) (requiring
proper methods for setting bail for defendants indicted under Smith Act).
224. Trial judges must determine if local public opinion was so enraged that a
defendant could not receive a fair trial: "[Tlhe refusal to grant a change of venue
on the mere affidavit of the defendants' agent to the state of public opinion in the
county clearly involves matter of fact and discretion, and is not a ruling upon a
mere question of law." Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 24-25 (1889); see also United States v. Shipp, 214 U.S. 386, 431 (1909) (Peckham, J., dissenting) ("The men
who testified that there was no apprehension of mob violence were men who were
specially cognizant of the state of public opinion at that time.").
225. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 645 n.22 (1980) (quoting Jacobs v. State,
361 So. 2d 640, 650-57 (Ma. 1978) (Jones, J., dissenting)) (not permitting death
penalty when jury was precluded from considering lesser included offense). Justice
Jackson wrote: "The judge was put in a position in which he either must appear
to yield his judgment to public clamor or to defy public sentiment." Craig v.
Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 395 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (upholding contempt for
unfairly publishing events in case pending before a state judge); see also Frank v.
Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 336 (1915) (holding that lower courts adequately considered
defendant's due process claim that trial was unfairly influenced by mob).
226. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 489 n.18 (1978) (quoting trial court
instructions). The Supreme Court has periodically wrestled with the relationship
between juries and public opinion. The Court upheld the following jury instruction:
"[Iln this part of the trial the law does not forbid you from being influenced by
pity for the defendants and you may be governed by mere sentiment and sympathy
for the defendants in arriving at a proper penalty in this case; however, the law
does forbid you from being governed by mere conjecture, prejudice, public opinion
or public feeling." McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 189 (1971) (holding that
jury cannot impose death penalty without having been given standards); accord
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In addition to keeping the adjudications immune from
undue influence by public opinion, the Supreme Court considered how public opinion directly affects the choice of appropriate criminal and civil procedures. Justices have used public
opinion to justify administrative searches? the enlargement
of "admiralty forms and jurisdiction,"228 the scope of the right
to jury under the Seventh A ~ n e n d m e n the
to a pubt ~ ~right
~
lic hearing before extradition,zsO the limited scope of the
state's defense of sovereign immunity:31 the liability of cities
for damages caused by riot,Zs2 and the absence of televisions
in the c o u r t r ~ o m In
. ~ ~Georgia u. McCollum, the Court held
that a defendant could not use peremptory strikes to eliminate
all members of a particular race, noting "two trials in Miami,
Fla., in which all African-American jurors were peremptorily
struck by white defendants accused of racial beating, and the
public outrage and riots that followed the defendants' acquitt a1."23Q
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 539 (1987) (upholding similar jury instruction).
Judicial notice of public ignorance helped determine proper jury instructions:
"The importance of a no-inference instruction is underscored by a recent national
public opinion survey conducted for the National Center for State Courts, revealing
that 37% of those interviewed believed that it is the responsibility of the accused
to prove his innocence." Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 303 13.21 (1981) (holding
that defendant had right to jury instruction explaining significance of defendant's
refusing to testify); see also Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 511 n.12 (1971)
(quoting Crocker v. Justices of the Superior Court, 94 N.E. 369, 376-77 (Mass.
1911)) (holding that statute preventing change of venue, despite prejudice, on sole
ground that the charge is a misdemeanor, violates 14th Amendment); Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 549 (1965) (excessive publicity prejudicial to defendant). The
Supreme Court has also acknowledged that juries bring a form of public opinion
into the courtroom, ensuring that the defendant is found in violation of community
mores as well as the law. Thus defense counsel could conduct a broad voir dire.
Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 US. 912, 914 (1950) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (denying certiorari).
227. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 372 (1959) (upholding health inspection
of house without search warrant).
228. Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 493 (1847) (Woodbury, J., dissenting) (admiralty case involving collision between two steamboats).
229. Fenn v. Holme, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 481, 486 (1858) (holding that plaintiff
in ejectment must always prove personal legal title).
230. In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 112 (1852) (holding that magistrate
must participate in extradition proceeding).
231. Davis v. Pringle, 268 US. 315, 318-19 (1925) (establishing priorities under
bankruptcy law), quoted in National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356,
359 (1955) (reversing dismissal of counterclaim by bank against Republic of China).
232. City of Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 324 (1911) (state can make
county liable for mob damage).
233. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 535 (1965).
234. 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354 (1992) (criminal defendant cannot use peremptory
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Even in criminal trials, public opinion has a benign side:
"The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective
restraint on possible abuse of judicial power . . . . Without
publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of
Although
publicity, all other checks are of small account.77235
trials must be conducted in
pretrial litigation can
take place behind closed doors. "Publicity concerning the proceedings a t a pretrial hearing, however, could influence public
opinion against a defendant and inform potential jurors of
inculpatory information wholly inadmissible at the actual tria1.'"37 An examination of the Court's references to public
opinion in criminal cases reveals that the Court has had several different publics in mind. The public can be dangerous,
ignorant, a source of guidance, or a benign check on judicial
abuse.
3. Public opinion as ward of the Court: The First Amendment

Progressive public opinion served as a consultant in most
Eighth Amendment cases, while public passion was viewed as a
threat in many criminal cases. In the First Amendment context, public opinion played a W e r e n t role, as a ward of the
Court. The Supreme Court has generally interpreted the First
Amendment to protect "public opinion" from inappropriate
governmental regulation. As early as 1855, dissenting Justice
Daniel equated the suppression of public opinion with tyranny,
"a power absolute and irresponsible enough to repress opposition, or to silence the expression of public ~ e n t i m e n t . "I~n ~
1889, the Court explained the importance of public debate:

challenges to exclude on the basis of race) (citing Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of
Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 195-96 (1989)). The entire Rodney King
affair offers a compelling example of how public opinion interacts with the judicial
system.
235. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1948) (reversing contempt based upon
secret proceedings), quoted in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
592 (1980) (Brennen, J., concurring in judgment) (protecting newspapers' right to
be present during criminal trial proceedings); see Gentile v. State Bar, 111 S. Ct.
2720 (1991) (protecting defense attorney statements at press conference concerning
pending adjudication).
236. Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270.
237. Gannet Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979).
238. The Steamer Oregon v. Rocca, 59 U.S. 570, 576 (1855) (Daniel, J., dissenting) (federal court has jurisdiction over maritime accident).
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"Public opinion thus enlightened [by debate], brought to bear
upon legislation, will do more than all other causes to prevent
abuses."23gTo facilitate such informed debate, the Court had
to protect the media from inappropriate governmental interferJustice
Brandeis considered public opinion to be "the
en~e.~
~'
life of the nation."241
239. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889) (upholding federal
law preventing Chinese worker from returning to United States). In several dissents, Justice Black elaborated on the Court's duty to defend unpopular political
opinions. He took judicial notice of the excesses of the Red Scare. Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 580 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) (upholding convictions of
Communist leaders under Smith Act). Justice Black analogized the Subversive
Activities Review Board's registration requirements to William Pitt's attempt to
protect the "public mind" from perverted factions by requiring all writers to sign
their works. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 153 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (upholding Board's finding that
American Communist Party was a "Communist-action organization").
240. The Court has been ambivalent about the media. On the one hand, governmental suppression of the media indicates tyranny: "The tragic history of recent
years demonstrates far too well how despotic governments may interfere with the
press and other means of communication in their efforts to corrupt public opinion
and to destroy individual freedom." Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1,
51-52 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (upholding governmental antitrust action
against news media). Consequently, the Court must protect the media: "A free
press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government and the
people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves." Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936); see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
620 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (upholding ban on political solicitations of coworkers under state merit system); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-05
(1940) (striking down state law outlawing loitering and picketing near a business).
On the other hand, the Court has also expressed fears over the media's capacity to manipulate popular opinion. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 202
(1957). It has acknowledged how a few private individuals have accumulated vast
power. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1974) (nevertheless invalidating statute forcing newspaper to print replies to editorials). That
power is largely unaccountable because the media is not forced to disclose information, while the government "may be coerced by public opinion to disclose what they
might prefer to conceal." Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (opinion of
Burger, C.J.) (denying media right of access to jail). Such concerns helped legitimate the affirmative action plan in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,
565-71 n.16 (1990) (quoting Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246,
1252 (1949)) (upholding federal afiirmative action plan to achieve broadcast diversity). The Court's media anxieties explained why it was initially unwilling to let
television into the courtroom. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 548 (1965).
Perhaps the most pathetic example of the Court's use of public opinion occurred in 1915, when it concluded that movies should not receive First Amendment
protection because films were only entertainment and could not affect public opinion. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 244-45 (1915). Whether one considers that case a "watershed" case or not, it was overruled almost forty
years later. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
241. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 340 n.1 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting John Lord O'Brian, Civil Liberty in War Time, 42 REP. N.Y. ST. B.

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION
To justify its doctrine favoring free speech, the Court has
frequently cited leading lawyers such as John Adamsu2 or
Lord Erskine, who defended Thomas Paine in a libel action
over Common Sense.243The Court has cited Thomas Jefferson, who had a broad conception of free speech (except when he
: ~ ~ opinions of men are not the object of
was P r e ~ i d e n t )"[Tlhe
~ ~ Court has
civil government, nor under its j ~ r i s d i c t i o n . "The
also quoted Justice Story:
So long as known and open responsibility is valuable a s a
check or an incentive among the representatives of a free people, so long a journal of their proceedings and their votes,
published in the face of the world, will continue to enjoy public favor and be demanded by public 0pini0n.l~~

The Court twice used the following quotation from Judge Cooley:
[The First Amendment includes the need] to protect parties in
the free publication of matters of public concern, to secure
their right to a free discussion of public events and public
measures, and to enable every citizen a t any time to bring the
government and any person in authority to the bar of public
opinion by any just criticism upon their conduct in the exer-

ASS% 308 (n.d.)) (upholding conviction under state law for teaching or advocating
resistance to war effort). Justice Jackson believed that protecting public opinion
was the goal of the First Amendment: "The very purpose of the First Amendment
is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind."
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (voiding state
law requiring labor organizers to register before soliciting members).
242. "[James] Otis' protest [that Writs of Assistance should require a showing
of probable cause] was eloquent; but he lost the case. His speech, however, rallied
public opinion. Then and there,' wrote John Adams, 'the child Independence was
born.' " Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 317 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(quoting 10 THE WORKSOF JOHN
ADAMS 248 (1856)) (permitting search based upon
reliable informant).
243. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 185 n.4 (1979) (Breman, J., dissenting in
part); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 247-48 (1936) (quoting 1
SPEECHESOF LORD ERSKINE524-25 (James C. High ed., 1876)); see also LLOYDP.
STRYKER, FORTHE DEFENSE210-16 (1947) (relating the trial of Thomas Paine).
244. See generally LEONARD
W. LEW, JEFFERSON
AND CNIL LIBERTIES: RIE
DARKERSIDE(1963) (examining Jefferson's beliefs and actions throughout his years
in public office).
245. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 2 THE
JEFFERSONIAN
CYCLOPEDIA
app. 976 (John P. Fowler ed., 1967), quoted in Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 25 (1968) (proscribing presidential security screening
program of merchant mariners).
246. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 671 (1892) (quoting 1 STORY,C O N S ~ I O N
Q 841) (upholding delegation of import duty powers to President).

1094 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993
cise of the authority which the people have conferred upon
them.247

There should be little surprise that the Court has frequently cited famous thinkers, politicians, and treatise writers in
constitutional adjudication. The Federalist Papers is the most
prominent
Every modern Justice has considered
such authorities. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist, who asserted
in Casey that the Court should not listen to any form of public
opinion, cited John Locke as an authority in a constitutional
opinion.249Justice Scalia cited with approval an article by
Professor Epstein in Lucas u. South Carolina Coastal
Council.250Such citations provide additional authority allowing the Justices to consult "informed public opinion," to interact
with the legal scholars who struggle with difficult jurisprudential problems. The real debate is not over consulting public
opinion, it is over whose public opinions should be considered.
The Court's duty to protect politically unpopular opinions251puts the Court in a difficult balancing act. Both major-

247. 2 THOMASL. COOLEY, C O N ~ I O N ALIMITATIONS
L
885 (Walter
Carrington ed., 8th ed. 1927), quoted in Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 392 (1962)
(reversing judicial contempt).
248. Wilson, supra note 80.
249. Justice Rehnquist favorably referred to John Locke in Industrial Union
Department v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 672-73 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) (striking down OSHA regulation concerning
exposure to benzene).
250. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992) (citing Richard Epstein, Takings: Descent
and Resurrection, 1987 SUP.CT. REV. 1).
251. At some point, however, political dissent becomes constitutionally unprotected violence: "It seems to me most important that the courts should distinguish
between the two with particular care in these days, when officials under the pressure of events and public opinion are tempted to blur the distinction." Norton v.
Discipline Comm. of E. Tenn. State Univ., 399 US. 906, 909 (1970) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (allowing no remedy for students suspended for
distributing leaflets criticizing university administration). The distinction is not
easy to find.
Judge Learned Hand claimed to protect "public opinion" but excluded the counselling of legal disobedience:
One may not counsel or advise others to violate the law as it stands.
Words are not only the keys of persuasion, but the triggers of action, and
those which have no purport but to counsel the violation of law cannot by
any latitude of interpretation be a part of that public opinion which is
the final source of government in a democratic state.
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
In Thornhill v. Alabama, Justice Murphy made access to the "market of public
opinion" the constitutional lodestone that separates permissible from unprotected
political speech: "Abridgment of the liberty of such discussion can be justified only
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ities and minorities have the right t o express themselves: 'Because a subject is legally arguable, however, does not mean
that public sentiment will be patient of its advocacy at all
times and in all manners."252To protect minorities from majority abuses of their free speech rights, the Court must determine the climate of opinion a t the time253of a particular constitutional controversy: "People were threatened in N.A.A.C.P.
and Bates. But while an angry public opinion, and the evils
which it may spawn, are relevant considerations in adjudging,
in light of the totality of relevant considerations, . . . the existence of an ugly public temper does not, as such and without
more, incapacitate government."254
When it makes such factual determinations, the Court

where the clear danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no
opportunity to test the merits of the ideas by competition for acceptance in the
market of public opinion." 310 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1940). In other words, certain categories of speech are unprotected because they short-circuit public discourse, preventing public opinion from having the last word. First Amendment doctrine
therefore incorporates public opinion both as an end and as a doctrinal litmus test.
252. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 33 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(statute prohibiting any breach of peace could not be applied with the First
Amendment to person making controversial speech).
253. The Court has defended particularly virulent speech during elections.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976) (per curiam) (striking down various limits
on campaign spending). As early as 1852, a dissenting Justice tried to
constitutionalize the public's earlier rejection of the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798.
The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 514 (1849) (Daniel, J., dissenting)
(voiding state tax upon alien passengers). Consequently, political campaigns can be
very ugly affairs, constrained only by public opinion.
Justice Scalia let his disgust overwhelm his judgment when he stated:
I doubt that those who framed and adopted the First Amendment would
agree that avoiding the New Corruption, that is, calibrating political
speech to the degree of public opinion that supports it, is even a desirable
objective, much less one that is important enough to qualify as a compelling state interest. Those Founders designed, of course, a system in which
popular ideas would ultimately prevail.
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 693 (1990) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (majority upheld state law prohibiting corporations from using general treasury funds in election); see also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 261
n.16 (1952) (quoting David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group
Libel, 42 COLUM.L. REV.727, 728 (1942)) (upholding statute outlawing group defamation). I t is easy to become appalled by politicians, political campaigns, the media, the electorate, the average citizen, even democracy itself. The American experiment may fail, but it would more likely collapse should a petulant Court withdraw
constitutional protection from basic democratic processes, tawdry though they sometimes are. The Court must accept the glitter and manipulation as existing costs
and characteristics of American democratization.
254. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 102 (1961) (emphasis added).
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should not be very deferential to the elected branches255nor
to the juries who decide "constitutional facts" that can undermine free speech rights. The Court was correct in closely scmtinizing a jury decision that civil rights leader Medgar Evers
caused recompensable damage for leading an economic boycott
during the Civil Rights movement? The subtle -relationship
between law and public opinion permeates this area of constitutional law. The Court's determinations of which "facts" a jury
must decide and what "standards" a jury must apply, such as
"clear and present danger" for seditious speech, "malice" for
libel against a public figure, or "prevailing community staninvariably
~~'
reflect the Court's underlydards" for o b ~ c e n i t ~
ing view of how and how much local public opinion should constrain various categories of speech.25s

255. W]e are cautioned that state legislatures must be leR free to
'experiment' and to make 'legislative' judgments. We are told that
mistakes may be made during the legislative process of curbing public
opinion. In such event the Court fortunately does not leave those
mistakenly curbed, or any of us for that matter, unadvised.
Beauharmis, 343 U.S. at 270 (Black, J., dissenting).
256. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 US. 886, 932-34 (1982).
257. Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962) (opinion of Harlan,
J.) (post office could not ban magazines which were not obscene). Dissenting in an
obscenity case, Justice Douglas complained that the unelected judiciary should not
set strict obscenity standards because that would bend "the popular mind to new
norms of conformity." United States v. 12 2004% Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413
U.S. 123, 137 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Congress may ban obscene material
under Commerce Clause).
258. No history of public opinion in constitutional interpretation would be
complete without noting the Court's tendency to provide less protection to political
dissent during wartime, when the majority popular opinion is of'ten the most cohesive and self-righteous. Only one of the World War I speech cases overtly discussed
public opinion, but they all reflected it. According to the dissent in Schaefer, the
First Amendment does not proted "wilIfully untrue statements or reports of military operations which might mislead public opinion as to the competency of the
army or navy or its leaders." Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 492-93
(1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (evidence sufficient to convict several defendants
under Espionage Act). The Schaefer Court actually created a "malice" standard of
"willfblly untrue statements" that is not all that different from the acclaimed malice standard in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 US. 254 (1964) (striking down
jury verdict for libel against public figures for lack of malice). Consequently, the
real problem with many cases is neither the principles nor the doctrines, it is the
application of those principles and doctrines.
On the other hand, the general goal of encouraging debate so public opinion
can be better infomed has led to Justices' arguing for a generous reading of the
Speech and Debate Clause. See Gravel v. United States, 408 US. 606 (1972) (holding that Speech and Debate Clause immunity extends to Senator's aide). The Court
has to battle governmental secrecy: "By using devices of secrecy, the government
attains the power to 'manage' the news and through it to manipulate public

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION
4. Public opinion triumphant: Economic and social legislation

a. The Lochner era. After the Civil War, the Court created a more formalistic, pseudo-scientific jurisprudence, which
was gradually undermined by internal contradictions, Legal
Realism, and the Depre~sion.~"The Lochner era attempted
to create objective, principled doctrinal limits that would permit the Justices to distinguish between unconstitutional interferences and legitimate exercises of the police power, as well as
between law and policy. The quest was futile because doctrine
will always have an element of incoherence due to irreconcilable political goals and beliefs. The legal system, particularly i n
its leading cases, invariably reflects society's most pressing tensions. After all, the "felt necessities of the time" influence plaintiffs even more than courts. The nine Justices are torn between
competing interests and ideologies which have a claim to some
power and constitutional protection.

opinion." Id. at 640-41 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Secrecy in a Free Society,
213 NATION254, 256 (1971)); see also Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 671 (1892) (upholding congressional delegation of power); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S.
581, 603 (1889). Free speech within Congress was particularly important: T h e
actual and practical security for English liberty against legislative tyranny was the
power of a free public opinion represented by the Commons." Wilson v. New, 243
U.S. 332, 366 (1917) (Day, J., dissenting) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516, 531 (1884)) (Congress has power to set eight-hour-day work limits but not
wages for interstate carriers).
Justices have noted the link between informed public opinion and free speech
while deciding to be wary of censorship, Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365
U.S. 43, 68-69 (1961) (Warren, CJ., dissenting) (permitting city to require film be
presented to it prior to granting of permit); to require full dissemination of information about labor disputes, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (striking down statute prohibiting picketing near businesses); to disclose allegedly improper business practices, Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 305 (1941) (Black, J., dissenting); to guarantee free speech rights of civil servants, Wieman v. Updegrd, 344 U.S. 183, 191
(1952) (proscribing loyalty oath for civil servants); and to insure the separation of
church and state, Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2674-75 (1992) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (public school could not have nonsectarian prayer at graduation ceremony). In a similar vein, an attorney told the Court in 1866: "Wlhenever the people
are told, as they have been in this case, that the indefeasible right to worship God
according to the dictates of conscience is about to be invaded, the public mind a t
once arouses itself to repel the invasion." Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
277, 304 (1866) (argument of State counsel) (prohibiting State from requiring clerics and priests to take oath that they never assisted Confederacy).
259. Professor Horwitz has described how American law evolved from a
Blackstonian, quasi-feudalism to an explicitly developmental system and next to a
,
1780-1860, supra note 162, at 166.
"formalist" approach. H o R ~TRANSFORMATION
Horwitz's second book describes how formalism collapsed under legal realism's
assault. H o R ~ TRANSFORMATION
,
1870-1960, supra note 44.
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In his famous dissent in Lochner, Justice Holmes reminded
the nation of the Court's limits. The Lochner majority did not
only err because they constitutionalized their own economic
ideology. They also ignored the public's views: "I think that the
word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when
it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion . . . ."260 Such relativism undercuts both the Casey joint
opinion and Justice Scalia's dissent. On a doctrinal level, Justice Holmes advised against an expansive judicial reading of
substantive due process. But more generally, he was wary of
any rigid theory, such as Justice Scalia's originalism, which can
isolate the Court from the polity. The rest of that same sentence in his Lochner dissent demonstrates that Holmes' skepticism still mandated limited judicial review: "[Whenever] it can
be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit
that the statute proposed would infiringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law."261 Even this scope of judicial review is contextual; the Court must protect America. traditions and American law, not jurisprudential abstractions.
Another problem with Lochner-style substantive due process was the Court's inconsistency. The Supreme Court has
continually fluctuated between perceiving the public and public
opinion as perverse, wise, and sovereign, even during the
pro-capital eras of vested rights and Lochner formalism. Sometimes the postCivi1 War Court denigrated the general
populace's wisdom, noting, for example, "the well-known mania
of the people to run in debt for public improvements?"
Thus, private corporations had to be protected from public
venality to avoid "the monstrous injustice of thus placing the
large investments of complainant, made under the stimulus of
the inducement held out by the act of 1858, a t the absolute
260. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For
further discussion of this passage fiom Lochner, see Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term--Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal
Fundamentali@ Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 32, 79-82 (1993).
Holmes' common law tradition remains a more formidable obstacle, with a
lengthy historical pedigree, to Justice Scalia's "originalism" than the "noninterpretivism'' that Justice Scalia has castigated. Scalia has explicitly rejected the
common law perspective. Antonin Scalia, Essay: The Ruk of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
261. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
262. Ritchie v. Franklin County, 89 U.S. 67, 75 (1874) (state can collect special
tax to pay interest on bonds).
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mercy of an irresponsible public sentiment, or of public cupidiIndeed, the people would not have ratified the Constitution if there was "the possibility of a government usurping
the ordinary business of individuals, driving them out of the
market."2MThe Constitution limited state power in the marketplace: "It is not t o be supposed that the company would
have entered upon this large undertaking in view of the possibility that, in one of the sudden changes of public opinion t o
which all municipalities are more or less subject, the city might
resolve t o enter the field itself."265
Nevertheless, that same formalistic Court often deferred t o
the public. In 1876, the Court applied the malleable law-policy
distinction to uphold the purchase of stock by local communities t o construct a toll road: "Whether the policy was a wise one
or not is not now the question. It was in accordance with the
public sentiment of that period."266Through the legislature,
the public could determine the means of economic development:
"[Tlhe legislature, reflecting the public sentiment, [can] decide
that this general benefit is better promoted by [railroads'] construction through individuals or corporations than by the State
itself."267Because corporations were state creatures, the government could limit their powers and regulate their abuses.
Legislatures could define and proscribe monopolies based upon
"[Tlhe general sentiment of the public depublic ~entiment:~"
clares that such monopolies must be limited to the necessities
of the case, and rebels against the attempt of one road to control all traffic between terminal points.'a69 Public opinion, op-

263. Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347, 367 (1884) (Field,

J., dissenting) (quoting a United States district court case from California) (states
can require utilities to supply goods at fmed prices).
264. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 457 (1905) (state agents
liable for federal liquor tax).
265. Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1898)
(holding city can not er& water works in violation of contractual noncompetition
clause).
266. County of Scotland v. Thomas, 94 U.S. 682, 693 (1876) (holding county
can issue bonds).
267. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry., 135 US. 641, 658 (1890) (quoting
1 COOLEY,supra note 247, at 537) (holding that Congress has power to grant railroad right of -way through Indian Territory).
268. "It is certainly the conception of a large body of public opinion that the
control of prices through combinations tends to restraint of trade and to monopoly,
and is evil." National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 129 (1905) (holding
state antitrust laws do not violate due process).
269. Pearsall v. Great N. Ry., 161 U.S. 646, 676-77 (1896) (state can amend
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erating through the legislature, could be the basis for amending corporate charters: "[Hlence it has been held that charters
for purposes inconsistent with a due regard for the public
health o r public morals may be abrogated in the interests of a
more enlightened public opinion."70 The states could also use
their police power to regulate some markets, or in the case of
lotteries and intoxicating liquors~" even ban the sale of previously legal goods.272Most importantly, the Court ignored
Taney's interpretive technique in Dred Scott, upholding paper
money even though the "public mind" at the time of constitucorporate charter if right to amend in original incorporation). "The acts of the
Minnesota legislature of 1874 and 1881 undoubtedly reflected the general sentiment
of the public, that their best security is in competition." Id. at 677.
270. Id. at 666. The states first had to put a savings clause in the charter to
allow future legislative amendments. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 708 (1819) (Story, J., concurring).
271. For some years after the Civil War, leading dissenters to the Lochner
jurisprudence made explicit references to public opinion. The first Justice Harlan
asserted in Pollock that public opinion, not the Court, should determine income tax
rates:
But the remedy for such abuses is to be found at the ballot-box, and in a
wholesome public opinion which the representatives of the people will not
long, if at all, disregard, and not in the disregard by the judiciary of
powers that have been committed to another branch of the government.
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 680 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (finding federal income tax to be unconstitutional direct tax).
Justice Holmes held public opinion in little regard: "I loathe the thick-fingered
clowns we call the people." Letter from Oliver W. Holmes Wov. 16, 1862), in
TOUCHED
WITH FIRE: CIVILWARLETTERSAND DIARY71 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1946),
quoted in HORW, TRANSFORMATION
1870-1960, supm note 44, at 123. Nevertheless, he concluded the public could abuse many constitutional powers without legal
recourse:
The truth seems to me to be that, subject to compensation when compensation is due, the legislature may forbid or restrict any business when it
has a sufficient force of public opinion behind it . . . . Wine has been
thought good for man from the time of the Apostles until recent years.
But when public opinion changed it did not need the Eighteenth Amendment, notwithstanding the Fourteenth, to enable a State to say that the
business should end.
Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing
state can enforce criminal prohibition against reselling tickets at higher prices). A
lawyer appearing before the Supreme Court anticipated Holmes in 1847: "But there
was no occasion to multiply proofs of public opinion, for intemperance was everywhere deprecated and lamented, and had almost everywhere fallen under the condemnation of legal restraint, by enactments for that purpose, or by taxation."
Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 520-21 (1847) (argument of State
counsel).
272. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 392 (1898) (refusing to grant habeas carpus petition to individual charged with violating maximum hour limitations for
miners).
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tional ratification opposed such inflationary, pro-debtor
means.273
Lawyers quickly seized upon such internal contradictions.
Overtly influenced by Brandeis' famous brief, the Supreme
Court in Muller v. Oregon created a loophole to reconcile the
tension between perpetually changing public opinion and a
fixed, written Constitution:
The -legislation and opinions referred to in the margin may
not be, technically speaking, authorities, and in them is little
or no discussion of the constitutional question presented to us
for determination, yet they, are significant of a widespread
belief that woman's physical structure . . . justify special
legislati[ve] restrict[ions] . . . . Constitutional questions, it is
true, are not settled by even a consensus of present public
opinion, for it is the peculiar value of a written constitution
that it places in unchanging form limitations upon legislative
action, and thus gives a permanence and stability to popular
government which otherwise would be lacking.274
'

The Muller Court attempted t o reconcile the fixed text with
fluid public opinion by asserting that public opinion does not
"settle" constitutional cases. Public opinion, however, could
influence constitutional determinations. The Muller Court technically decided the case by labelling the shift in public opinion
a question of "fact":
At the same time, when a question of fact is debated and
debatable, and the extent to which a special constitutional
limitation goes is affected by the truth in respect to that fact,
a widespread and long continued belief concerning i t is worthy of consideration. We take judicial cognizance of all matters of general kn~wledge?'~

Justices frequently employed the fact-law distinction to shift
away from existing doctrinal formalism, recharacterizing questions of law as questions of fact. Not surprisingly, Justice
Brandeis, author of the famed Muller brief, was a leader in the

'

273. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 6!54 (1870) (Field, J., dissentPAPERS1345 (Henry D. Gilpin ed.,
ing) (quoting Mr. Ellsworth in 3 MADISON
1842)) (upholding congressional power to print paper money); see also Hepburn v.
Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 633 (1869) (Miller, J., dissenting) (invalidating
statute permitting paper money to satisfy debts).
274. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420 (1908) (emphasis added) (upholding
ten-hour day for women workers).
275. Id. at 420-21.
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use of this technique. Justice Brandeis wrote that both Congress and the public legitimately could consider the "evidential
fact" of changes in the cost of living?" In an earlier dissent,
Justice McKema noted that public opinion had changed about
changed-and a
unions: 'We know things are in chang-have
mark of it is that the drift of public opinion, and of legislation
following opinion, is to alter the relation between employer and
employee."277In short, the constitutionality of a statute depended on five Justices' determination that a certain variable
had become a social, legislative "fact.'a78 Eventually, public
opinion, by itself, became a constitutionally relevant "fact" for
Brandeis:
Nearly all legislation involves a weighing of public needs as
against private desires; and likewise a weighing of relative
social values. Since government is not an exact science, prevailing public opinion concerning the evils and the remedy is
among the important facts deserving consideration; particularly, when the public conviction is both deep-seated and
widespread and has been reached aRer deliberati~n.~"

These interpretations resemble Justice Souter's argument
in Casey that the Court should consider overruling watershed
cases when there is widespread belief that the facts have
changed. Once the Court permits public opinion to redetermine
such legislative/constitutional "facts" as women's vulnerability
in Muller or black schoolchildren's injuries in Brown, public
opinion will have the capacity to transform most constitutional
doctrines. The constitutional text remains the same, but its
meaning becomes

276. St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. v. United States, 279 U.S. 461, 496 (1929)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (ICC can issue recaption order requiring railroads to place
excess income in a reserve fund and not to keep interest there).
277. Arizona Employers' Liab. Cases, 250 U.S. 400, 438 (1919) (McKenna, J.,
dissenting) (upholding state employers' liability law for inherently hazardous employments).
,
1870-1960, supra note 44, at 189, 198.
278. See H o R ~ TRANSFORMATION
279. Truax v. Conigan, 257 U.S. 312, 357 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted) (state cannot immunize union leaders fiom civil liabilities).
280. Although he lost the case, the Solicitor General advocating enforcement of
child labor laws combined public opinion with existing caselaw upholding state
t denied that a change in public opinion regarding child
police powers: "It c a ~ o be
labor has occurred like that in relation to lottery tickets." Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251, 253 (1918) (argument of Solicitor General) (Congress cannot regulate
child labor).
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b. The death of economic substantive due process. Although a judicial revolution occurred in 1937, the first
shift took place three years earlier. Taking judicial notice of the
Depression, the Court upheld a state law limiting creditors'
remedies against defaulting mortgage holders in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. B l a i ~ d e l lThe
. ~ ~majority
~
disregarded the
history of the impairment of Contract Clause, which indicated
the Framers had created the Clause t o preclude exactly the
kind of legislation involved in B l a i ~ d e l l Dissenting
.~~~
Justice
Sutherland not only condemned the majority's dismissal of
history but also claimed the Court reinterpreted the Constitution because of a change in public opinion:
Public sentiment and action effect such changes, and the
courts recognize them; but a court or legislature which should
allow a change in public sentiment to influence it in giving to
a written constitution a construction not warranted by the
intention of its founders, would be justly chargeable with
reckless disregard of official oath and public d ~ t y . 2 ~

Justice Sutherland's fears were more than amply realized.
In 1936, Justice Cardozo quoted in a dissent Professor Warren,
who observed that numerous constitutional objections concerning the Bankruptcy Clause, "so hotly and frequently asserted
from period to period, were overcome either by public opinion
or by the Court."28"In 1937, the Court began systematically
to overrule economic substantive due process cases. Chief Jus281. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
282. See CHARLESA. MILLER,THE SUPREMECOURTAND THE USES OF HISTORY
39-51 (1969). See generally Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love
Affair, 1965 SUP.CT. REV. 119.
283. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 452 (1934)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 COOLEY,supra note 247, at 124) (state can
establish mortgage relief during Depression). Justice Sutherland quoted Judge Cooley extensively:
A principal share of the benefit expected from written constitutions would
be lost if the rules they established were so flexible as to bend to circumstances or be modified by public opinion. It is with special reference to
the varying moods of public opinion, and with a view to putting the fundamentals of government beyond their control, that these instruments are
framed; and there can be no such steady and imperceptible change in
their rules as inheres in the principles of the common law.
Id.
284. CHARLES WARREN,BANKRUPTCY
IN UNITED STATESHISTORY10 (19351,
quoted in Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S.
513, 536 n.6 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (state water district can issue bonds,
levy and collect taxes, sue and be sued).
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tice Burger later expressed the prevailing view: "The means
chosen to effectuate legitimate governmental interests are not
for this Court t o select. 'These are matters for the legislative
judgment controlled by public opinion.'
The last word on
this struggle belongs to retired Justice Roberts, the "switching"
Justice who "saved Nine": "Looking back, it is difficult t o see
how the Court could have resisted the popular urge for uniform
standards throughout the country-for what in effect was a
unified

IV. WHATROLEOUGHTPUBLICOPINIONPLAY
IN CONSTITUTIONAL
ADJUDICATION?
This section will argue that several conceptions of public
opinion ought t o be part of constitutional adjudication. It will
start with a relatively non-controversial example: the Court's
continuing duty t o eradicate state-sponsored racism, a particularly odious form of public opinion. This section will then examine several "structural" issues to demonstrate how public opinion, reflected through the legislative process, has and ought t o
have the last word on many important constitutional questions.
The article will then return to the Casey controversy, evalu-

285. Metromedia, Inc., v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 561 (1981) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96-97 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring)) (invalidating city's general ban of billboards carrying noncommercial
advertising).
THE COURTAND THE CONSTITUTION
61 (1951). Seven
286. OWEN J. ROBERTS,
years earlier, Justice Roberts had been more committed to stare decisis:
It is regrettable that in an era marked by doubt and confusion, an era
whose greatest need is steadfastness of thought and purpose, this court,
which has been looked to as exhibiting consistency in adjudication, and a
steadiness which would hold the balance even in the face of temporary
ebbs and flows of opinion, should now itself become the breeder of fresh
doubt and conhsion in the public mind as to the stability of our institutions.
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 670 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (states cannot
abridge right to vote in federal elections on the basis of race).
The modern Court has conceded that public opinion, directly and indirectly via
legislation, is a major factor in regulating the economy. Tigner v. Texas, 310 US.
141, 149 (1940) (legislature can refuse to extend antitrust laws to farmers and
stockmen). The Court has also deferred to congressional regulation of the
business-labor relationship. American Fed'n of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co.,
335 U.S. 538, 545 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (state can pass "right to
work" law); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 349-50 (1947)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting) (court has authority under federal law to issue national
labor injunction); see also ARNOLD
M. PAUL,CONSERVATIVE
CRISISAND THE RULE
OF LAWxiii, xv, xvii, 25 (2d ed. 1976).
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ating the three relevant opinions in light of what has been
presented. That discussion leads in turn to an inquiry about
the relationship between "principles" and "public opinion."

A. Weeding Out Venal Public Opinion:
Equal Protection and Race
Nowhere has the Supreme Court's uneasy relationship
with reality been more evident than in its race cases. The battle against racism, after all, is an effort to eradicate a vile,
unenlightened form of public opinion.287 Putting the issue
more generally, the Court cannot determine which traits deserve additional constitutional protection as "suspect classifications" without consulting history, particularly the history of
public "irrational prej~dice."~"For example, Justices Murphy
and Rutledge looked at California's "public mind" to argue that
the California Alien Land Law was racist and unconstitutional.289
Chief Justice Taney's Dred Scott opinion demonstrates the
Court's selective use of public opinion. Taney inaccurately described the state of public opinion a t the time of the
Constitution's ratification and expressly ignored existing opinion at the time of his decision.290On the other hand, Taney
properly observed that colonial racial laws, such as the proscription against racial intermarriage, were stigmatic proof of
the blacks' lack of equal citizenship rights.291
287. I do not mean to imply that the First Amendment leaves racist speech
completely unprotected. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (invalidating statute crirninalizing burning of cross under a viewpoint discriminatory
approach).
288. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 450 (1985)
(invalidating city's refusal to permit a group home for mentally retarded).
289. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 650-62 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring)
(holding state c a ~ o pass
discriminatory alien land law).
t
290. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407-09 (1856).
291. Id at 409. The Fourteenth Amendment overruled Dred Scott. The Supreme Court later reflected: "It is sufficient to say that the country did not acquiesce in the opinion, and that the civil war, which shortly thereafter followed, produced such changes in judicial, as well as public sentiment, as to seriously impair
the authority of this case." Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 274 (1901) (Congress
and President can permit Puerto Rico to set different customs and duties than rest
of country).
Yet there were limits to that momentarily enlightened public sentiment. The
drafters initially did not include an explicit right to vote in the Fourteenth Amendment because they feared public opinion. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 180
n.42 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting CONG.
GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2532 (1866)).
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The Supreme Court firmly put its racial blinders on when
it upheld the "separate but equal" doctrine in Plessy v.
Fergu~on.~'~
Ignoring Taney's argument in Dred Scott, the
majority did not find segregation t o be stigmatic. They considered any injuries to be mere fantasies of the black minority. In
his dissent, Justice Harlan openly discussed the pernicious
influence of Southern racism on the laws and customs in question:
[Earlier state judicial decisions] were made a t a time when
public opinion, in many localities, was dominated by the institution of slavery; when it would not have been safe to do
justice to the black man; and when, so far a s the rights of
blacks were concerned, race prejudice was, practically, the
supreme law of the land?"

In a variety of ways, Chief Justice Warren demonstrated
his political astuteness when desegregating public schools in
Brown v. Board of ducati ion^^^ overruling Plessy in the process. He knew Brown had t o satisfy world opinion: "The federal
government prepared an amicus brief that explained in great
detail the harmful effects of American segregation on the foreign policy of the executive branch."2g5 He lobbied Justice
Reed for months to join the opinion to create a unanimous
vote.296 Chief Justice Warren then wrote a short,
nonjudgmental opinion, designed to be accessible t o the average
citizen.297He criticized neither the South nor the Plessy
Court, gently distinguishing Plessy by citing leading social
scientists who had recently "discovered" that segregation injures black children. The Rrown II remedy also reflected deference2" to the Southern white public, both in terms of timing
292. 163 US. 537 (1896). Chief Justice Shaw created the doctrine. LEVY,
supra
note 171, at 109-17.
293. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 563 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
294. 349 US. 294 (1955) (Brown II).
295. FISHER, supra note **, at 18. The Government's brief noted: "Racial discrimination furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda mills, and it raises
doubts even among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion to the demBRIEFSAM) ARGUMENTS
OF THE SUPREME
C o r n OF
ocratic faith." 49 LANDMARK
THE UNITED
STATES:CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 121 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
296. RICHARD KLUGER,SIMPLEJUSTICE
698 (1975).
297. "The genius of the Warren opinion . . . was that it was so simple and
unobtrusive." Id. a t 697 (quoting Barret Prettyman).
298. "[Ilt should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional
principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them."
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("all deliberate speed") and implementation (by lower federal
In short, a variety of public opinions, regional, national, and international, permeated those all-important decisions.
After the South became intransigent, the Warren Court
turned more judgmental?' The Court found local school desegregation plans to be inadequate because they were compromised by hostile public opinion.301 The Court knowingly
forced its decrees upon an unwilling white majority: "[Tlhe
vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to
yield simply because of disagreement with them."302Justice
Breman described the South's dismal racial history:
The real evil in the southern States you will find in the baffled pro-slavery tendency prevailing there; in a diseased public sentiment which partly vents itself in violent acts, partly
winks at them, and partly permits itself to be overawed by
them. That public sentiment is not only terrorizing timid
people, but it is corrupting the jury-box, it is overawing the
witness-stand, and it is thus obstructing the b c t i o n s of justi~e.~'~

More recently, the Court has returned to a more formal
conception of equality, levelling the playing field without evaluating the condition of the players. The actual state of public
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (requiring desegregation of
schools with all deliberate speed) (Brown II).
299. KLUGER, supra note 296, at 698.
300. In 1968, the Court relied upon legislative history to outlaw racially discriminatory housing: "[Tlhe Senatois concern . . . was that Negroes might be 'oppressed and in fact deprived of their freedom' not only by hostile laws but also by
'prevailing public sentiment.' " Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 432
n.54 (1968) (quoting CONG.GLOBE,3%h Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1866)) (holding that
African-Americans have right to sue private home sellers for racial discrimination).
301. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S.430, 439 (1968) (rejecting freedom of
choice plan as insufficient to accomplish elimination of dual school system). The
district court in Dowell v. Board of Education criticized desegregation plans: "[The
Board] rationalize[d] its intransigence on the constitutionally unsound basis that
public opinion [was] opposed to any further desegregation." 338 F. Supp. 1256,
1270 (W.D. Okla.), af'd, 465 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041
(1972).
302. Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968) (holding that "free
transfer plann is insufficient to eliminate dual school system) (quoting Brown II,
349 U.S. at 300).
303. Adickes v. S.H.Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 218-19 (1970) (Breman, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting CONG.GLOBE,42d Cong., 1st Sess.
687 (1872) (remarks of Senator Schurz)) (emphasis added) (holding that white
plaintiff failed to prove conspiracy under civil rights law).
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opinion, particularly the overall extent and effects of racism,
has become constitutionally insigmficant. Justice O'Connor
struck down Richmond's affirmative action plan in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co. partially on the technical ground that
there were insdlicient findings of racism in the local construction industry.s04On one level, that legalistic argument borders on the absurd. There is and has been widespread, damaging racism in Richmond, Virginia that has impaired black
entrepreneurs for centuries. Richmond, aRer all, was the capital of the Confederacy. There may be reasons not to have affirmative action, but insufficient evidence of racism and racism's
insidious effects is not one of them.
In his Casey dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist used Brown
t o demonstrate how his jurisprudence was grounded on abstraction, not racial realities: "The rule of Brown is not tied to
popular opinion about the evils of segregation; it is a judgment
that the Equal Protection Clause does not permit racial segregation, no matter whether the public might come to believe
that it is beneficial."305Somewhat ironically, Chief Justice
Rehnquist was confirming an earlier liberal complaint that the
Brown opinion was too contextual because it is largely premised upon unstable social science findings of injury. There are
times to be formalisticso6and to ignore public opinion, but
there are other times t o take such realities into consideration.
Many liberals will use formal doctrine t o immunize Brown's
core holding proscribing legal segregation fkom changes in
social views or social science, yet they also want the Court to
be aware of the actual state of racial relations in affirmative
action cases.307The judicial choice is over when to use the
public opinion argument, expressly or not, not whether to use it
at all.

B. Public Opinion as Constitutional Decisionmaker
and the Constitutional Structure
In a recent article, this author wrote that the American
304. 488 U.S. 469, 485, 499 (1989).
305. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2865 (1992) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in the judgement in part, dissenting in part).
306. See James G. Wilson, The Morality of Formulism, 33 UCLA L. REV.431
(1985).
307. Of course, Justice Souter's hedged opinion may satisfy public opinion more
than Justice Scalia's more rigid approach or the liberals' more absolutist
protections.
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constitutional system cannot be adequately understood without
importing the English concept of "constitutional convent i o n ~ . "Constitutional
~~~
conventions are allocations and regulations of constitutional power that the judiciary cannot effectively determine andlor enforce. Conventions are formed by
circumstance and are ratified by practice and public opinion.
Examples include impeachment standards and proceedings, the
obligation of the electors in the electoral college to vote for the
presidential nominee who received the most votes in the
electors' state, and most internal workings of Congress..
Although it has never conceptualized such issues as "constitutional conventions," the Supreme Court has cordoned off
certain constitutional disputes from meaningful judicial review.
The factor of public opinion helps justify protection of the core
stmctural doctrines of federalism30gand separation of powers:
"Probably of more importance is the public reaction engendered
by any attempt of one branch to dominate or harass another.
Even traditional political attempts to establish dominance have
met with little success owing to contrary public sentiment."1°

308. See James G. Wilson, American Constitutional Conventions: The Judicially
Unenforceable Rules That Combine with Judicial Doctrine and Public Opinion to
Regulate Political Behavior, 40 BUFF. L. REV.645 (1992).
309. When the Warren Court was constitutionalizing numerous criminal procedures, Justice Frankfurter partially justified such actions for their educative value,
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 202 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (upholding admission of allegedly coerced confession); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is
the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.961 (1992).
Indeed, the Court explained how public opinion created different state and federal rights:
There are, moreover, reasons for excluding evidence unreasonably obtained
by the federal police which are less compelling in the case of police under
State or local authority. The public opinion of a community can far more
effectively be exerted against oppressive conduct on the part of police
directly responsible to the community itself than can local opinion, sporadically aroused, be brought to bear upon remote authority pervasively exerted throughout the country.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1949) (exclusionary rule does not apply to
unreasonable search and seizure in state court); see &o Linkletter v. Walker, 381
US. 618, 630-31 (1965) (refusing to give retroactive application of exclusionary rule
to the states). Less activist Justices were less charitable, believing federal court
interventions led to the "growing denigration of the state courts and their functions
in the public mind." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 264 (1973) (Powell,
J., concurring) (quoting Judge Paul C. Reardon, Address at the ABA section of
Judicial Administration annual dinner (Aug. 14, 1972)) (state need not prove that
defendant knew he had right not to consent to search).
310. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 523 (1972) (bribery not protected
by Speech and Debate Clause).
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For example, the Supreme Court recently refused to review
Federal District Judge Walter Nixon's procedural challenges to
his impeachment because Nixon raised a "political quest i ~ n . " ~ Congress
"
alone will initially determine when, why,
and how someone should be impeached. The public remains the
only meaningful constraint. Because the Court cannot effectively regulate either the process or substance of impeachments,
the rest of us need to develop precise constitutional conventions
to control the politicians' congressional discretion. For instance,
we should continue to support the convention, established by
the failure to impeach Justice Chase, of not impeaching Justices for their political views. Nevertheless, impeachment, a
legislative weapon that can only be effectively regulated by
public opinion^* remains the final safeguard against judicial

1. Congressional committee investigations:A case study of law
and convention
Over a period of years, Congress has developed a set of
conventions to prevent constitutional abuses: "It is not, therefore, reasoning upon things as they are, t o suppose that any
deliberative assembly, constituted under it, would ever assert
any other rights and powers than those which had been established by long practice, and conceded by public opinion.'"14
Examples include limiting the Supreme Court to nine Justices
and refusing to use congressional power over federal jurisdiction t o strip the federal courts of the power t o adjudicate constitutional claims. Congress is another interpreter and protector of the C o n ~ t i t u t i o n . ~ ~ ~

311. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
312. Wilson, supra note 308, at 699-701.
313. In two different opinions, seven Justices held that Judge Nixon's claim
was a nonjusticiable political question. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 732. For an argument
favoring judicial review in the Nixon case, see Rose Auslander, Note, Impeaching
the Senate's Use of Trirtl Committees, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.68 (1992).
314. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 US. (6 Wheat.) 204, 232 (1821) (Sergeant at Arms
of House has defense to assault and battery and false imprisonment for arresting a
Member held in contempt).
315. Justice Daniel reminded the Court that it had to coexist with public opinion expressed through the legislative branches:
[Tlo whatever extent, therefore, the opinions of this tribunal may be recognized, (and by no one will they within their proper bounds be maintained with truer loyalty than by myself,) yet when challenged to obedience to those opinions, I am bound to remember that the constitution is
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The investigatory powers of congressional committees present problems that can best be resolved by a mixture of law and
convention. The Supreme Court has properly created legal
rights that even congressional committees must respect. For
above all and over all, and that public opinion conveyed through its legitimate channel, the legislation of the country, will cause itself to be heard
and respected.
The Steamer Oregon v. Rocca, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 570, 576 (1855) (Daniel, J., dissenting) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction to try case involving boat collision).
Such an allocation of power is not as disturbing as it might seem. Another
nineteenth-century court observed that public opinion joins the judiciary in protecting constitutional rights:
[N]o serious invasion of constitutional guarantees by the legislature
could withstand for a long time the searching influence of public opinion,
which was sure t o come sooner or later to the side of law, order and
justice, however it might have been swayed for a time by passion or
prejudice, or whatever aberrations might have marked its course.
Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 534 (1892) (holding states can regulate fees
charged by grain elevators).
In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall concluded the Court should
defer to legislative determinations of the need for a particular means to fulfill a
particular constitutional end. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 412-24 (1819). The Lochner
era demonstrated that such judicial deference was not always forthcoming. Because
the public-legislative assessments of necessity vary over the years, legislators can
change many constitutional arrangements:
The question before us is not one of policy but of power, and while public
opinion had gradually brought all the States as matter of fact to the
pursuit of a uniform system of popular election by general ticket, that
fact does not tend to weaken the force of contemporaneous and long continued previous practice when and as different views of expediency prevailed.
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1892) (holding states can determine how
t different election date).
members of electoral college are selected but c a ~ o set
Congress is the best forum to "modify the law to reflect such changes in popular
attitudes." Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 686 (1966) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (poll tax unconstitutional).
Committing many constitutional disputes to the Legislature does not undermine
the Constitution. "To fight out the wise use of legislative authority in the forum of
public opinion and before legislative assemblies rather than to transfer such a
contest to the judicial arena, serves to vindicate the self-confidence of a free people." Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940) (states can require
school students to take Pledge of Allegiance). In 1821, the Court explained how
public opinion helps develop constitutional practices:
That a deliberate assembly, clothed with the majesty of the people, and
charged with the care of all that is dear to them; composed of the most
distinguished citizens, selected and drawn together from every quarter of
a great nation; whose deliberations are required by public opinion to be
conducted under the eye of the public, and whose decisions must be
clothed with all that sanctity which unlimited confidence in their wisdom
and purity can inspire . . . .
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 228-29 (1821).
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example, it held that the Self-Incrimination Clause prevents
Congress from forcing individuals to testify without immunitye316
Congress, however, is fkee to interrogate whomever it
wants, both to develop policy and to attempt t o modify behavior. The primary check on congressional investigations is public
~pinion.~"
It is permissible t o attempt to mobilize the public
to eliminate the House Un-American Activities Committee, but
such attempts do not immunize HUAC critics from W A C
investigation^?'^ The Court cannot stop all constitutional
wrongs; it cannot protect those who are being investigated from
the injury caused to their public reputations by being investigatede31gConsequently, the country needs to develop additional constitutional conventions to balance Congress' "need to
know" against important individual rights and interests. For
example, the Senate recently createdSman important, desirable convention. Senators from both parties who were investigating the leak of Anita Hill's affidavit decided not to force
testimony from the reporters who first wrote about the leak of
316. One witness noted in Sweezy v. New Hampshire that the right against
self-incrimination becomes somewhat illusory when the public is enraged: "My own
reason for rejecting it is that, with public opinion in its present state, the exercise
of the privilege is almost certain to be widely misinterpreted." 354 U.S. 234, 241
n.6 (1957) (plurality opinion) (state c a ~ o conduct
t
investigations under the vague
phrase of "subversive persons"); see also Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 546
(1917) (House has no express power to punish contempt aside from its own
members).
317. "When the powers of legislative inquiry are abused, the remedy does not
lie in noncooperation or defiance; it is to be sought through the normal c h a ~ e l sof
informed public opinion." Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 564
n.6 (1956) (Reed, J., dissenting) (quoting 3 THE RIGHTSAND RESPONSIBILITIES
OF
UNIVERSITIES AND THEIR FACULTIES,ASSOCIATIONOF AMERICANUNIVERSITIES
(1953)) (state cannot dismiss employee for refusing to testify).
318. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 414 (1961) (upholding House
contempt for rehsing to testify on First Amendment grounds). In a prior dissent,
Justice Douglas argued that such legislative investigations were unconstitutional
because they constituted "infamy." U l l m a ~v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 448-54
(1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (person can be forced to testify before Committee
after being granted immunity).
319. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 500-01 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (upholding Civil Rights Commission's power to investigate without permitting cross examination); Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399, 421-23 (1958)
( B r e ~ a n ,J., dissenting) (upholding discharge of employee for refusing to answer
questions about Communist f i a t i o n s ) ; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 US. 123, 128-29 (1951) (holding Attorney General can not designate
certain groups as Communist without having a hearing).
320. Constitutional conventions can be created or modiiied by a single episode.
K.C. WHEARE,MODERNCONSIT~PTIONS
180 (1951).
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Professor Hill's allegation that she was sexually harassed by
future Justice Thomas.321
2. Public opinion, war, and peace
In Marbury v. Madison:22 Chief Justice Marshall limited
the vast scope of judicial review to legal questions. For instance, the Court has little authority over such political problems as foreign policy decision^.^^ In 1823, Chief Justice
Marshall explained how only public opinion could regulate
territorial conquest.3u Justice Reed later argued that "methods for maintenance of Army discipline should be subject to
public opinion as expressed through Congress."3* Another
Justice concluded that only military tribunals and public opinion could stop "wanton cruelty" during wartime.32BImmediate
public opinion and carefully crafted conventions remain the primary regulators of these all-important powers.
Of all the modern Supreme Court Justices, Justice Jackson
has been the most attuned t o the complex, contextual relationships linking constitutional law with constitutional politics.
When the Court upheld the internment of Japanese-Americans
during World War 11 in Korernat~u:~'Jackson dissented. He
concluded that the federal district court did not have the power
to punish a Japanese-American defendant violating a camp
curfew because the federal judiciary has no jurisdiction over
such an issue. The only effective constitutional constraints
were nonjudicial:
I would not lead people to rely on this Court for a review that
seems to me wholly delusive . . . . The chief restraint upon
those who command the physical forces of the country, in the
future as in the past, must be their responsibility to the political judgments of their contemporaries and to the moral judg-

WINTER^, CAPITOL
GAMES431-33 (1992).
321. TIMOTHY M. PHELPs & HELEN
322. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
323. Id. at 165-66.
324. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589-90 (1823) (holding United States courts cannot recognize title of land granted from Indian tribes to individuals).
325. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 43 (1955) (Reed, J.,
dissenting) (ex-serviceman could not be subjected to trial by court-martial).
326. Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 166 (1879) (army officer not liable for
injuries resulting from military actions or orders in Southern states under martial
law).
327. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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ments of history.328

Eight years later, Jackson apparently limited his judicial
deference t o armed conflicts immediately threatening the
nation's existence. He decided that President Truman acted
unconstitutionally by seizing the country's stee1 mills during
the Korean War.329This time, the rule of law, expressed
through congfessional legislation, congressional inaction, and
judicial decisions, prevailed over executive prerogative powers.
What had been unreviewable in World War I1 had become
unconstitutional. Jackson saw the President's unique relationship with the body politic not as just a constraint but also as a
threat:
No other personality in public life can begin to compete with
him in access to the public mind through modern methods of
communications. By his prestige as head of state and his
influence upon public opinion he exerts a leverage upon those
who are supposed to check and balance his power which ofken
cancels their effecti~eness.~~'

Jackson's opinions demonstrate that many constitutional
issues should not be reduced to convention; we need a proper
mix of law and on vent ion.^^' For example, the Court properly protected the New York Times in the watershed Pentagon
Papers case, because a free press is needed to inform public

328. Id. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Jackson's arguments supporting the
Nuremberg trials were very different. He argued that international law was needed
to punish the major Nazi leaders who had engaged in evil a d s of war. TELFORD
T A ~ RTHE
,
ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG
TRIALS53 (1992). The British had
initially wanted to execute the leaders without trial. Id. at 29.
329. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 US. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (preventing President from seizing and running steel mills
during wartime).
330. Id. at 653-54.
331. Prosecutorial and administrative discretion temper the rule of law with
political considerations. Except in the rarest situations, the Court does not review
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, particularly in criminal cases. Consequently,
the control of administrative discretion takes place largely outside the courtroom.
Yick Wo is the exception that proves the rule. That case held that the San Francisco Board of Supervisors violated the Equal Protection Clause by giving laundry
licenses to virtually all white applicants but no Chinese applicants. Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 359 (1886) (striking down racist administration of laundry
licenses). However, the Court noted: "[Iln many cases of mere administration the
responsibility is purely political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of
the public judgment, exercised either in the pressure of opinion or by means of the
suffrage." Id. at 370.
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opinion about foreign affairs and military conflicts.332 The
public, after all, cannot create and enforce conventions to prevent abuses abroad if the public does not know what is happening abroad.
3. Public opinion a n d the judiciary

Justice Souter's argument that the Supreme Court needs
the support of the body politic is not original. A lawyer told the
Court in 1849 in The Passenger Cases: "It is desirable [that the
unelected judges] should secure the affections of the people."33s Judges write opinions, containing their reasoning, to
persuade public opinion:
[Als long as the judges of the United States are obliged to
express their opinions publicly, to give their reasons for them
when called upon in the usual mode, and to stand responsible
for them, not only to public opinion, but to a court of impeachment, I can apprehend very little danger of the laws being
wrested to purposes of injustice."'

Over the decades, the judiciary and public opinion combine to
determine which judicial outcomes, which judicial reasons, and
which judicial modes of argument are constitutionally legitimate.
Like impeachment, the judicial power to punish contempt
is a governmental power, arising under the law, that cannot
effectively be regulated by law alone: "The power to punish for

332. In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in
other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas of national defense and international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry-in an informed and
critical public opinion which alone can here protect the values of democratic government. For this reason, it is perhaps here that a press
that is alert, aware, and free most vitally serves the basic purpose of
the First Amendment. For without an informed and fkee press there
cannot be an enlightened people.
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring) (permitting newspapers to print stolen, classified Pentagon Papers during
Vietnam War).
333. Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 379 (1849) (argument of defense
counsel) (invalidating state laws imposing taxes on foreign ship passengers).
334. Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 107 (1895) (quoting United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 1336 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No. 15,815). The
open judicial process serves as a cathartic vehicle to absorb community anger after
a violent crime has taken place. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
571-72 (1980) (plurality opinion) (criminal trial cannot be closed to media).
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contempt is always open to abuse. The persons injured are
judges in their own case. The only safeguard, outside of public
opinion, lies in the character of the persons intrusted with this
power.77335
The power will sometimes be abused by the entire
judiciary, as in I n re Debs.336In the first volume of the United States Reports the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a
contempt of court because the defendant's speech "prejudic[ed]
the public (a part of whom must hereafter be summoned as
jurors) with respect to the merits of a cause depending in this
court, and of corrupting the administration of justice.77337
J u s t as there are costs and risks in creating discretionary
powers, there are also benefits. The Court has praised judges
who resist local pressures: "A judge who is part of such a dramatic episode can hardly help but know that his decision is apt
to be unpopular. But the law of contempt is not made for the
protection of judges who may be sensitive to the winds of public
opinion."3s8 Certainly Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., who battled Southern segregation for decades, is a judicial h e r ~ . ~ ~ ~
The public should closely scmtinize judicial behavior and feel
,~~
criticize
~
the jufree, protected by the First A m e n d ~ n e n t to
335. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 723-24 (1964) (appendix) (quoting
ARTHUR P. SCOTT,CRIMINAL
LAW IN COLONIALVIRGINIA174 (1930)) (emphasis
added).
336. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
337. Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319, 326 (1788) (opinion of the
Supreme Court of Pe~sylvania) (interpreting the Pennsylvania Constitution to
uphold libel action against newspaper article criticizing judge); see also Toledo
Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 415 (1918) (newspaper can be held
in contempt for writing article calling judge's integrity into question). But see Craig
v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (reversing contempt for publishing newspaper articles critical of state trial judge).
338. Craig, 331 US. at 376.
339. See generally TINSLEYE . YARBROUGH,
JUDGE
FRANKJOHNSON
AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN ALABAMA
(1981) (examining Judge Johnson's career up to his appointment to the Fifth Circuit); Frank M. Johnson, Jr., In Defense of Judicial Activism, 28 EMORY
L.J. 901 (1979).
340. "The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding
judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of American public
opinion. For it is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not
always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions." Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941) (footnote omitted) (state judges can only punish contempt
if there is "clear and present danger"). But see P e ~ e k a m pv. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946) (holding that trial court could not find critical newspaper articles to be in
contempt of court). "Courts c a ~ o function
t
in a free country when the atmosphere
is charged with the effusions of a press designed to poison the mind of the public
against the presiding judges rather than to clarify the issues and propagate the
truth about them . . . ." Id. at 344 n.6 (quoting P e ~ e k a m pv. State, 22 So. 2d
875, 885 (Fla. 1945)).
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diciary. Judges, on the other hand, should not be intimidated
by the public. Two conflicting fears reside at the heart of this
problem. But there is no contradiction in distrusting both the
judiciary and the public; there is only common sense. Every
group has the capacity to abuse its power. Ultimately, the public retains the last word. Not only can the public complain
about judges, but it also can pressure Congress t o impeach.341
C. The Judicial Tradition Opposing the Use of Public
Opinion in ConstitutionalAdjudication
This survey has revealed that Justices tend to refer expressly to public opinion in the most contentious cases: Dred
Scott, the debate over the Lochner jurisprudence, Blaisdale, the
Pentagon Papers case, and Casey. Overt judicial discussion of
public opinion is a symptom of major judicial conflict.
As seen in the initial section of Casey, public opinion analysis has influenced modern substantive due process cases.342
Justice Harlan incorporated public opinion into his determination of "ordered liberty" in the first contraception case, Poe v.
U l l r n ~ n .Public
~ ~ ~ opinion of one era created t h e
anti-contraception statute: ';The so-called Comstock Law may
be regarded as characteristic of the attitude of a large segment
of public opinion on this matter through the end of last centu~ y . ' 'That
~ ~ public opinion became dated: ';Indeed the
criticism of these measures assumes that they represented

There were limits to this principle; courts could bar pickets near the
courthouse because the state had the power to protect the judicial process from
being misjudged in the minds of the public. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 564
(1965) (reversing conviction for picketing "near" a courthouse).
341. In 1866, an attorney in Ex parte Milligan explained: "For any wilful or
corrupt violation of their duty, they are liable to be impeached; and they cannot
escape the control of an enlightened public opinion, for they must sit with open
doors, listen to full discussion, and give satisfadory reasons for the judgments they
pronounce." 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)2, 64 (1866) (defense counsel argument) (military
courts do not have jurisdiction over civilians when civil courts are still available).
342. In her concurrence in Cruzan, Justice O'Connor cited an AMA poll: "56%
of those surveyed had told family members their wishes concerning the use of
life-sustaining treatment if they entered an irreversible coma." Cruzan v. Director
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.261, 289 n.1 (1990) (O'Co~or,J., concurring) (citing
SURVEYS
OF PHYSICIAN
AND PUBLIC OPINIONON
AMERICAN
MEDICALASSOCIATION,
HEALTH
CAREISSUES29-30 (1988)) (holding that state can require clear and convincing evidence that person in coma wanted termination of life-support systems).
343. 367 U.S.497 (1961).
344. Id. at 546 n.12 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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general public opinion, though of a bygone day."345As noted
in the Introduction, Justice Blackmun in Roe v. Wade partially
relied on leading "professional" public opinion, discussing the
views of the American Medical Association, the American Bar
Association, and the American Public Health A s s o ~ i a t i o n . ~ ~
Justice Souter's Casey opinion attempted to reconcile the
ancient tension between the Federalists and the Republicans
by incorporating both perspectives, much as Justice Johnson
had done in Hudson.347 According to Justice Souter, the
Court must be committed t o "principle" in order to have continued public respect and support. The Court must ignore momentary swings in public sentiment, particularly those generated by furious partisans. However, when a large percentage of
the public comes to believe that a watershed constitutional
decision was wrongly decided, as was the eventual fate of
Plessy and Lochner, the Court can and should change the basic
constitutional doctrine t o incorporate that transformation in
public opinion. In such cases, the Court should also consider
the views of leading legal thinkers, such as Professor Charles
Black. In other words, constitutional "principles" are not immutable but are contingent creatures.
In one of the most honest judicial opinions ever written,
Justice Souter has sought to combine the stability of principle
and stare decisis with the inevitable constitutional revolutions
that sweep this country. Some constitutional thinkers, including some of his colleagues, will not like this fluid vision of the
Constitution, but I think it accurately describes how the Con. ~ law
stitution has operated over the past two c e n t u r i e ~ All
is permanently in flux. The only question is the rate of change.
By the same token, the rejection of public opinion by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist in Casey does not make
They can turn to a
them constitutional revoluti~naries.~~~
345. Id. at 547 n.12.
346. 410 U.S. 113, 141-47 (1973). Justice Blackmuds opinion is overly deferential to the medical profession; Roe sometimes reads more like a right to practice
medicine case than a privacy case.
347. 11 US.(7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
348. In addition, Justice Souter's approach is consistent with the views of
many constitutional thinkers, on and off the Court.
349. Justice Thomas cited a book arguing that the judiciary's insularity makes
it attractive to leftist lawyers. Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 905 n.4 (1993)
MELTSNER,
CRUELAND UNUSUAL: THE
(Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting MICHAEL
SUPREME COURTAND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 25 (1973)) (defendant barred in collateral review from raising new constitutional rule challenging death sentence).
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smaller group of cases to formulate a different judicial tradition. Unless one wants to transform the Constitution into a
purely majoritarian document, the Court must protect some
"core" rights from prevailing public opinion. Justice Jackson's
Barnette opinion eloquently stated the Court's obligation:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy,
to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech,
a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.350

In 1827, Justice Johnson, author of the Hudson opinion,
equated "public opinion" with the politics side of the
law/politics distinction: "[Acquiescing to unfounded doctrines
and dicta] affords facilities for giving an undue bias t o public
opinion, and, I will add, of interpolating doctrines which belong
not t o the law."351 Recall that Justice Story also separated
"principle" from "popular appeal" in Dartmouth College. We
have already seen how Chief Justice Taney's opinion'in Dred
Scott explicitly repudiated current public opinion: "Any other
rule of construction would abrogate the judicial character of
this court, and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion
or passion of the day."352
In the 1880s, members of the formalistic Supreme Court
isolated themselves from public opinion: "The truth is, that
public opinion is oftentimes like a pendulum, swinging backward and forward to extreme lengths."353They praised Eng350. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 US. 624, 638 (1943)
(state cannot require schoolchildren to take Pledge of Allegiance). Justice Jackson
added:
It seems trite but necessary to say that the First Amendment to our
Constitution was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these beginnings. There is no mysticism in the American concept of the State or of
the nature or origin of its authority. We set up government by consent of
the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those in power any legal
opportunity to coerce that consent. Authority here is to be controlled by
public opinion, not public opinion by authority.
Id. at 641.
351. Ramsay v. Allegre, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 611, 614 (1827) (Johnson, J.,
concurring).
352. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1856).
Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1882) (Bradley, J., dissenting)
353. Ex pa&
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lish judges for their capacity t o transcend their fellow citiz e n ~ Such
. ~ ~judicial
~
arrogance helped set the stage for the
Lochner era, in which the Court ignored, at great cost to the
country, radical changes in the economy, technology, and public
opinion.355In addition to quoting favorably the above statement from Dred Scott, in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell Justice Sutherland argued: "The Constitution is a
written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That
which it meant when adopted it means
Justice Souter's Casey opinion could also be criticized on
the ground that no Supreme Court had ever applied his particular conception of public opinion. Furthermore, many Justices
have separated the judicial domain, excluding public opinion,
from the political domain, where public opinion reigns supreme. In other words, Justice Scalia might argue that Justice
Souter has not properly adhered to the Supreme Court's "tradition." Justice Souter's argument, however, resembles the Hudson decision: he consults both the public and leading legal
scholars like Professor Charles Black t o determine whether or
not a watershed case should be overruled. Justice Scalia's tradition of pure judicial autonomy from public opinion, based
upon Osborn, Dred Scott, and Sutherland's Blaisdell dissent,
proves, a t best, that at least two competing "traditions" can be
teased out of the cases.
The historical record is rich, not easily susceptible to a
single interpretation. It is notoriously difficult to "prove" any-

(upholding law prohibiting federal officials from giving or receiving anything from
any other officer for political reasons). Justice McClean's dissent in Dred Scott condemned the pro-slavery change in state law caused by "some new light" or "excited
public opinion." Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) a t 563 (McClean, J., dissenting)
(quoting Pease v. Peck, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 595, 599 (1855)) (published version of
law prevails over unpublished version). In Pease v. Peck, the Court rejected a then
recent precedent because it reflected excited public opinion:
When the decisions of the state court are not consistent, we do not feel
bound to follow the last, if i t is contrary to our own convictions,-and
[sic] much more is this the case, where, a h r a long course of mnsistent
decisions, some new light suddenly springs up, or an excited public opinion has elicited new doctrines, subversive of former safe precedent.
59 U.S. a t 599.
354. Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 140 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting).
355. For a contrary view, see Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence
and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1991).
356. 290 U.S. 398, 450 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (quoting South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905)).
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thing in constitutional law, particularly what is or is not a
"tradition." Those observations contain a n additional problem
for Justice Scalia. The characterization of a constitutionally
valid tradition involves another subjective choice between competing definitions. Justice Scalia, however, has tried to use the
tradition argument to formulate "objective" law. I n other words,
Justice Scalia endorses arguments that he believes will
eliminate indeterminacy and subjective choice. The historical
record presented in this Article demonstrates the htility of
such a quest, whether in determining a "tradition" or defining
"public opinion."357
Interpretive irony colors Justice Scalia's approach. At the
end of Casey, he graphically describes the sullen portrait of
Chief Justice Taney, painted after Dred Scott, in Harvard Law
School's library. Justice Scalia noted that Chief Justice Taney's
opinion failed to reunite the country and predicted that Justice
Souter's opinion will probably meet a similar fate. Yet, Justice
Scalia's constitutional methodology reproduces Chief Justice
Taney's rigid commitment to text and ratification history. In
addition, Chief Justice Taney's ruthless twisting of the Territories Clause, finding that Congress had no power to regulate
slavery in any new territories under that Clause,s5' neither
persuaded much of the country nor removed the Court from
political controversy. Over a hundred years ago, Chief Justice
Taney's decision demonstrated that a n explicit, exclusive appeal to text and history, combined with express repudiation of
existing public opinion, is not invariably the best mode of constitutional interpretation. The Court's ultimate decisions tend
to drag it into political controversy far more than its choice of
interpretive techniques.
A Scalian might retort that Justice Scalia never banished
public opinion from the constitutional universe. One of the
goals of objectifying the law is to separate law from politics,
principle from policy. That distinction cannot be made without
being aware of what is on the other side, namely, public opinion. Public opinion is something that takes place outside the
courtroom. Sometimes it is to be feared and other times to be
protected.

357. See Frank H.Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U . CHI. L. REV.
349 (1992); Laurence H.Tribe & Michael C . Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U . CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990).
358. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 432-51.
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Justice Scalia, of course, does not completely keep public
opinion out of the adjudicatory process. An "originalist," he consults text and history to determine what the populace thought
when they ratified a particular part of the Constitution. Furthermore, Justice Scalia accepts more contemporary public
opinion expressed through legislation, which transforms otherwise suspect opinion into constitutional tradition: "The public
sentiment expressed in these and other polls and resolutions
may ultimately find expression in legislation, which is an objective indicator of contemporary values upon which we can re1y."559
Justice Scalia has not only dismissed the long-standing
judicial tradition of expressly incorporating public opinion into
constitutional analysis in a variety of ways, but he also has
created a model that is internally inconsistent. How can Justice
Scalia ignore public opinion when he counts statutes and practices to determine what is or is not a constitutionally protected
"tradition"? Despite the myriad imperfections of our democratic
system, statutes are reflections of dominant public opinion. Is
not the "legislative mind" similar to the "public mind"? In
Furman Justice Powell noted the powerfid link between legislation and public opinion: "In a democracy the first indicator of
the public's attitude must always be found in the legislative
judgments of the people's chosen representative^."^"
Justice Scalia aspires to create an objective constitutional
jurisprudence that precludes the Court from imposing any
subjective values on the electorate. That goal is impossible
because the subjective/objective distinction cannot resolve constitutional questions, which require inherently normativelsubjective choices between competing conceptions of the
Nevertheless, we need to determine the appropriate
scope of judicial review. Few of us want the Court to become
tooidios$cratic, too unaware of the rest of the country. Justice
Scalia's "tradition" argument limits judicial discretion by linking it more closely with the views of the general public as expressed through statutes. Tradition, thus, becomes a legitimate,
but not an "objective," technique. But that interpretation forces
the Court to weigh public opinion, not exclude it or give it determinate force. The questions are whose public opinion
359. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989).
360. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 436-37 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
~,
1870-1960, supra note 44, at 139.
361. See H O R W TRANSFORMATION
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counts-the legislators', the commentators', andlor the average
citizens'-and how much that opinion should count in a particular case, not whether public opinion is relevant at all.
Unlike many other methods of ascertaining public opinion,
Justice Scalia's technique does not have many methodological
problems. After all, he only consults constitutional text, historical writings, and written statutes. But, he still has the problem
of subjectively interpreting the objective statutory survey of the
statutes in question. One can never be certain what the Court
will do when it has completed its arithmetic. For example, the
Court ignored the absence of statutory authority in Powell u.
Alabama:62 requiring all the states to provide free lawyers t o
indigent defendants facing the death penalty. In Coker u. Georgia,36sthe Court struck down the death penalty for rape as
disproportionate, partially because only a few states authorized
the penalty. In 1981, the Court deferred t o a mixture of legislative procedures regulating the termination of parental rights,
although the majority of states were moving in the direction of
providing counsel: "[Slignificantly, 33 States and the District of
Columbia provide statutorily for the appointment of counsel in
termination cases. The Court's opinion today in no way implies
that the standards increasingly urged by informed public opinion and now widely followed by the States are other than enlightened and wise."3B4Perhaps Justice Scalia is saying that
the Court will only provide constitutional protection when all
the legislatures have consistently protected a right. But under
such a model, he has created an elaborate, unnecessary, confusing fiction. What plaintiff need bring a constitutional action
if all the states already acknowledge that plaintiffs rights on
other grounds?
Justice Scalia has not consistently excluded public opinion
from his formulation of constitutional doctrine. Dissenting in
FWIPBS u. Dallas:"
he wmte that the Supreme Court's obscenity standards, which protect erotic material, have "met
with general public acceptance,"366 but the application of
those standards has "most certainly not [been] approved."367
362. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
363. 433 U.S. 584, 593-96 (1977) (plurality opinion).
364. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 34 (1981) (not requiring court-appointed counsel in termination of parental rights cases).
365. 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
366. Id. at 251 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
367. Id.
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He pointed to continuing efforts to combat "sexually oriented
businesses" to prevent "the erosion of public morality" through
techniques such as zoning ordinances.3psJustice Scalia tried
t o resolve this public reaction by allowing communities to proscribe businesses that distribute vast amounts of sexually oriented material as engaged in "the sordid business of pandering," even though those communities could not ban any single
Whether his creative doctrine should have become
constitutional law or not, Justice Scalia's methodology sits
uneasily with his complaints in Casey about Justice Souter's
use of public opinion. It is very dimcult, not to mention undesirable, t o exclude a valuable form of constitutional interpretation from all decisions.
Some of Justice Scalia's goals become less objectionable
after removing the distracting adjective "objective." The Court
needs to have a dual conception of constitutional power, separating the political from the legal, public opinion from legal
rights. This Article has attempted to show that the two categories have never been, and should not, be mutually exclusive.
Some overlap is inevitable, even desirable.
Eventually public opinion will have its way,370expressly
amending the Constitution or forcing the Court to respond t o
the "felt necessities of the ti~ne[s]."~'~
The most obvious example was the repudiation of economic substantive due process
during the Depression. In 1992, a large segment of the public
validated the right of privacy as applied to abortion when it
overwhelmingly voted for the two pro-choice candidates,
Clinton and P e r ~ tThat
. ~ ~election
~
helps explain how judicial

368. Id. at 251-52.
369. Id. at 260. In formulating this standard, Justice Scalia quoted a prior
statement by Justice Stevens on the limits of principle: 'We learned long ago that
broad statements of principle, no matter how correct in context they are made, are
sometimes qualified by contrary decisions before the absolute limit of the stated
principle is reached." American Mini Theaters v. Young, 427 U.S. 50, 65 (1976),
quoted in FWIPBS, 493 US. at 263.
370. Robert Goldwin observed that "public opinion and popular taste rule, ultimately, on everything." Robert A. Goldwin, Of Men and Angels: A Search for Morality in the Constitution, in THE MORALFOUNDATIONS
OF THE AMERICANREPUBLIC
15 (Robert H. Horwitz ed., 2d ed. 1979).
LAW 5 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1963)
371. OLIVERW. HOLMES,THE COMMON
(1881).
372. Some political scientists have concluded that the abortion controversy
played a major role in the 1992 presidential election. David S. Broder, Lasting Effects of Perot, Religious Right Debated; Each Likely to Remain a Force, Scholars
Say, WASH.POST,Sept. 9, 1993, at A6. In a famous passage, Ely applied modem
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review in general, and the doctrine of substantive due process
in particular, can legitimately exist in our form of democratic
government. To paraphrase Tocqueville, the people have continued to permit the Court to engage in substantive due process review.373Former Judge Bork learned the price of defying public opinion when he argued that the Fourteenth Amendment did not outlaw sex discrimination because that issue was
not on the Framers' minds. The seating on the Supreme Court
of Justice Ginsburg, a leading early advocate of gender equality, confirms the public's power to participate in the perpetual
reinterpretation of the Constitution.

D. A Matter of Principles
One way to narrow most of the cases discussed above is to
assert that the Court has usually considered public opinion as
something outside the courtroom. The Court has seen public
opinion as a threat in many criminal cases, something to be
protected. in First Amendment cases, or an independent adjudicator of some structural issues. The acutely controversial
problem is whether or not the Court should sometimes let public opinion "inside" its doctrine, allowing public opinion t o influence directly the types of constitutional rights and powers that
the Court has traditionally determined. In other words, should
public opinion help shape the contours of fundamental rights
andlor compelling state interests? The Court has consulted
public opinion to expand the definition of "cruel and unusual
punishments"; can the Court also use public opinion to limit
the scope of constitutional rights and principles? To begin to
answer those questions, we need to consider the relationship
between politics and principles.
Many legal scholars have criticized Herbert Wechsler's famous article on "neutral principle^,"^^ both as a general idea

political philosophy to constitutional adjudication: 'We like Rawls, you like Nozick.
We win, 6-3. Statute invalidated." ELY,supra note 9, at 58. Ely will not be much
more pleased with a crude reduction of this Article's argument: "Anti-abortionist
President Bush won only 37% of the popular vote in 1992 against two pro-choice
candidates. We win, 5-4. Roe affirmed. Statute upheld under undue burden test."
For discussions of the Court's relationship to electoral politics, see David
Adamany, Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court, 1973 WIS. L.
REV.790; Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL.
SCI. REV.795 (1975).
373. TOCQUEVIUE,supra note '**, at 100.
374. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
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and as applied to criticize Brown v. Board of E d u ~ a t i o n ? ~ ~
There were both substantive and methodological problems.
How and why should the Court limit itself to "neutral" principles, and how the Court could determine which principles are
"neutral"? In short, who knows what the adjective "neutral"
means?376
The word "principle" presents a related set of probl e m ~Are
. ~ "principles"
~ ~
anything more than "values," dressed
up in academically and legally acceptable language, that courts
ought to take seriously, applying them consistently until they
collide with other principles?378Such a query has its own tradition. I n 1882, Jevons wrote in the context of legislation: "It is
futile to attempt to uphold in regard to social legislation any
theory of eternal fixed principles or abstract right^."^" Yet, a

HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); see also Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 I m . L.J. 1 (1971).
375. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
,
1870-1960, supra note 44, at 170; Jan G.
376. See H o R ~ TRANSFORMATION
Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between
Law and Political Science, 20 STAN.L. REV. 169 (1968); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion and
Surrogacy), 92 COLUM.L. REV. 1 (1992).
377. Such doubts have a tradition: "Radical neo-realism seems to deny that
there are rules or principles or conceptions or doctrines at all." Roscoe Pound, The
Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV.697, 707 (1931). Although some
thought he overreacted, Pound's complaint had substance:
Some Progressive critics (who came to include the 'Legal Realists' of the
1920's and 30's) delighted not only in showing the class bias of Liberal legalism~,but in exploding its aspirations to technical coherence: The famous 'principles' were exposed as empty formulae that could lead by
logical manipulation, to totally contradictory results.
CONSTITUTIONAL
PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF
DECISIONMAKING:
CASESAND MATERIALS
362 (3d ed. 1992). fiofessor Brest nevertheless has proposed a different set of principles as essential parts of the judicial
function: 4W)here the very authority of the judiciary is based on its ability to
expound and apply general principles, it cannot a d on such an ad hoc basis [as a
school board]." Paul Brest, Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1, 47 (1976); see also Ronald
Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 381 (1992) (arguing that the distinction between enumerated and
unenumerated rights is "bogus"). Morton Horwitz noted that the search for "underlying universal principles" is a relatively new one, "virtually unknown" to the
common law for over the previous 500 years. HORWITZ,TRANSFORMATION 18701960, supra note 44, at 201.
378. "The truth is, that the law is always approaching, and never reaching,
consistency. It is forever adopting new principles from life at one end, and it always retains old ones from history at the other . . . ." HOLMES,supm note 371, at
32.
379. W. STANELYJEVONS,THE STATE w RELATIONTO LABOUR 16 (3d ed.

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION
powerful tradition exists that perceives the Court as principled.
Alexander Bickel characterized the Court a s a n institution
dedicated to principle.380 Justice Powell wrote: "Congress is
not a n adjudicatory body called upon to resolve specific disputes between competing adversaries. Its constitutional role is
to be representative rather than impartial, to make policy rather than to apply settled principles of law."381
The word "principle" loses some of its import because it
often is used simply as another word for "doctrine." Even
Langdell did not make a clear distinction: "Law, considered as
a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines."382 The
Supreme Court has often equated "principle" with modifiable
doctrine.383
How can public opinion coexist with legal principles inside
constitutional doctrine? The short answer may be that some
fundamental rights are more fundamental than others. The
Court has always created an hierarchy of rights, determining
which interests are "f~ndamental."~"There is, and ought to
be, a small set of "core" fundamental rights that the Court
should isolate from public opinion, particularly majori-

1894), quoted in DICEY,supra note 43, a t 446. Dicey extended Jevon's analysis
beyond social legislation to judicial decision-making. More recently, Mark Tushnet
has criticized neutral principles because they are open to substantial manipulation.
MARKTUSHNET,RED,WHITE, AND BLUE:A CRITICALANALYSISOF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 46-47 (1988); see also Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950s, 21 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 561 (1988); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV.L. REV. 781 (1983).
M. BICKEL,THE LEASTDANGEROUS
380. See, e.g., ALEXANDER
BRANCH(1962).
Even Bickel concedes that the word "principle" is ambiguous, partially aspirational.
Id. a t 199-200; see also Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 469 (1981).
381. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 502 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)
(upholding minority set-asides for federal construction contracts). Chief Justice
Warren wrote: "[P]articularly in the Supreme Court, the basic ingredient of decision
is principle, and it should not be compromised and parceled out." EARLWARREN,
THE MEMOIRSOF EARLWARREN
6 (1977); see also H a n y T. Edwards, The Judicial
Function a n d the Elusive Goal of Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 837
(arguing that "result-oriented" decision-making is unprincipled).
382. C.C. LANGDEU,A SELECTIONOF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
vi
(187 1).
383. For a judicial example, see the Supreme Court's claim in Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co. v. United States that i t complied with E.C. Knight's "principle" that
the manufacturing of sugar was not interstate commerce, even though the
Addyston Court held that manufacturing steel pipes was interstate commerce.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 246-48 (1899) (distinguishing United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895)).
384. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
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tynegislative opinion. The Court, for instance, should be particularly anti-majoritarian when formulating First Amendment
rights.385The Court needs to protect both minority viewpoints
and the processes that lead to informed public opinion from
suppression by passionate public opinion, be it in the form of
a n elected official, a n agency, a statutory act, or a n angry mob.
We will, of course, disagree over which rights are "core" rights.
There are, however, a few such "core" rights that most of us believe are non-negotiable: the right to free speech, the right to a
basically equal vote in state elections, and the right not to be
expressly, maliciously discriminated against on the basis of
race, gender, ethnicity, or religion. In those situations, the
Court should prefer formal rules, elevating those "principles"
over politics. Most other issues are murkier, more contextual,
more amenable to compromise. In other words, we can use the
word "principle" so long as we don't take it too seriously.
Constitutional law, like all law, frequently involves the
allocation of inevitable suffering. The Court creates formalistic
doctrine that accepts ongoing injury, whether that injury be
Jerry Falwell's anguish a t seeing his mother's reputation
dragged through the mud,sg6 or black contractors having to
contend against societal racial discrimination after City of
Richmond u. J A . Croson CO.~"When determining which party should bear the burden, the Court must sift among several
modes of argument that do not always favor one side over another: text, history, precedent, tradition, policy, morality, and
structure. Public opinion simply is another variable. Sometimes
the Court should consider public opinion to be irrelevant or
even threatening; but, at other times, the Court ought to tailor
its decisions to the country's prevailing mood.
The task will not be easy. There are institutional and
methodological difficulties i n determining any form of public
opinion. Justices do not face the electorate or have frequent

385. Skepticism can coexist with a hierarchy of principles: "To have doubted
one's own first principles is the mark of a civilized man." Oliver W. Holmes, Ideals
and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REV.1, 3 (1915). The trick is not to confuse operating principles that one pretends are absolute with the notion of immutable absolutes. See,
e.g., GORE VIDAL,Novelists and Critics of the 19#s, in UNITEDSTATES:
ESSAYS
1952-1992, at 12-13 (1993) (discussing the lack of absolutes in literary criticism). In
other words relativism and existentialism need not lead to nihilism.
386. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (First Amendment protects offensive parody of public figure).
387. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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contacts with lobbyists. Polls are unreliable and fickle, while
intuitive assessments of public opinion often are little more
than projections of the Justice's personal beliefs. One of the
Court's more awkward moments arose when it seemed to resolve a sex discrimination case on the assumed passage of the
Equal Rights Amendment.388Assuming the Court will consider public opinion in a particular case, the Court next has the
difficult task of choosing between the many forms of public
opinion.389Even if the Court can determine when and what
public opinion is relevant, it then must decide how much
weight that particular kind of public opinion should receive.
For instance, Justice Souter's approach forces him to determine
when a watershed decision has been accepted, merely disputed,
or so rejected by such a substantial majority that it should be
overruled.
Because all of us have different rankings of constitutional
norms, the best way for me to demonstrate the influence of
public opinion on constitutional analysis is to discuss several
cases in which the courts made "unprincipled" compromises
that I initially disagreed with. The tests of time and public
opinion however, have given those decisions more ~alidity.~"
Affirmative action recently has been one of the country's
more divisive issues. Both factions have powerN arguments.
Opponents favor the "color blind" Constitution over proponents'

388. "Congress itself has concluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of Government is not
without significance to the question presently under consideration." Frontier0 v.
Richardson, 411 US. 677, 687-88 (1973) (plurality opinion) (army must provide
same benefits to men and women).
389. This Article demonstrates that many definitions of public opinion have
permeated constitutional theory and doctrine. Theorists and judges have used Zeitgeist, reputation, honor, approbation, elite public opinion, public opinion of the
masses, reasoned public opinion, passionate public opinion, mob, views of partisans,
perspective of the body politic, enlightened, lawyers, reflective and informed reactions, judgment of history, world opinion, views of the Framers, views of the populace a t the time of any constitutional ratification, prevailing views, statutory law,
tradition, a threat to liberty, and a guarantor of liberty.
390. I have long believed that the Supreme Court should interpret the Constitution to do more for the poor. See James Wilson, Reconstructing Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment to Assist Impoverished Children, 38 CLEV.ST. L. REV.
391 (1990). However, no powerhl faction is clamoring for such a jurisprudence.
Public domestic discourse presently swirls around race and sex more than class.
Perhaps the Court is wise in leaving to the elected branches the resolution of the
systematic abuse and neglect of poor young children during the late twentieth
century. But such wisdom is paltry, providing no honor either to the Court or to
the people i t serves.
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pleas for equal opportunity and just compensation for past
injustices.391 Many people criticized Justice Powell's controlling, solo opinion in Bakke392 for prohibiting racial quotas
while holding that universities could consider race as a factor
to achieve "diversity." I n his concurrence, Justice Breman
chided Justice Powell for allowing universities to reach the
same end of more minorities in the classroom under the rubric
of "diversity" instead of "social discrimination," but only
through less candid means of factors instead of quotas. I n the
1990s, Justice Scalia has sought to eliminate all affirmative
action except "where . . . [it] is necessary [for the states] to
eliminate their own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial
classifi~ation."~~~
As a matter of principle, both Justice
Brennan and Justice Scalia offer more coherent doctrine. Either the Court should find virtually all affirmative action plans
to be unconstitutional, or it should generally defer to the
majoritarian process.
What is the practical difference between a quota and maki n g race a factor? J u s t i c e Powell seems to h a v e
constitutionalized hypocrisy in Bakke. Yet, Justice Powell's
opinion has withstood the test of time, within the Court and in
the court of public opinion. Both political sides currently use
Justice Powell's rhetoric. Affirmative action critics attack "quotas," while advocates praise "diversity." Justice Powell's awkward compromise better reflects the country's ambivalence
about the issue than Justices Breman's and Scalia's purer
conceptions of constitutional rights. Affirmative action was
bound to strain the country's political and social fabric. Justice
Powell's compromise has allowed a diluted form of affirmative
action to exist for almost twenty years, providing many educational opportunities for minorities without alienating the rest
of America from the Court. Critical Legal scholars like Roberto
Unger might see Justice Powell's decision as proof of antimonies that reduce liberalism to incoherence and contradict i ~ n . ~ I" see his opinion as a prime example of liberalism's
capacity to compromise.

391. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind,"44 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1991).
392. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.265 (1978).
393. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 US. 469, 524 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment).
394. See, e.g., ROBERTO
M. UNGER,
KNOWLEDGEAM) POLITICS (1975).
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In Milliken v. Bradley, the Court refused t o extend busing
from the inner cities into the suburbs.395Milliken undercut
Brown v. Board of Education's commitments to equal opportunity, equal education, and reduction of psychological injury to
black children.3g6The constitutional text does not distinguish,
as the Court did, between states and local governments formed
by the states. As a matter of policy, inner-city busing increased
middle-class flight.397Doctrinally, the Court easily could have
extended desegregation into the suburbs. The Court previously
had found that violations within a school district tainted the
entire district,SgSbut it refused in Milliken t o find that similar violations could cross municipal boundaries within the same
urban community.
The conservatives' claim in Milliken that the State was not
responsible for city boundaries is inaccurate because municipalities are creatures of the state. The conservatives themselves
quickly jettisoned that argument when it no longer suited
them. In Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, Justice
Powell, who was part of the Milliken majority, wrote, "The
Constitution does not dictate to the States a particular division
of authority. . . between state and local governing bodies."399
In other words, the state has ultimate responsibility for all
education decisions. It would seem that proof of intentional
discrimination in one part of the state's system, Detroit, should
spill over to the rest of the state's system, the suburbs, just as
proof of segregation in part of a school district polluted the
entire district in Keyes. More realistically, it is commonly believed that many people fled to the suburbs t o isolate themselves from blacks and the poor. The legal fictions of "intent"
and local boundaries prevailed over the inner-city
schoolchildren's need for a quality, equal education, cleansed of
state-facilitated racism. The Court completed its defense of the
suburbs by protecting them from racial housing integration in
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop ment C ~ r p . ~and
" from equal school subsidies in San Antonio
395. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
396. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954); see Sonia R.
Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALEL.J. 1285 (1992).
LUKAS,COMMON
397. See generally J. ANTHONY
GROUND
(1985).
398. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
399. 458 U.S. 457, 492-93 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). The liberals, of
course, also flip-flopped. The state-local distinction was irrelevant in Milliken but
became crucial in Washington.
400. 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (holding that respondents failed to show racially dis-
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Independent School District u. R o d r i g u e ~ . ~Overall,
~'
the conservatives reflected the powerful suburban wish to be isolated
from the anguish of the inner city.
In terms of precedent, immediate policy, morality, principle, and even text;O2 I believe the Court grossly erred in cases like Milliken. On the other hand, the best justification for
Milliken is the mood of the predominantly white suburbs,
which expressed their views a t the time of Milliken by electing
Richard Nixon to the Presidency. If the Court had tried to
integrate the suburbs by itself, a powerful part of the citizenry
would have become enraged. At the very least, many suburbanites would have pulled their children out of the suburban public schools, undercutting the goals and benefits of racial and
economic integration. Legislatures would engage i n a variety of
subterfuges, entangling the federal courts in ugly, perpetual
conflicts.403We want constitutional law to reflect and sappeal
to our better sides, but the Court is also committed to maintain
social stability and harmony. It must balance moral aspirations
against societal constraints. It must practice realpolitik, trying
to determine how particular groups will react to its decisions.
Political reality, a major policy variable, may justify an otherwise unjustifiable decision.404
Although I express these depressing arguments reluctantly, there is a slight glimmer of hope within them. Perhaps one
day the country will be more willing to share its pains and
benefits, giving the Court the leeway to mandate a more egalitarian, racially just, educational system that provides equal
opportunity to all. The Court could start with more equal funding, not more disruptive, counterproductive busing. Recent
state court efforts to require equal funding for all public schools
may provide some answers. However, based upon the 1993

criminatory intent in challenged rezoning decision).
401. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Milliken might have been less damaging if the Court
had decided Rodriguez the other way. The dual system Rodriguez tolerated has
been fiercely criticized. See JONATHANKOZOL,SAVAGEINEQUALITIES
214-19 (1991).
402. As has been written many other places, the text of "equal protection" is
open to many meanings. For example, Ronald Dworkin distinguished between the
Framers' particular conception of a text and the text's broader "concept." RONALD
DWORKIN,
TAKINGRIGHTSSERIOUSLY
134-37 (1977).
403. For a recent example of adverse public reaction, see Sam H. Verhovek,
Texans Reject Sharing School Wealth, N.Y.TIMES,May 3, 1993, a t A12.
404. This Article provides a way to distinguish and limit opinions like
Milliken, a way to overcome them as precedent, while also giving them more
short-term legitimacy.
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Texas vote not to equalize school funding, there is little reason
for short-term optimism.405
Public opinion analysis reminds us of the intimate relationship between rights and remedies. The Court may be unwilling,
or unable, to fully protect a "right" because any meaningful
remedy would be ineffective, even counterproductive. The right,
abstractly expressed, might not seem too controversial until the
Court considers the range of viable remedies. Few will argue i n
the abstract against "equal educational opportunity." But,
equalizing public school payments could lead to more rich and
middle-class flight out of the entire public school system, thereby increasing electoral opposition to increased funding of any
public schools. Like it or not, the Court has sacrificed Brown's
broadest aspirations of equal, non-injurious education for
African-Americans to the suburban public opinion. Only the
"core" right of not being forced by the state to attend racially
segregated public schools remains untouched.
While it is easy to criticize such opinions, liberals should
be aware of the political costs of constitutionalizing their entire
political agenda. Conservatives can develop a broader political
coalition, combining social/religious conservatives, who are
particularly irked by decisions like Roe u. wade406 and those
banning prayers in schools~'' with libertarians and free marketeers, who know their social rights will not be affected so
long as the Court does not become too conservative or deferential. Although there seems little doubt that the American economy was the determinative factorF8 William Jefferson
Clinton might not have become President if the Court had not
decided against homosexuals409 in Bowers u. Hardwick:''
405. See Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch.
Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992) (striking down school financing legislation as
imposing unconstitutional ad valorem tax); see also Allen W. Hubsch, Education
and Self-Government: The Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 18
J.L. & E ~ u c 93
. (1989). But see Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J.1990) (striking down finance provision of state education act for insufficient provision for poorer school districts).
406. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
407. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
408. But see Charles R. Morris, "It's Not the Economy, Stupid," ATLANTIC
MONTHLY,July 1993, a t 49 (arguing that it is unrealistic to expect the President
to have much influence over the economy).
409. See generally Jeffrey Schmalz, Gay Politics Goes Mainstream, N.Y.TIMES,
Oct. 18, 1992 (Magazine), a t 18 (discussing the rising power of the gay electorate).
410. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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threatened abortion rights in Webster v. Reproductive Health
~
Seruicesfl and gagged doctors in Rust u. S u l l i ~ a n ? Many
wealthy homosexuals and corporate feminists prefer the economic policies of the Republicans and the social politics of the
Democrats. In the crucial electoral state of California, homosexuals make up an important part of the voting e l e ~ t o r a t e . ~A' ~
liberal, activist Supreme Court, with a firm majority, allows
such swing voters to have it both ways. In other words, the
Brennan-Marshall constitutional jurisprudence certainly made
political sense to many, including this author. But if those two
Justices had succeeded, they might have created a formidable
conservative coalition that would dominate the country today.
One of the ironies of the modern American system is that one
of the political conservatives' best friends is an activist, liberal

The primary question this Article has sought to answer is
the role of public opinion in constitutional adjudications, theories, and controversies. This Article concludes that Justice
Souter's Casey opinion is somewhat more consistent with American constitutional tradition than the views of Justice Scalia
and Chief Justice Rehnquist, whose interpretive techniques
echo Chief Justice Taney and Justice Sutherland in completely
refusing to consider contemporary public opinion. It should not
be very surprising that the Court has paid so much attention to
public opinion over the years; our democratic system is premised upon popular sovereignty and public participation.
This Article has not offered any easy method, any
three-prong test, to determine which definitions of public opinion should be admitted into constitutional adjudication and
how much weight those definitions should be given. The Article
only argues that public opinion does and should enter the
multi-factored, balancing equation that is also known as constitutional law. I am certainly not recommending that the Court
jettison all precedent and "principle," consulting only Gallup

411. 492 U.S.490 (1989).
412. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
413. See Schmalz, supra note 409.
414. It is possible that there is some deep structure within the Constitution
that tends to drive political issues back to the center, towards a political equilibrium.
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polls. The Court must decide which "core" rights are largely
immunized from public will. Public opinion, however defined,
can lead to deadly outcomes.415
The Supreme Court is caught in a dilemma when engaging
in crowd control.416 If the Court refuses to consider public
opinion, it can quickly generate opinions like Dred Scott,
Lochner and even Roe v. wade?' Even the two Brown decisions, which refused to let racist regional sentiment determine
fundamental constitutional rights, compromised with those
sentiments by implementing desegregation at "all deliberate
speed."418 Many of us do not want anyone to push their principles to logical extremes, ignoring external realities. More generally, it is doubtful that there are any absolute rights or absolute powers.41gYet, if the Court frequently includes elaborate
assessments of the public mood in its opinions, the law becomes
ever more indeterminate, a potentially thin shield against majority tyranny.
Part of the answer to this Polonius-like waffling lies i n
rhetoric. The Court writes opinions in part to convince the rest
of us of the correctness of its decision.420There are many rea415. Gore Vidal recalled "in 1935 when the Nazis solemnly determined that
anything is punishable if it was deserving of punishment according 'to the hndamental conceptions of penal law and sound popular feeling.' " Gore Vidal, Sex and
the Law, in UNITEDSTATES:ESSAYS1952-1992, at 530 (1993). Vidal also recounts
"In response to public opinion, the Emperor Justinian made homosexuality a criminal offense of the grounds that buggery, as everyone knew, was the chief cause of
earthquakes." Id. at 531. This leads him to conclude: "At any given moment, public
opinion is a chaos of superstition, mis-information, and prejudice. Even if one could
accurately interpret it, would that be a reason for basing the law upon a consensus?" Id. at 536.
416. For those of us who work in offices and work with words, preferring
briefs to bombs, "public opinion" is frequently a polite metaphor for the mob: never
completely knowable, always unpredictable, and potentially dangerous. "Public opinion" is the Other, the crowd that we lawyers try to control.
417. One of the risks of the plastic doctrine of substantive due process, whether practiced by the Lochner Court or the Roe Court, is that the Court can be
tempted by early successes to miscalculate. For example, public acceptance of
Griswold's protection of contraception among married couples led the Court to
believe the Country was also indifferent about abortion. The subsequent fury over
Roe may help explain why the Court was later unwilling to protect homosexuals in
Bowers.
418. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S.294, 301 (1955) (Brown IT).
419. T o r one thing, no principles of law, or of anything else, can be guaranteed good past the next revolution." GRANTGILMORE,
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT68
(1974).
420. "On every case which lawfully invokes the action of these powers, this
Court, I trust, will not hesitate to exert it, that it will, by so doing, 'plant' itself in
public opinion and confidence, on an 'impregnable position.' " Holmes v. Jennison,
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sons why a Justice will reach a particular decision, but some
are not rhetorically acceptable. Justice Blackmun may have
reached his decision in Roe partially because he had been general counsel for the Mayo Clinic. Justice Scalia's hostility to
Roe may reflect his Catholicism. Justice Kennedy allegedly
changed his mind in Casey because of letters from a pro-choice
nun.421The Justices need not always put such "reasons" into
opinions.422The Court has a duty to tell the truth about the
reasons it chooses, but it need not tell the whole truth.423The
Court must present arguments that the public will accept,
reasons that almost certainly will change over the decades.
Justice Souter's remarkable degree of candor should be seen as
an exception to the rules of constitutional dscourse.
Ironically, the American people seem to prefer a Court that
does not expressly ground its opinions on public opinion, a t
least most of the time. The public wants its Constitution and
Court to be both predictable and largely immune from momentary public passions. However, the public expects its Constitution to respond to hndamental shifts in cultural consciousness.
Consequently, the Court needs to be aware of the public mood
but should not try to calibrate its opinions too finely. The Court
takes a longer-term view of the political process, sometimes
forcing the majority to develop a supermajority through the
amendment process to overrule judicial decision or at least to
develop a political coalition that can eventually transform the
Court through presidential appointments. The additional time
and energy needed to accomplish such goals may generate
enough reflection to prevent the creation of odious constitutional text or doctrine.422
Whether American lawyers like it or not, we live in a culture that is saturated by many forms of public opinion.425The

39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 632-33 (1840) (Baldwin, J., concurring) (appendix 11).
421. David G. Savage, The Court's Rescue of Roe vs. Wade, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
13, 1992, a t Al, A22.
422. It is both hard and undesirable to weed all doctrinal formalism out of
adjudication. See Wilson, supra note 306.
constitutional
423. But see David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 731 (1987).
424. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 635 (1895) (invalidating federal tax on real and personal property as unconstitutional unapportioned direct tax).
425. The role of public opinion helps answer Professor Bobbit's argument that
constitutional judging can be reduced to judicial "conscience," PHnIP BOBBIT,CON~I'I'~JTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
(1991), and Professor Tushnet's emphasis on charac-
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public will eventually repudiate or constrain unpopular judicial
developments. Examples range from Lochner's substantive due
process, to Justices Brennan's and Marshall's attempts to
constitutionalize liberal social policy, to anger by doctors, feminists, and libertarians over the Rehnquist Court's unwillingness t o protect abortion rights by permitting the federal government to "gag" abortion speech in federally funded clinics in
Rust v. Sullivan.426
Denial is not the answer. Better to admit that constitutional adjudication is a difficult process that involves both compromise and guesswork. The Court needs t o decide which issues, if
any, should be influenced by public opinion. It then needs to
define which "public opinion" it is considering, to determine
what that public believes, to establish the weight to be given
such opinion, and to conclude whether it should expressly discuss public opinion at all. Adding these questions t o all the
other factors the Court must consider demonstrates the complex process that lies behind the phrase "constitutional interpretation."
All of which brings us full circle to Justice Souter's Casey
opinion. Using a balancing approach, the "undue burden" test,
he closely analyzed Pennsylvania's statutory constraints on
abortion rights, upholding an informed consent provision427
but striking down a spousal notification ~ection.~''Such compromises will not satisfy those who believe that a woman's
autonomy or bodily integrity generates an absolute right to
abortion.429Abortion opponents will be even more distraught

ter, Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character, and Experience, 72 B.U.
L. REV. 747 (1992). Admittedly, character and conscience are very important: "The
ultimate reliance for the fair operation of any standard is a judiciary of high competence and character and the constant play of an informed professional critique
upon its work." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951). But
public opinion constrains the choice of judicial arguments and judicial outcomes.
Judges who stray face reversals if they sit on lower courts, derision on and off the
bench, declining influence over hture cases caused by lack of respect and cooperation, and even impeachment in extreme situations.
426. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). One of President Clinton's first decisions was to
eliminate the regulation establishing the gag rule. Robin Toner, Clinton Orders
Jan. 23,
Reversal of Abortion Restrictions Left by Reagan and Bush, N.Y.TIMES,
1993, 5 1, at 1.
427. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2824-26. The joint opinion also upheld a record-keeping requirement. Id. at 2832-33.
428. Id. at 2826-31.
429. Casey states: "Even the broadest reading of Roe, however, has not suggested that there is a constitutional right to abortion on demand." Id. at 2826.
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because the states must permit most abortions. Legal purists
can condemn the decision for being "unprincipled," arguing that
either the woman has the right or the state has the power. But
just as Justice Powell forged a doctrine that satisfied, a t least
for a while, much of the country in Bakke, so Justice Souter
may have created a solution that will defuse the abortion controversy. If so, his opinion will have been, a t least for some of
us7 a triumph.

